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Abstract 
 
Moral disagreement is not only a philosophically interesting matter in its own right, but is 
also a highly important social and political issue. Historically, moral disagreement has often 
led to instability, conflict and persecution. It’s easy enough to see how a society of individuals 
with a consensus on important moral issues can forge a common life together, but it is more 
difficult to determine how cooperation is to be attained whilst disagreement on key matters 
persists. If we are to understand how best to face up to moral disagreement, it is vital that we 
get to grips with what exactly we are dealing with, and what options are feasible.  
In this thesis, I articulate a particular conception of what moral disagreement involves, its 
extent, and what its root psychological causes are. I further demonstrate that this conception 
has important implications for a contemporary debate within liberal political theory. In so 
doing, I advocate a descriptive form of value pluralism, whereby individuals are typically 
committed to a range of distinct values which they implicitly take to have independent 
normative force. I suggest that individuals both across and within cultural groups weight such 
values differently, leading to fundamental moral disagreement.  
This is explained by my proposed Two-stage Enculturated Affect (TEA) model of moral 
psychology, whereby values are cultural constructs which gain their perceived normative 
force through their relation to an agent’s affective dispositions. Such affective dispositions 
are the product of both shared and non-shared environmental influences, as well as our 
particular genetic endowment. They thus differ between individuals, leading to differences in 
value-weighting.  
My account implies that moral disagreement is both inevitable and often a consequence of 
affective variation, rather than any defect in either disputant’s reasoning. This may present a 
problem for accounts of liberalism which rely on a consent-based account of political 
legitimacy. In the final part of my thesis, I show that my TEA model’s account of moral 
disagreement can be drawn upon to help reinforce a modified version of John Rawls’s 
political liberalism. 
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Introduction 
 
Some believe that abortion is a form of murder whilst others hold that it is no worse than 
removing a tumour. Some regard capital punishment as barbaric and unjustifiable whereas 
some take it to be the only just means to punish certain offenders. Some denounce a range 
of sexual practices as unnatural and perverted, while some claim that nothing that goes on in 
the bedroom between freely consenting adults can possibly be wrong. Moral disagreement 
permeates our own society, and is even more extensive when we factor in disagreements 
between those inhabiting different societies.  
We take our moral principles seriously, and although we may reflect on whether or not they 
apply in particular situations, we rarely doubt that they are fundamentally correct. Thus, when 
we encounter those who profess different moral views which are incompatible with our own, 
we find it a troubling experience. We may try to reason with our disputants to bring them 
around to our way of thinking, whilst they do the same with us. Considerations which the 
other has overlooked may be brought to bear, and in some cases this will prove effective in 
changing their mind. However all too often it will lead to a deadlock, typically leaving both 
parties frustrated yet stalwart in their conviction that their opponent has made a mistake of 
some kind or other. What are we to make of these situations? How do we explain them from 
both a conceptual and psychological point of view, and how might we live together in light 
of them? Answering these questions is the business of this thesis.  
In the first part of the thesis, I begin by discussing the phenomenology of moral conflict, and 
how this underpins an interpretation of moral disagreement as arising from differences in 
how individuals weight distinct values. Next, I take an empirically informed approach in order 
to advance our understanding of the scope, extent and psychological causes of such moral 
disagreement. In the last part, I demonstrate how my conclusions can inform a contemporary 
debate within political philosophy.  My thesis is divided into six chapters, each of which I will 
put into context and briefly outline below. 
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Chapter 1 - Moral Conflict and Descriptive Value Pluralism 
In Chapter 1, I discuss the phenomenology of moral conflict and argue that it implies a form 
of descriptive value pluralism. Value pluralism is usually adopted as a metaethical or 
normative thesis concerning the ontological multiplicity of moral values. I argue for the 
different but related claim that, purely as a matter of descriptive psychology, people are in 
fact committed to a range of values, each bearing distinct normative force.  
Moral conflict is an intrapersonal phenomenon, which occurs when agents find themselves 
in a situation where they feel that there are good moral reasons for acting in two (or more) 
incompatible ways. This is usually understood in terms of individuals feeling there to be 
conflicting moral duties, obligations or values at stake. A moral dilemma, on the other hand, 
is an instance of moral conflict where one takes there to be no candidate for a right action; 
all potential actions are taken to be morally impermissible. Many cases of moral conflict will 
not constitute full blown moral dilemmas. In most instances, the agent might feel conflicted 
but can nonetheless judge one course of action to be best, all things considered.  
Recognition that situations can exist in which an agent faces conflicting moral considerations 
predates recorded ethical philosophy itself, as evidenced from examples in Homeric legends. 
Such examples of situations of moral conflict also feature in the works of the major Ancient 
Greek philosophers. In The Republic, Plato has Socrates invoke an example wherein one has 
borrowed a weapon from a friend, who subsequently develops murderous insanity and asks 
you to return his weapon.1  This example represents a conflict between promise keeping and 
preventing murder. Aristotle, whilst discussing voluntariness, discusses the case of a man 
whose family is in the power of a tyrant and is forced to perform base acts in order to ensure 
their safety.  More recently W.D Ross, Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams cite the existence 
of moral conflicts in their arguments for normative value pluralism.  
Chapter 1 will take a slightly different tack to these latter thinkers, and argue in favour of 
descriptive rather than normative value pluralism. I will argue that individuals are indeed prone 
to experience a disquieting sense of moral loss after having resolved moral conflicts when 
distinct considerations are at stake. This, I suggest, is most especially so when agents are faced 
with genuine moral dilemmas. However, even when they are satisfied that there is an all-
things-considered morally right resolution to a moral conflict, they still undergo a disquieting 
phenomenology, which Steven De Wijze, dubs ‘tragic remorse’. I argue this indicates that 
                                                          
1 Plato, The Republic, 331d 
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individuals implicitly take a range of considerations to be of distinct moral value, yet that they 
also typically manage to commensurate values in a particularist manner to deliver an all-
things-considered best judgement. In order to resolve moral conflicts, then, individuals assign 
distinct considerations different levels of overall normative weight, in a context sensitive 
manner.  
I emphasise that this is merely a psychological and descriptive rather than a normative or 
metaethical claim, and thus doesn’t necessarily prove normative or ontological value 
pluralism. The main import of this chapter is the model of moral judgement which it entails. 
For the truth of descriptive value pluralism implies that one way in which individuals may 
morally disagree is through differing in the amount of normative weight that they assign to 
distinct values. This would lead individuals to commensurate values differently, and thus 
come to different resolutions to moral conflicts. Such an interpretation of moral 
disagreement will inform my following chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 - Intercultural Fundamental Moral Disagreement 
Chapter 1 left open the question of whether individuals do in fact weight and commensurate 
values differently from each other or not, which requires an empirical outlook for its answer. 
In Chapter 2 I move on to discuss intercultural moral disagreement, and survey evidence that 
it does indeed result from differences in value weighting. 
Most of the discussion surrounding moral disagreement in the philosophical literature has 
continued to focus on its implications for metaethics. Specifically, a common anti-realist 
argument is that moral disagreement between individuals and cultures is indicative of there 
being no objective moral truth. Most famously, J.L. Mackie applied the ‘Argument from 
Relativity’ as one of his two main arguments in favour of his moral error theory.2  Mackie’s 
formulation of the argument from relativity has been extremely influential, with many counter 
arguments and reformulations based on the original notion having followed.3  
Chapter 2 avoids discussing the metaethical implications of moral disagreement in favour of 
concentrating on establishing the depth and breadth of the phenomenon itself. I intend to 
                                                          
2 Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin Books (1977) 
3 See, for instance, Tolhurst, W. ‘The Argument from Moral Disagreement’, Ethics, Vol.94. No.3 (1987) 
pp.610-621 and McGrath, S. "Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise” in Shafer-Landau, ed. Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics 3: (2008) pp. 87-107 
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demonstrate that cultural groups typically do recognise a similar range of values, but that 
moral disagreement sometimes stems from them weighting such values differently. In this 
sense, moral disagreement between cultural groups is sometimes fundamental. Fundamental 
moral disagreement involves two agents who are situated in the same context, possess the 
same non-moral understanding and are both free of errors of inferential reasoning, yet come 
to different judgements concerning what is the morally best course of action, all-things-
considered.4  
I aim to substantiate the existence of fundamental moral disagreement between distinct 
cultural groups, whilst also maintaining that such disagreement occurs between groups which 
tend to recognise a broadly similar range of values. First I draw on various anthropological 
examples to illustrate the kinds of moral disagreement – and moral similarities- that we often 
discern between cultural groups. I then discuss various ‘defusing explanations’ of such 
disagreement, which attribute it to factors such as non-moral disagreement, and thus interpret 
it as only apparent rather than fundamental. I cite various studies which purport to show the 
existence of fundamental moral disagreement, such as those by Richard Brant, Richard 
Nisbett and Kaiping Peng, drawing on a recent paper by Alexandra Plakias and John Doris. 
I then argue against those such as Michele Moody-Adams that more sophisticated 
formulations of defusing explanations can account for the moral disagreement that these 
studies reveal. 
 
Chapter 3 - Intracultural Fundamental Moral Disagreement 
To many readers, I expect it will come as no surprise that some moral disagreement between 
cultural groups can be established as being fundamental. However, in Chapter 3, I argue for 
a less familiar and more radical claim: that moral disagreement is also sometimes fundamental 
within cultural groups. I thus take the position that fundamental moral disagreement is more 
pervasive than others have suggested. 
Discerning whether such disagreement can also be conceived of as fundamental or not is an 
area of research which has been relatively overlooked, yet is key to determining the ultimate 
                                                          
4 Moral disagreement of this sort is not necessarily intractable. Two agents who are initially in 
fundamental moral disagreement might come to weight moral values differently over the course of their 
life and eventually come to an agreement. However, the relevant point is that this agreement cannot be 
reached merely by ensuring that both agents share the same context, non-moral understanding and are 
free of inferential errors in reasoning. It can only be reached if one or both parties revise their 
fundamental commitments regarding the relative importance of distinct values.  
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nature and cause of moral disagreement. Here I acknowledge that fundamental moral 
disagreement is less extensive within cultural groups, especially those which are narrowly 
defined. But, there are good reasons to believe that it does emerge within the context of such 
groups, and that its true extent is masked by other factors.  
I will scrutinise the sort of everyday moral disagreement within broadly defined, national 
cultural groups, such as those disagreements concerning the moral status of abortion and 
capital punishment. I argue that the previously discussed defusing explanations, such as non-
moral disagreement, may apply in some such cases. Nonetheless we have good reason to 
suspect that they do not in all, and are sometimes best explained in terms of differences in 
value-weighting.  Next, I move onto examine moral disagreement within more narrowly 
defined cultural groups. I concede that such disagreement is less well documented than within 
broader groups, and that it is indeed less extensive. Nonetheless, there are other factors which 
might explain this relative moral homogeneity other than there actually being a moral 
consensus within such groups. Moreover, there is ample anecdotal experience of 
disagreement with those who share a similar background to ourselves, and moral 
disagreement found amongst ethical theorists within philosophy represents a particularly 
good candidate for being fundamental. Finally, I point to the results of moral judgement 
surveys to provide further proof of intracultural fundamental moral disagreement. 
 
Chapter 4 - The TEA Model of Moral Psychology 
The first three chapters aim to motivate descriptive value pluralism and the claim that 
individuals both between and, to a lesser extent, within cultural groups differ in value 
weighting. However, this does not explain why fundamental moral disagreement occurs. 
Without an understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying moral disagreement, 
we are still at a loss as to the full extent of differences in value weighting, how it comes to be 
and whether it can ever be eliminated. The answers to these questions are not only of interest 
in their own right, but will also determine the precise influence that moral disagreement 
should have on our normative theory and practice. Chapter 4 focuses, then, on developing 
my own empirically grounded account of moral psychology - the Two-stage Enculturated 
Affect (TEA) model.  
For much of the history of 20th century, empirically informed psychology has had little 
influence on moral philosophy. This state of affairs has recently changed, and now both 
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philosophers and psychologists are engaging in interdisciplinary experimental research which 
aims to shed light on many aspects of moral judgement. The earliest prominent example of 
experimental psychology applied to moral judgement can be found in the works of Lawrence 
Kohlberg. His work emphasised the importance of the development of explicit, conscious 
reasoning capacities in shaping the moral judgement of individuals. More recently, 
advancements in moral psychology have highlighted the extent to which much of our moral 
judgement is a product of automatic, affective processes as opposed to deliberative reason.  
Chapter 4 advances a psychological account of the bases of moral judgement which is in line 
with this contemporary focus on affective primacy in moral judgement. I draw from both 
Shaun Nichols’ and Jonathan Haidt’s accounts of moral psychology, but ultimately conclude 
that each is incomplete when considered in isolation. Thus, insights from both must be 
combined into a single model. I thereby propose my own TEA model of moral psychology, 
which combines the fundamental insights from each account and offers a more complete 
picture of moral psychology. This holds that our affective dispositions are to some extent 
innate and the product of evolutionary process, and these help shape our moral values, but 
that these dispositions themselves are somewhat malleable in the face of cultural influences. 
Moreover, the extent to which a particular moral value is cherished within a particular cultural 
group helps determine the extent to which a particular norm will originate, survive the 
process of cultural evolution, and further be treated as morally salient by those within the 
cultural group. 
 
Chapter 5 – Explaining Moral Conflict and Disagreement 
Chapter 5 argues that my proposed TEA model of moral psychology best explains the 
conclusions of chapters 1, 2 and 3, when compared with competing accounts. Whilst chapter 
4 makes the case for the TEA model being well supported by empirical evidence, it does not 
consider alternative accounts of moral psychology. The argument in its favour is not 
conclusive until such competitors are considered. Moreover, chapter 4 has little to say 
concerning moral disagreement, per se, and more is needed in order to demonstrate the 
relevance of the TEA model for the purpose of my thesis. Chapter 5 aims to demonstrate 
the plausibility of the TEA when compared to competing accounts by demonstrating that it 
is not only better supported by the available empirical evidence, but has more explanatory 
resources at hand to account for the phenomenology of moral conflict and moral 
disagreement. This will not only buttress the case for my proposed TEA model of moral 
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psychology, but provides an explanation of the root psychological cause of moral 
disagreement.  
I begin by articulating the two competing accounts of moral psychology which I will consider: 
Jesse Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism and John Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar. The 
former agrees with the TEA model that our emotional dispositions are responsible for moral 
judgement, but holds that they are almost infinitely malleable in the face of cultural influences. 
The latter, meanwhile, maintains that moral judgement is a product of an innate, dedicated 
faculty of moral reasoning.  
I further point out various reasons for preferring my TEA model to either model, 
independent of their explanations of moral disagreement. Next, I demonstrate that the TEA 
model can better explain the phenomenology of moral conflict and tragic remorse than 
Universal Moral Grammar. I show that the TEA model can also neatly explain the pattern of 
intercultural moral disagreement, whereas Universal Moral Grammar struggles to explain 
variation in moral values and Emotional Constructivism finds it more difficult to 
accommodate intercultural moral similarities. Finally, I illustrate how the TEA model explains 
intracultural moral disagreement to a more satisfactory degree than either Universal Moral 
Grammar or Emotional Constructivism. 
 
Chapter 6 – Implications for Political Liberalism  
Having developed a descriptive account of moral deliberation, moral disagreement and the 
psychological mechanisms which underpin them, we are now equipped to address the 
question of what implications this has for normative practice. The answer to this depends 
upon the extent to which one takes descriptive moral psychology to properly bear upon 
matters of ‘ought’ – some might argue that the very fact that we can explain and understand 
the source of fundamental moral disagreement is normatively irrelevant. Nonetheless, when 
we are considering how we should live together whilst respecting the diverse judgements of 
individuals, then our particular conceptualisation of moral disagreement becomes salient. In 
chapter 6 I will thereby demonstrate how the TEA model of moral psychology and its 
accompanying account of moral disagreement can inform political philosophy. I will 
concentrate on the implications my account has for liberalism, being both the dominant 
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strand of contemporary Western political theory and one for which moral disagreement is 
particularly salient.5 I briefly clarify why this is the case below.  
What unites the various articulations of liberalism is a fundamental concern for protecting 
the individual freedom of citizens, combined with the recognition of the necessity of 
endowing a central political authority with coercive power. In doing so, all forms of liberalism 
must offer a means by which individual freedom can remain unthreatened by the prospect of 
state coercion. The vast majority of contemporary liberal theorists do so by drawing on the 
consent-based notion of legitimacy from the social contract tradition.6 The basic idea is that 
laws are legitimate, binding and do not violate freedom just so long as all those subject to 
them can be taken to have consented to them in some form. Liberal theorists typically 
recognise that attaining the actual consent of all citizens for any law is impossible, and so too 
stringent a requirement for legitimacy. Instead they suggest that it is enough that citizens can 
be said to hypothetically consent to the laws which govern their society.7 That is, coercive power 
is legitimate if agents would consent to the political authority under certain idealising 
conditions, such as being fully informed, consistent and instrumentally rational.  
Insofar as most contemporary accounts of liberalism are grounded by this kind of account 
of legitimacy, the problem posed by the prospect of inevitable fundamental moral 
disagreement is clear. Not only does it imply that no political authority will ever become an 
object of actual consensus amongst citizens, but it also suggests that none could even 
hypothetically enjoy universal endorsement. For the principles which justify any political 
system are ultimately based on a conception of the relative weight of values. Thus, 
fundamental disagreement concerning the proper weightings of value implies that for any 
and each proposed political system, some individuals will reject it as incongruent with their 
value system. Since this disagreement is fundamental rather than merely apparent, liberal 
theorists cannot sidestep the issue by insisting that all would ultimately consent to a particular 
authority under certain hypothetical conditions. For even if we make idealising assumptions 
which abstract away citizen’s constraints on knowledge, rationality and consistency, we can 
                                                          
5 Of course, the psychological claims I have made thus far also have implications for other forms of 
political theory, but cashing these out would be beyond the scope of this thesis.  
6 This is not to say that all forms of liberalism share these moral foundations. For instance, on one 
plausible reading of Mill’s liberalism, the ultimate justification for privileging liberty is in its instrumental 
role in terms of maximising utility. More recently, Joseph Raz notably avoids grounding legitimacy upon 
consent. (Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1986)). I will not discuss the 
implications of the TEA model of moral disagreement for these accounts of liberalism.  
7 Another way to go is through following the Lockean tradition of grounding legitimacy upon tacit 
consent which, again, I will not discuss here. See Locke, J. Second Treatise of Government, Chapter VIII 
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still expect there to be disagreement about which principles should regulate how society is 
organised.  
In chapter 6 I will assess whether my contention that fundamental moral disagreement is an 
inevitable consequence of our moral psychology undermines liberalism. Ultimately, I argue 
that despite the apparent threat that the TEA model’s account of moral disagreement poses 
for political liberalism, it can actually buttress one important variant. I suggest that the TEA 
model can substantiate John Rawls’ claim that individuals are subject to the ‘burdens of 
judgement’, aspects of human reasoning which make fundamental moral disagreement 
between reasonable people inevitable. Rawls rightly claims that widespread recognition of the 
burdens of judgement amongst reasonable people is crucial if political liberalism is to be 
practically realisable. However, his presentation of them is, I argue, inadequate. Appealing to 
the TEA model thereby helps to ameliorate a severe deficiency in Rawls’s political liberalism. 
I further argue that accepting the implications of the TEA model might also require 
modifying certain other aspects of Rawls’s theory in line with political realism, a form of 
political theory which has long accepted the inevitability of moral disagreement.  
 
10 
 
Chapter 1: Moral Conflict and Descriptive Value 
Pluralism 
 
This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of moral conflict and the implications that this 
has for descriptive accounts of moral thought. I argue that in certain situations individuals 
tend to experience an internal struggle between incompatible reason-giving factors. I suggest 
along with Bernard Williams that acting in such situations of moral conflict will typically leave 
agents with a sense of moral loss. This is indicated by the feeling of what Stephen De Wijze 
calls ‘tragic-remorse’. Utilitarianism and Kantian deontology account for this experience by 
ultimately attributing it to error and confusion, insofar as they are committed to a monist 
account of value.  Value pluralism, meanwhile, provides an account of moral judgement and 
the underlying structure of value that informs it which is more consistent with our experience 
of moral conflict. It therefore serves as a good basis upon which to model moral disagreement 
between individuals in the following chapters of my thesis.  
It is important to reiterate from the outset that I do not aim to advance a direct philosophical 
argument against the normative legitimacy of monist theories of value, such as utilitarianism 
and Kantian deontology, in favour of normative value pluralism. In contrast, I mean only to 
establish value pluralism as the theory of value which provides the best account of our 
underlying moral thought. Whilst I will frame the issue in terms of the challenge that moral 
conflict presents for utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, it is only the descriptive 
component of these theories which I take direct issue with. Such theories typically hold that 
deep down, we take only one consideration, such as happiness, to be genuinely reason-giving. 
I mean to deny this descriptive claim, and vindicate the pluralist view, whereby we are 
commitment to a range of independently reason-giving values which sometimes prove 
incompatible with one another. 
Value pluralism thereby accounts for our disposition to experience multiple, distinct moral 
motivations which may come into conflict, without attributing this experience to error or 
confusion on the part of the agent regarding what they implicitly take to be reason-giving. 
This, I hold, makes it preferable from a psychological descriptive perspective, although it is 
still open for the advocate of a monist theory of value to argue that we should nonetheless 
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only take a single value to be genuinely reason-giving on the normative level. As an aside, I 
do think that such a strategy is problematic, and that my argument could be developed to 
directly threaten normative value monism, but this is not the goal of this chapter. I only mean 
to argue that descriptive value pluralism offers the most accurate depiction of our underlying 
moral thought. This justifies my adoption of the conceptualisation of moral disagreement 
which it implies in later chapters. 
In section 1, I discuss the value monist moral theories of utilitarianism and Kantian 
deontology and why they dismiss the possibility of genuine moral conflict. Section 2 
articulates Williams’s account of the experience of moral remainders in cases of moral 
conflict, and how this poses a threat to such monistic theories of value, at least from a 
descriptive perspective. In section 3 I further elaborate on this phenomenology of moral 
conflict via De Wijze’s concept of tragic remorse. I argue that the particular character of this 
phenomenology suggests that individuals do not take actions in situations of moral conflict 
to necessarily be wrong, but only involving of distinct moral loss. Section 4 will buttress this 
claim, by appealing to the intuitive distinction between what counts as an appropriate decision 
making procedure for conflicts between instantiations of the same moral value and for 
conflicts between distinct values. In section 5 I will turn to value pluralism, as articulated by 
Isaiah Berlin, as an alternative to monist theories of value and argue that adopting a 
descriptive account of pluralism offers us a better means to explain the phenomenology of 
tragic remorse. Section 6 will then discuss one aspect of value pluralism which isn’t coherent 
with our moral phenomenology – that of strong value incommensurability. Finally, section 7 
will suggest a form of pluralism whereby people do commensurate values in a particularist 
manner, and spell out how this paves the way for fundamental moral disagreement.  
 
1. Moral Conflict and Value Monism 
As mentioned in the introduction, there has being recognition of apparent moral dilemmas 
and the internal conflict which they provoke in both the ancient and modern world. However, 
the influential moral theories of utilitarianism and Kantian deontology do not take these 
phenomena to be particularly revealing of the nature of morality. Proponents of these 
theories hold that ethical conduct consists in adherence to a single principle. In the case of 
act utilitarianism, the ultimate moral principle is that one must act in order to maximise 
happiness. Meanwhile, Kantian deontology holds that we must always act according to the 
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categorical imperative; we may only permissibly act “in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."8   
The implication of these systematic, principle-based approaches to moral theory is that moral 
conflicts (and especially moral dilemmas) cannot really exist. For one thing, on the practical 
level, one of the major aims of these moral theories is to offer determinate action-guiding 
solutions in situations where the right course is seemingly unclear. Thus, if it were to turn out 
that there were situations where their principles offered no guidance then they would fail to 
serve their purpose.  However this is supposedly incidental:  proponents of these theories do 
not admit to denying moral conflict out of mere practical convenience. Rather, the 
fundamental reason that Kantian deontology and utilitarianism do not accommodate the 
existence of genuine moral conflict lies in the fact that these theories are underpinned by a 
monist conception of moral value. That is, that they consider all moral rightness to be 
ultimately reducible to a single consideration; for the utilitarian, happiness, for the Kantian, 
the requirement of rationality, as expressed by the categorical imperative.9  
For the sake of practicality, advocates of these theories might well suggest keeping distinct 
moral considerations aside from the ultimate principle in mind. For instance, Kant suggested 
that multiple imperfect as well as perfect duties could be derived from the categorical 
imperative; the latter being duties which we are always morally required to fulfil, the former 
duties which merit praise if fulfilled, but do not merit blame if neglected, at least on some 
occasions. Meanwhile, rule utilitarians hold that maximising happiness in the long term is 
best assured by adhering to a code of conduct including rules such as prohibitions upon lying, 
theft and violence, even in instances where these kinds of action might promote happiness 
in the short term. There are certainly situations in which such derivative rules could conflict 
with one another, such as it being necessary to lie or steal to prevent violence, and thus 
adherents of a monist theory of value might indeed face apparent dilemmas from time to 
time. However, these conflicts between secondary rules can and should in theory be resolved 
through proper application of the ultimate principle. As the prominent utilitarian theorist 
                                                          
8 Kant, Immanuel. trans. Gregor, M Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1998) p. 31  
9 Kant offers several formulations of the categorical imperative, but holds that these are merely different 
expressions of a unitary principle. Some, such as Thomas Hill, have argued that we should nonetheless 
interpret Kant as an ethical pluralist who acknowledges a variety of moral concerns. (Hill, T.E, ‘Kantian 
Pluralism’ Ethics, (1992) pp.743-762) On that matter, it can be claimed that utilitarianism can too be 
pluralistic, insofar as it holds there to be various distinct and incommensurable forms in which happiness 
takes. I will not pursue the possibility of Kantian or utilitarian pluralism, except to note that these 
variations of the theories are not my target in this chapter.   
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J.J.C Smart argues, such considerations represent mere ‘rules of thumb’ which one should be 
willing to discount in favour of realising the primary value in situations of conflict. To adhere 
to a rule even when doing so would clearly fail to maximise utility would to be guilty of 
“surreptitious rule worship”.10   
Thus, for the value monist any moral conflict we encounter (and especially moral dilemmas) 
can only be attributed to error on our part; a failure to properly understand what is ultimately 
required of us. For if there is a single source of moral value from which all other 
considerations derive their moral significance, then in any particular situation there will be 
one course of action which will more fully realise this value than any other. For instance, the 
utilitarian holds that in any particular choice between preventing violence and lying or 
cheating, there is one option which will maximise happiness and this constitutes the right 
action. In many such cases it may be extremely difficult to discern which action this is, given 
the huge range of ways an action might potentially increase or reduce happiness in the long, 
short and medium term. Nonetheless, the utilitarian conceives this as an epistemic problem 
rather than a consequence of a genuine conflict taking place.11 Similarly, Kantianism, with its 
focus on rationality as the ultimate arbiter of moral rightness, suggests that in any apparent 
conflict there can only ever be a single action that is prescribed by the categorical imperative 
as our moral duty. In Kant’s words, “A conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable 
[for] the concepts of duty and obligation as such express the objective practical necessity of 
certain actions, and two conflicting rules cannot both be necessary at the same time: if it is 
our duty to act according to one of these rules, then to act according to the opposite one is 
not our duty and even contrary to duty.”12 
                                                          
10 Smart, J.C.C ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Quarterly, (1956) pp. 344-354  
11 There could conceivably be a situation in which two different actions would both produce exactly the 
same amount of happiness. Yet such a situation would presumably not constitute a dilemma as such, as 
both options would be permissible rather than impermissible. Moreover, these types of situation would 
be extremely rare and would only constitute a tiny proportion of those which people commonly 
interpret as morally problematic, such as the examples mentioned above.  
12 Kant, I. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part 1 of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. John Ladd 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, (1965) pp.24-25. It might yet seem that acting solely in accordance with the 
categorical imperative could still result in situations of moral dilemma. For instance, we might find 
ourselves in a situation where we have no choice but to break one of two promises we have made 
through no fault of our own. Nonetheless, it would seem from this quote that Kant discounts this 
possibility; presumably, in any potential situation, one action would not actually constitute a violation of 
the categorical imperative, despite the fact that it seemingly would do so. Regardless, even if a revised 
Kantianism could accommodate these sorts of dilemmas, this does not undermine my argument; the 
salient point is that it does not recognise situations which most people experience as morally 
problematic as involving genuine moral conflict.  
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Both these moral theories are notorious for their tendency to advise courses of action in 
certain situations which seem counterintuitive and even morally repugnant. Utilitarianism is 
often criticised on the grounds that it implies that one should always be willing to sacrifice 
the well-being of a single individual if it will bring about a larger total sum of happiness for 
the many. Thus, it would seemingly suggest that we are morally required to torture an orphan 
child if it would satisfy the desires of many sadists, assuming that it were possible to assure 
that this act would not become public knowledge or diminish utility in the long term in some 
other manner. In contrast, Kantianism advises agents to refrain from acts which violate the 
categorical imperative, such as lying or theft, even if such acts would bring about vastly 
preferable consequences. The classic example which Kant himself discusses involves an axe-
wielding murderer arriving at your door and asking where your friend is, who is currently 
hiding inside your house. Kant explicitly prohibits lying to the murderer to prevent your 
friend being killed because this would inhibit their capacity for rational autonomy, regardless 
of how clear it is that they would (under Kant’s understanding of autonomy) fail to exercise 
this capacity by going on to commit murder.13  
Many moral philosophers have rejected both utilitarianism and Kantianism as inconsistent 
with our moral intuitions on the basis of such examples. Advocates of these theories, on the 
other hand, go to great efforts to either prove that they do not in fact deliver such 
counterintuitive moral requirements, or else reject the reliability of those intuitions which 
prove inconsistent with their preferred theory. Nonetheless there is a related and yet more 
fundamental complaint about value monist act-evaluations than their failure to deliver 
intuitively satisfactory guidance in particular circumstances. This is that all such theories of 
value do not do justice to our underlying moral thought under conditions of moral conflict; 
even in situations when they offer what we might consider to be the right advice, they fail to 
account for the sense of distinct moral loss which we experience.  
In the next section, I will go on to discuss this objection. But first it is incumbent upon me 
to explain the distinction between two different yet related levels of moral thought which I 
appeal to throughout this chapter. The first level, which I shall refer to as the explicit level, is 
constituted by our most basic, pre-theoretical moral phenomenology. This encompasses our 
intuitions concerning the moral appropriateness of both our actions and feelings. For 
instance, the instinctive judgement that killing an innocent child for no good reason is wrong, 
                                                          
13 Kant, I. ‘On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy’ in Gregor, M. (ed. and trans.) The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) pp.605-615 
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or that to take pleasure in killing a child, even if it were somehow deemed morally justified, 
is abhorrent, are widely shared aspects of our explicit level of moral thought. This contrasts 
with what I shall refer to as the underlying level. We do not have such immediate conscious 
access to the underlying level of our moral thought, but we can infer its content from our 
explicit moral phenomenology. For instance, since people generally judge all situations 
wherein an individual harms another for no good reason as morally wrong on an explicit 
level, we can infer that one widely shared component of our moral thought is that, all else 
being equal, harming others is wrong. We need not be consciously aware that we are implicitly 
committed to this principle on an underlying level for it to be an important aspect of our 
moral thought which shapes our ethical intuitions on the explicit level.   
 
2. Moral Remainders and the Challenge to Value Monism 
The notion that situations of moral conflict as such threaten moral theory was first explicitly 
acknowledged by Sir David Ross in The Right and The Good, published in 1930.14 He argued 
that certain situations present us with two or more conflicting moral duties which, if 
encountered in isolation, we would be required to act upon. However, he also suggested that 
in each particular situation there is a solitary duty which overrides those which it conflicts 
with and which we are morally obliged to fulfil. In explaining this, he introduced the notion 
of prima facie duties. A prima facie duty has moral force, and may appear to the agent to be 
obligatory to satisfy. Yet when two or more prima facie duties come into conflict with each 
other, denying us the possibility of satisfying them all, only one truly constitutes an actual 
moral duty. He accepted that there was no determinate manner of ranking these duties which 
would apply to every situation, and that no duty was ultimate, entailing that no formal rules 
of deliberation over which duty took precedence could be produced.  Nonetheless, he 
suggested that reflection could enable individuals to better determine which duties were 
actual and which merely prima facie. Whilst this may seem to offer scant systematic, practical 
advice, he stated that “Loyalty to the facts is worth more than a symmetrical architectonic or 
a hastily reached simplicity.”15 For Ross, the experience of moral conflicts is enough evidence 
of their reality, and they should not be dismissed out of convenience.  
                                                          
14Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good Oxford: Clarendon Press (1946) pp.16-42 
15Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good p.23 
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However it was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that the full force of this style 
of criticism from moral conflict to moral theory was reaffirmed and engaged with. Bernard 
Williams broached a similar argument over the course of several articles and chapters in his 
books, beginning with his highly influential piece ‘Ethical Consistency’.16 Here, Williams 
suggests that the specific character of our experience of moral conflict in some situations 
indicates that there can be genuine moral dilemmas which do not admit of solution. He draws 
an analogy between conflicts of inconsistent moral obligations and conflicts of inconsistent 
desires. Whereas conflicts between inconsistent beliefs can be satisfactorily resolved by 
appealing to that belief which is most likely to be true, conflicts between desires and 
obligations cannot be resolved without leaving what Williams refers to as a ‘remainder’. 
Choosing to satisfy one desire or obligation rather than the other will not leave an agent 
entirely satisfied. Rather, they are left with a sense of something similar to regret or remorse 
for that which they neglected; ideally they would have wished to have satisfied both desires, 
or acted on both moral ‘oughts’, if circumstances had allowed it. This remains the case even 
if an agent is convinced that they chose the morally best action which they could have taken. 
The regret is not a consequence of their wish that they had acted differently; they might be 
adamant that given the same situation they would act in an identical manner, and it would be 
experienced to a greater or lesser degree whatever the agent had done. In his words, “These 
states of mind do not depend, it seems to me, on whether I am convinced that in the choice 
I made I acted for the best; I can be convinced of this, yet have these regrets, ineffectual or 
possibly effective, for what I did not do.”17 They are the result of having failed to satisfy one 
of the moral oughts in conflict, which maintains its moral force even after one has decided 
that it represents a less pressing claim than the ought which one did satisfy.  
Ross does make a similar claim in his earlier work, suggesting that the moral force of prima 
facie duties remained even after they did not constitute an actual duty in a particular situation. 
As he suggests, “When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally obliged 
to break, a promise in order to relieve someone’s distress, we do not for a moment cease to 
recognise a prima facie duty to keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame 
or repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do; we recognise, further, that 
is our duty to make up somehow to the promise for the breaking of the promise.”18 
                                                          
16 Williams, B. ‘Ethical Consistency’ in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 London: 
Cambridge University Press (1973) 
17 Ibid, p.122 
18 Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good, p.28 
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Nonetheless, he does not place the same emphasis on this feeling of regret as Williams, who 
takes it to be highly significant in verifying the significance of moral conflict. It is this focus 
on our experience of moral conflict and regret which I will concentrate on as a criticism of 
monist moral theory.  
Williams further maintains that experiencing a type of regret after having acted in situations 
of moral conflict is in fact appropriate and, at the least, not irrational, even from the 
perspective of an ideal moral agent. Certainly, he argues, those who experience such regret 
are no less morally admirable for it. In fact he holds that “The notion of an admirable moral 
agent cannot be all that remote from that of a decent human being, and decent human beings 
are disposed in some situations of conflict to have the sort of reactions I am talking about.”19 
He considers the suggestion that these regrets are a consequence of ‘natural’ as opposed to 
moral motivations, and thus imply nothing about the structure of moral conflict. For 
instance, one might claim that the personal distress Agamemnon felt at sacrificing his 
daughter to save his army was of course entirely natural, but that it has no bearing on whether 
the situation qualifies as one of moral conflict or not. However, he rejects this notion, arguing 
that such distress cannot be so clearly distinguished from moral concern. The source of our 
aversion to such acts as allowing the death of one’s child may be natural in origin, but it is 
also intimately tied up with our conception of them as wrong in some manner.  
In the aforementioned article, Williams tentatively suggests that the vindication of moral 
conflicts as genuine which he offers poses a challenge to moral realism, as opposed to value 
monist moral theory. As a consequence, much of the literature on moral conflict has 
concentrated on countering or supporting this claim.20 However, in a later piece he uses the 
experience of moral conflict and the remainder that it leaves as a specific argument against 
utilitarianism, which applies generally against all value monist theories. In Utilitarianism: For 
and Against he cites some moral dilemmas to help articulate it, including the now famous ‘Jim 
and the Indians’ case.21 Here, he asks us to imagine that a man named Jim, whilst travelling 
through a South American country, encounters a group of twenty native peoples who are 
being restrained by a ruthless army commander and his men. The army commander is about 
to kill these innocents as part of a terror policy to suppress popular protest against the 
                                                          
19 Williams, B. ‘Ethical Consistency’ P.123 
20 For instance, see Foot, P. Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
(2002)  
21 Smart, J.C.C, Williams, B. Utilitarianism: For and Against Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1973) 
pp.98-99 
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government. However, he offers Jim the opportunity to save nineteen of the natives if he will 
concede to kill a single one himself. If Jim refuses this offer then the commander will certainly 
kill all twenty of them, who are all pleading with Jim to accept it. 
Williams holds that in this particular case it would be morally preferable for Jim to go ahead 
and kill one of the natives, as the utilitarian would presumably advise him to. Nonetheless, 
his point is that it is not immediately obvious that this is the case, and that to take the decision 
lightly on the basis that killing one rather than letting twenty die would clearly minimise the 
loss of utility seems inappropriate. To do so would involve neglecting the distinct moral 
consideration of personal integrity, which one sacrifices when one directly causes a morally 
wrong action such as murder rather than merely allowing it to happen. He rejects the notion 
that this amounts to nothing more than self-indulgent moral squeamishness on similar 
grounds upon which he criticised the distinction between natural and moral aversion in his 
earlier paper; such so called squeamishness is at least partly derived from the sense of it being 
a wrong action. Thus, Williams concludes, utilitarianism fails to account for all morally 
relevant considerations. It implies that it would be inappropriate and irrational for Jim to 
hesitate and feel bad about killing the one to save the many, which is inconsistent with our 
explicit moral phenomenology.  
Although Williams did not specifically state as much, one can deduce that this argument 
equally poses a challenge for Kantian deontology. The Kantian solution to the dilemma 
would be for Jim to refuse to murder the individual in order to save the entire group; the 
categorical imperative rules out such killing regardless of the severity of the consequences. 
Nonetheless, even if one disagreed with Williams and insisted that this struck them as the 
morally preferable course of action, it would again seem inappropriate for the individual to 
experience no sense of something like remorse or regret for having failed to save the lives of 
nineteen innocents. Just as utilitarianism fails to do justice to the morally significant value 
which people invest in their own personal integrity, Kantianism fails to properly account for 
the moral importance that people place on preventing death and suffering. In sum, as a 
consequence of their value monism, both theories cannot accommodate the notion of moral 
remainders and their associated negative emotions in any way other than attributing them to 
error on the part of the agent.  
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3. Moral Wrongness and Tragic Remorse 
The issue of moral remainders and their significance for moral theory has inspired much 
discussion in the extensive literature devoted to moral conflict and moral dilemmas since the 
1970s. For instance, Ruth Barcan Marcus claims that some situations of moral conflict not 
only inspire a feeling of remorse or regret for rational reasons, as Williams contends.22 Rather, 
the fact that this remorse is regarded as justified indicates that such situations actually force 
wrongdoing on the part of the agent; there is nothing which the individual could do that 
would be morally right. She maintains that this is not a consequence of inconsistency of 
ethical theory; on her interpretation, principles need only be mutually obeyable in a 
theoretically possible world to count as consistent, and thus the occurrence of dilemmas 
under our non-ideal conditions does not indicate ethical inconsistency. For Marcus, the fact 
that moral conflict occurs in the real world, and thus leads to situations whereby whatever 
we do involves acting wrongly, does not imply theoretical inconsistency. All that we can do 
to avoid wrongdoing is attempt to structure our lives and the world in which we live so as to 
minimise the situations in which we may encounter moral conflict.23 
Phillipa Foot, meanwhile, criticises this suggestion that moral conflicts necessarily involve 
wrongdoing on the part of those who act in them. She concedes that situations involving 
moral conflict exist and that resolving them might appropriately inspire a negative emotion 
in an agent, but denies that this entails that they have done wrong. She points out that 
sometimes one can feel ‘creditable regret’ without it implying wrongdoing, invoking the 
example of distributing the possessions of a dead relative. We may indeed feel regret for 
giving away objects that we feel connects us to someone that we loved, and it would be 
appropriate to do so. Nonetheless, this does not imply that such actions are wrong; in fact 
most would deem it morally admirable and not in the least disrespectful to the dead, especially 
if one gave them to those in need.24 Earl Conee makes a similar point in suggesting that 
although one may experience subjectively justified guilt in acting in a situation of moral 
                                                          
22 Marcus, R.B. ‘Moral Dilemmas and Consistency’ in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 3. (1980), pp. 
121-136. 
23 This proposal has itself being criticised by Conee, on the grounds that attempting to shy away from 
certain forms of moral dilemmas might actually be morally worse than accepting the moral wrongness 
that they supposedly necessitate. Conee, E. ‘Against Moral Dilemmas’, Philosophical Review 91 (1982)  
pp.87-97 
24 Foot, P. Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press (2002) 
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conflict, and that this guilt is appropriate, it does not imply that objectively justified regret is 
appropriate and thus that they have committed wrongdoing.25 
I will not argue whether or not action in situations of moral conflict necessarily involves 
wrongdoing per se; taking such a position goes beyond the psychologically descriptive 
ambitions of this chapter. Nonetheless, I do contend that the negative emotion associated 
with moral remainders does not necessarily indicate that an agent must commit an action 
which they themselves take to be wrong in situations of moral conflict. In some situations, 
an agent will feel an emotion similar to regret or remorse and judge it appropriate that they 
experience such an emotion despite being willing to admit that they were not actually guilty 
of any wrongdoing. For instance, to take a case very similar to one which Williams’ offers in 
his discussion of moral luck26, suppose that an individual was driving down a quiet road very 
carefully, well within a speed limit and in a well maintained car when a child suddenly rushed 
across the road in pursuit of a stray football. The driver immediately brakes, but it is 
impossible to prevent their vehicle hitting and fatally injuring the young child. In this 
situation, the driver would presumably experience something akin to intense guilt and regret 
for having killed the child. Nonetheless, despite being causally responsible for their death, it 
would be an extremely harsh moralist who would accuse the driver of ‘wrongdoing’ in this 
particular case. Yet whilst most observers might attempt to comfort and reassure them that 
they have done nothing wrong, we would still judge it appropriate for them to feel bad about 
their role in the incident, and not merely the consequences that followed from them. If they 
did not, observers would typically regard them as morally insensitive; most take it to be 
incumbent on them to experience negative affect with regards to their own involvement in 
the bad state of affairs, rather than merely the bad state of affairs alone.  
What this example shows is that, as a matter of descriptive psychology at least, perceived 
wrongdoing is not a necessary condition for experiencing some emotion similar to remorse 
and regret which is regarded as appropriate by both the subject of experience and third party 
observers. Something like these negative emotions can arise purely from being causally 
connected to a regrettable state of affairs; they needn’t require that the individual conceive 
themselves as personally blameworthy. However, it is still open for some to object that 
remorse and regret proper are necessarily associated with overall wrongdoing in our standard 
understanding of the concept. As a matter of definition, in order for us to experience remorse, 
                                                          
25 Conee, E. ‘Against Moral Dilemmas’, pp.87-97 
26 Williams, B., Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1981) pp.27-28 
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we must on some level believe that we have done wrong. In that case, what the driver 
experiences does not count as remorse. This does seem to be a plausible suggestion, and in 
that case one can claim that what individuals who act in instances of moral conflict 
experience, whilst a negative emotion, does not count as true remorse (or regret) either. 
More needs to be said about the distinct nature of the negative emotion which we experience 
when we act in cases of moral conflict. For it does seem right that we can only properly say 
that someone experiences guilt or regret concerning their actions when they wish that they 
had done otherwise. Yet people can still feel bad about their actions in situations of moral 
conflict whilst remaining confident that they would not change their decision if presented 
with an identical conflict in the future.  Williams himself has pointed out that the standard 
terminology used to describe various negative emotions tied to our sense of responsibility for 
wrongness is lacking, and doesn’t adequately demarcate the full range of different feelings 
that we are prone to experience. He raises the example of regret, which he deems too broad a 
term to refer to the particular feeling that we are typically disposed to experience when we 
are non-intentionally yet causally linked to a moral wrong. For we can intelligibly feel some 
form of regret about incidents that we have no causal relation to whatsoever; I can deeply 
‘regret’ the Chernobyl disaster and all the death and destruction this incident caused without 
feeling complicit in any way. Yet this sort of regret is distinct from the feeling we would 
associate with the example above, where even though the driver acted blamelessly, they were 
nonetheless causally involved with the regrettable consequences. Williams names this distinct 
moral emotion ‘Agent-regret’, which is both elicited under different conditions and 
phenomenologically distinct from the type of regret that we feel concerning states of affairs 
unrelated to our own actions.27  
This method of introducing new concepts for specific negative moral emotions associated 
with our responsibility for wrongness has been utilised by Stephen De Wijze, who coins the 
term ‘tragic-remorse’.28 Tragic-remorse is an emotion which typically accompanies acts which 
involve violating a moral principle in the pursuit of the overall right action. De Wijze holds 
that neither the concept of remorse nor agent regret adequately captures the standard 
phenomenology of acting in such a manner. Agent regret and remorse involve such feelings 
as a personal link with a violation of a moral principle or duty, guilt, shame and the necessity 
of making amends, which are all shared with the concept of tragic-remorse. Yet the former 
                                                          
27 Williams, B., Moral Luck pp.27-28 
28 De Wijze, S., ‘Tragic-Remorse – The Anguish of Dirty Hands’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2004) 
pp.453–471 
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emotions also involve the feeling of wishing we had done otherwise, having failed from a 
moral point of view and the need to reform our character to avoid making such mistakes in 
the future. These features are not characteristic of tragic-remorse, and although it involves 
feelings of anguish, shame and guilt, also includes a feeling of pride or relief at having done 
the overall morally right thing for the right reasons and a commitment to continue to act as 
such in the future. De Wijze suggests that tragic-remorse is most strongly related to ‘dirty 
hands’ situations. These are a subcategory of moral conflicts which come about when we are 
forced to render ourselves complicit in the evil projects of others, typically associated with 
political acts considered necessary which nonetheless violate moral principles.29 Nonetheless, 
it can be generalised as capturing the emotion which we typically experience in acting in any 
situation of moral conflict; there is nothing in De Wijze’s account to suggest tragic-remorse 
is exclusively a reaction to dirty hands situations.  
I maintain that the fact that people tend to experience tragic-remorse in situations of moral 
conflict, and that they regard it as an appropriate response, entails that descriptive value 
monism does not square with our typical moral phenomenology. Whilst an agent may act in 
a manner that they deem to be overall right in a moral conflict, their negative experience 
suggests that in acting all things considered rightly they have nevertheless neglected 
something which they take to be distinctly reason-giving. This does not imply that they regard 
themselves as committing wrongdoing in terms of an overall evaluation of an act; even in 
particularly difficult cases, one can feasibly regard either option to be morally permissible. 
However, an action can involve regrettable neglect of a value taken to have independent 
normative force without the act being taken to be wrong in itself. Rather than involving 
perceived overall wrongness per se, the action instead involves moral loss; the sense that one 
has sacrificed one value in realising another, and that what is lost in this sacrifice is not entirely 
redeemed by what is gained. This represents an underlying explanation as to why some 
situations prompt us to experience tragic remorse.  
 
4. Coin Flipping and Implications for Value Monism 
I will next discuss the difference in attitude that we have between what counts as acceptable 
decision making procedures in different types of moral conflict. This provides further 
                                                          
29 What precisely distinguishes dirty hands situations from standard moral conflicts is contentious, with 
different theorists offering varying interpretations. I will not enter into a discussion on this tangential 
issue.  
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evidence that people experience distinct moral loss as opposed to the feeling that they have 
acted wrongly when acting in situations of moral conflict. 
In ‘The Diversity of Moral Dilemma’, Peter Railton argues that the appropriate decision 
making procedure in situations of apparent moral dilemma differs depending upon what type 
of values are in conflict.30 Some apparent dilemmas involve conflict between different 
instantiations of the same value. For instance, we may find ourselves in a position whereby 
two complete strangers whose lives we know nothing about are both in mortal danger, and 
we can only possibly save one. In the same vein, we may be forced into a position where we 
have no choice but to break one of two promises of equal stringency which we have made 
to two equally good friends. In these kinds of situation, Railton suggests we would be justified 
in adopting a random decision making procedure such as flipping a coin to decide what to 
do; there is simply no non-arbitrary means of deciding which life we should save, or which 
promise we should break. Moreover, although there is left what one might deem a moral 
remainder after we have acted in these cases, our sense of tragic-remorse is likely to be 
lessened by the thought that there were no grounds for our deciding to do otherwise.  
However most moral conflicts do not fit this symmetrical pattern. Rather, they involve a 
conflict between seemingly distinct moral considerations. For instance, the Jim and the 
Indians case necessitates a choice between minimising death and preserving one’s personal 
integrity. As Railton argues, it seems inappropriate to utilise a random decision making 
procedure in these types of dilemma. Whether we choose to prioritise the lives of the natives 
or our own personal integrity is not experienced as an arbitrary choice, even if it may be one 
where moral loss is accompanied by either choice. In choosing our actions, we are expressing 
a commitment to a position on which consideration is of greater ethical significance in the 
context of the conflict. To flip a coin to make this decision for us would be to avoid making 
such a commitment, and effectively try to pass off our responsibility for our actions by 
putting it down to random chance. A moral remainder, and the associated experience of 
tragic-remorse is inevitable when making a decision in these asymmetrical conflicts. 
Nonetheless, despite this, it would seem like absolving oneself of a choice which is of genuine 
import if we were to put it down to chance. And even when we are satisfied that we have 
attended to the most important moral consideration in our actions, this does not make up 
for the distinct consideration which we necessarily neglect.  
                                                          
30 Railton, P. ‘The Diversity of Moral Dilemma’ in Mason, H.E (ed.) Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996) pp.140-166 
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I hold that this account accurately reflects how most individuals implicitly conceive of 
appropriate decision making in situations of moral conflict. When what is at stake cannot be 
easily compared, we judge it important to make a decision between which consideration 
should be prioritised. This sense of certain moral considerations as dissimilar and yet 
requiring determinate, non-arbitrary choices between them, along with the tragic-remorse 
associated with moral remainders, indicates that we identify and are morally motivated by a 
range of distinct values as opposed to a single consideration which all others are ultimately 
reducible to.  
Thus, from our explicit moral phenomenology as encountered when we have to deal with 
moral conflict, we can infer what underlying structure is shaping how humans experience 
value. We may not be consciously aware of this underlying level of moral experience; indeed, 
if we were, then it would not be necessary to make such inferences about it from our more 
basic reactions to moral quandaries. Nonetheless, the implication of moral remainders and 
our intuitive sense of how to appropriately react to moral conflict is that we tend to regard a 
multiplicity of distinct moral values as reason-giving, rather than a single one. This is, I 
maintain, the most significant inference concerning our underlying moral thought that we 
can make from our shared experiences associated with moral conflict.  
Of course this does not entirely undermine monist theories of value. It is still open for the 
utilitarian or the Kantian to claim that individuals’ multifaceted moral motivations are an 
inaccurate reflection of ethical reality, regardless of whether they are generally regarded as 
appropriate or not.  People may simply be mistaken to judge it morally appropriate to 
experience tragic-remorse when acting in situations of apparent moral dilemma.  
To elaborate; a utilitarian or Kantian might be willing to accept that agents might experience 
tragic-remorse after having acted in a situation of apparent moral conflict. They might even 
offer reasons why it might be appropriate for an imperfect moral agent to experience such a 
negative emotion. For instance, the utilitarian moral theorist R.M Hare suggests that, given 
our cognitive limitations, it is preferable for individuals to develop sentimental attachments 
to ‘moral’ considerations which only indirectly contribute to utility, and thus experience 
negative emotions when they are sacrificed in the name of utility per se.  He thus holds that 
“Our common intuitions are sound ones just because they yield acceptable precepts in 
common cases. For this reason, it is highly desirable that we should all have these intuitions 
and that our consciences should give us a bad time when we go against them.”31 Nonetheless, 
                                                          
31 Hare, R.M. ‘Moral Conflicts’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Value (1978) p.186 
CHAPTER 1 – MORAL CONFLICT AND DESCRIPTIVE VALUE PLURALISM 
25 
 
this is merely justifying tragic-remorse out of the practical consideration that humans are 
flawed beings. If an idealised agent with perfect instrumental rationality, a faultless ability to 
calculate predicted consequences and the right moral motivation was to emerge, such 
sentimental attachments to secondary considerations would be redundant; it is necessarily a 
consequence of any monist theory that tragic-remorse is ultimately irrational and 
inappropriate for such an ideal moral agent. This is because, as long as one has acted so as to 
best realise the single moral value conceptualised by these theories, there is absolutely no 
reason to feel morally bad for what one has done.  
Yet even if such an agent were to exist, I contend that most individuals would regard such 
an agent as inhuman, and lack something important in our common humanity, to the extent 
that they did not experience tragic-remorse. Our intuitions regarding the appropriateness of 
tragic remorse do not, I suggest, stem from the implicit understanding that such emotions 
ultimately serve to better enable us to realise a single moral value. Rather, they reflect the 
more simple truth that individuals feel that it is important to recognise multiple, distinct 
considerations as reason-giving, and that when one of these considerations are put to one 
side, it is to be mourned. This makes no sense from a value monist standpoint; a consideration 
is only reason-giving insofar as it realises the single value, which any given option can do to 
a greater or lesser extent. A value monist could intelligibly feel bad that the single value they 
posit couldn’t be realised to a greater extent, given the situation that they are presented with. 
But if one picks the option which does so to the greatest extent possible in the situation, 
there are no grounds for feeling bad concerning the choice that one made. One has acted in 
the straightforwardly morally best way that one possibly could, given the context, and there 
is no distinct moral loss involved. As Michael Stocker puts it, the value monist must claim 
that “there is no ground for rational conflict because the better option lacks nothing that 
would be made good by the lesser."32  
Although it is open for the value monist to deny the relevance of our intuitive responses 
regarding moral conflict, or, like Hare, to invoke an ad-hoc explanation to accommodate 
them, if we are looking for a psychological descriptive account of value more consistent with 
our typical moral phenomenology then we should turn to an alternative. The opposing theory 
to value monism is value pluralism, and the most influential form of it was advocated by the 
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political philosopher Isaiah Berlin.33 Although, like value monism, it was initially conceived 
of as a normative/metaethical thesis, I will be explicating it in order to analyse it in terms of 
its adequacy as a descriptive account of value.  
 
5. Berlin’s Value Pluralism 
Berlin never attempted to explicitly formulate his understanding of value pluralism, yet one 
can infer his position concerning the nature of value from his various writings on the history 
of philosophy. To articulate the position, Berlin focused on bringing to light the underlying 
role that it plays in the works of particular historical thinkers such as Machiavelli, Vico, 
Herder and Montesquieu.34 In his exegesis of these philosophers, he inferred that their 
conception of value differed significantly from that of the standard monistic enlightenment 
view. Whilst the latter is characterised by a belief that all human ends are in principle mutually 
consistent and attainable, since they are ultimately reducible to a single value, Berlin highlights 
the former’s commitment to an understanding of goods as plural, incommensurable and 
often incompatible. For example, on Berlin’s interpretation, Machiavelli held that Christian 
values such as humility and charity were incompatible with the pagan virtues necessary to 
maintain a strong and prosperous state,35 whilst Herder argued that each culture possesses its 
own unique set of values which cannot all be attained in a single form of life.36 
Value pluralists such as Berlin suggest that there is a range of distinct sources of moral 
goodness, each worthy of pursuit in its own right. Though there is a limit to the extent of 
these values, few pluralists attempt to provide an exhaustive list. As Berlin himself states, 
“The number of human values, of values which I can pursue while maintaining my human 
semblance, my human character, is finite – let us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 26, but finite, 
whatever it may be.”37 Nonetheless, the main significance is not in the details of the particular 
values which constitute the range, but in the theory of plurality itself. For claiming that there 
may be more than one ultimate human end admits the possibility that our pursuit of one 
                                                          
33 Ross’ ethical theory was also pluralistic, and came before Berlin’s. Nonetheless, it was not as radical as 
Berlin’s exposition of the idea in that it denied the necessity of moral loss in situations of conflict, and 
did not have the same intellectual impact.  
34 For a collection of Berlin’s relevant work on these thinkers and more, see Berlin, I. Against the Current: 
Essays in the History of Ideas, London: Hogarth Press (1979) 
35 Berlin, I. ‘The Originality of Machiavelli’, in his The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, 
London: Pimlico Press (1998)  pp.269-325 
36 Berlin, I. ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, in Ibid, pp.359-435 
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might conflict with that of another, implying that our political policies and individual actions 
cannot realise all human goods simultaneously.  In his words, “To admit that the fulfilment 
of some of our ideals may in principle make the fulfilment of others impossible is to say that 
the notion of total human fulfilment is a formal contradiction, a metaphysical chimera”38 
This notion of value plurality and conflict, although not the central theme of the paper, is 
also clearly expressed in Berlin’s highly influential ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’39. Here, Berlin 
suggests that two distinct values come under the common name ‘liberty’. He explains that 
whilst 'negative' liberty is realised when we are unconstrained by external, manmade barriers 
to action, 'positive' liberty involves self-mastery over one’s own internal constraints. Although 
related, these two forms of liberty are not interchangeable and cannot be mutually maximised 
within a single society; the full realisation of positive liberty necessarily involves a restriction 
of negative liberty, whilst maximising negative liberty unavoidably neglects positive liberty. 
This is because it is sometimes necessary to externally constrain individuals in order to help 
them overcome internal restrictions; to use the phrase from Rousseau, to ‘force them to be 
free’.40 For instance, we might forcibly restrict a drug addict from ingesting their chosen 
substance, thus impairing their negative liberty, on the grounds that helping them overcome 
their addiction will improve their positive liberty to live a life in line with their second order 
desires. Although Berlin finds reason to place a general preference on negative over positive 
liberty, he admits that both are genuine goods in themselves and that the sacrifice of one in 
pursuit of the other inevitably involves distinct moral loss.  
Although Berlin concentrated on the political implications of this thesis, he also suggests that 
such conflict between incompatible values is a common feature of our ethical experience, 
and applies on an individual as well as a social level. Just as social values such as positive and 
negative liberty, equality and security regularly come into conflict, as do personal virtues such 
as honesty, compassion and loyalty. Thus, his account of value pluralism readily explains the 
sense of there being a moral remainder as a consequence of our actions in situations of moral 
conflict, especially when the considerations at stake are asymmetrical. When we act in cases 
of moral conflict where two distinct values are at stake, we neglect goods which cannot be 
made up for by the preservation of those which we attend to. In Berlin’s terminology, in such 
situations we make a ‘tragic choice’; our act is regrettable and inspires negative emotion as it 
necessarily involves moral loss. Indeed, he predicts such tragic choices and their associated 
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remainders to be a defining feature of our everyday life and not merely restricted to hard 
cases of apparent moral dilemma, given the multiplicity and inherently incompatible nature 
of values.  
Value pluralism is thus more in line with the phenomenology of moral conflict than monistic 
accounts of value. The notion that humans treat a range of distinct considerations which 
cannot be reduced to a single concern as reason-giving accounts for the experience of moral 
conflict without resorting to attributing it to irrationality. Given that we tend to regard our 
feeling of tragic-remorse in response to moral remainders as entirely appropriate and justified, 
this indicates that value pluralism accords with our intuitive understanding of moral conflict. 
However, this is not to claim that some form of value pluralism represents the ethical theory 
which better reflects an objective moral reality in some deeper sense. As previously 
mentioned, it is still open for value monists to deny that coherence with our moral 
phenomenology represents the most salient standard by which to judge an ethical theory.  
Berlin himself proposed value pluralism as an ontological, metaethical thesis; he claims that 
“the multiple values are objective, part of the essence of humanity rather than arbitrary 
creations of men’s subjective fancies.”41 Nonetheless, one does not need to subscribe to this 
conception of distinct values as existing in an objective sense in order to subscribe to the 
view that it is descriptively true that humans universally tend to recognise a wider range of 
ends to be morally salient than those posited by monist theories of value. Those who attribute 
a high degree of salience to our ethical experience in informing moral theory might consider 
this to indicate that value pluralism better represents the objective moral order. Again, I need 
not take a strong position on this issue for my purposes. I merely aim to justify the descriptive 
understanding of what is going on when we encounter moral disagreement that value 
pluralism implies when I later go on to discuss the issue, on the basis that it provides the 
most accurate account of our typical moral phenomenology in situations of conflict, for 
better or worse. 
At this point, it might be useful to re-emphasise the various ways in which value pluralism 
and monism could apply and say more about how they relate, in order to clarify the nature 
of my argument.  Firstly, value pluralism or monism could hold on a purely descriptive level. 
According to descriptive value monism, humans ultimately treat a single value as legitimately 
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reason-giving.42 All of our apparently distinct moral concerns can be reduced to care for this 
one value, even if we are not always conscious of this link. An example of a descriptive value 
monist position is psychological hedonism, most famously espoused by the utilitarian 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham.43 Psychological hedonism holds that humans ultimately strive 
for pleasure and the avoidance of pain on an underlying level; all motivation is guided by this 
concern, even apparently altruistic actions reflect an implicit understanding that such 
behaviour will maximise our pleasure. Descriptive value pluralism, in contrast, holds that 
those ends which we treat as reason-giving are irreducibly distinct. For instance we might 
treat both loyalty to one’s family and impartial justice as reason-giving, and these 
considerations are not reducible to a third factor such as their contribution to our happiness.  
However, these positions are distinct from normative value pluralism and monism. The 
theories of utilitarianism and Kantianism which I have articulated are monist in this sense. 
They do not necessarily deny that individuals, as a matter of psychological fact, experience 
multiple distinct ends as reason-giving. Rather, they hold that we should consider only a single 
value as legitimately reason-giving, regardless of whether this is a natural tendency of human 
psychology or not. Normative value pluralism suggests the contrary; in order to act morally, 
we need to consider a range of values as worthy of consideration and act in accordance with 
them all, insofar as we are able to do so.  
Now, there is logical space for any combination of these two forms of value 
monism/pluralism; accepting descriptive value pluralism does not commit one to normative 
value pluralism, nor does advocating descriptive value monism force one to subscribe to 
normative value monism. As I have just explained, a utilitarian or Kantian can consistently 
combine descriptive value pluralism with normative value monism. Hypothetically, one could 
also endorse a position which combined descriptive value monism with normative value 
pluralism. For example, a theory might hold that humans take only their own pleasure as 
reason-giving but that in fact they should strive to pursue a multitude of other moral goods, 
or satisfy a range of distinct principles, other than maximising ones pleasure. Although both 
the sorts of positions could fall foul of the ‘ought implies can’ principle, depending on the 
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level of psychological flexibility towards what we take as reason-giving that we conjecture, 
they cannot be precluded purely on the basis that psychological facts should dictate our 
prescriptive standards. Such preclusion would run up against Hume’s law – the famous 
dictate against deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ without any independent reason for doing so.44  
Having said that, there is also a sense in which the matter of whether either descriptive 
monism or pluralism holds true does have a bearing upon the status of normative monism 
or pluralism. For most ethical theorists implicitly assume that there is at least some indirect 
relation between our descriptive moral thought and moral reality. Ethical philosophy does 
not generally attempt to merely codify common sense morality; there is usually a degree to 
which it attempts to refine and correct what we believe to be the right grounds for action and 
feeling. Nonetheless, it would be an odd ethical theory which held that our pre-theoretical 
understanding of what is of moral worth and therefore legitimately reason-giving is 
completely misguided. If our ethical intuitions are universally mistaken, it is not clear from 
where we are supposed to derive our understanding of moral truth, and most moral 
philosophers, explicitly or implicitly, take moral intuitions as an important source of evidence 
when evaluating ethical theories. In Ross’ words, “the moral convictions of thoughtful and 
well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense perceptions are the data of a natural 
science”45 Moreover, as John Rawls frames it in his discussion of reflective equilibrium, any 
ethical theory can only be inconsistent with so much of our moral experience until it becomes 
implausible and in need of revision.46 
 
Thus, whilst I intend only to argue for a form of descriptive value pluralism, I believe as an 
aside that this does in fact count against normative value monist theories, such as 
utilitarianism and Kantianism as they are traditionally interpreted. As I make clear, this does 
not constitute a knock down refutation of these theories, but it does go some way towards 
undermining them.  
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6. The Problem of Value Incommensurability 
There is a further aspect of Berlin’s value pluralism which seems to be less consistent with 
our moral phenomenology in situations of value conflict; that of the supposed 
incommensurability of values. Value incommensurability is a difficult concept to make sense of 
and much work has gone into articulating it.47 Here I will attempt to offer a brief account of 
it in order to explain why it does not cohere with our experience of deliberation in situations 
of moral conflict. 
The claim that values are not only plural and conflicting but incommensurable represents the 
most radical and contentious aspect of Berlin’s value pluralism. Value incommensurability 
entails that there is no means of rationally comparing different values and that they cannot 
be weighed against each other by means of some common currency. As he suggests, “The 
world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices 
between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must 
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.”48 (Emphasis mine) To illustrate, value 
incommensurability rules out claims such as the following:  
Value x is worth more than/less than/equally as much as value y. 
Such comparisons make no sense to the value pluralist who subscribes to an understanding 
of values as strongly incommensurable. For claiming that one value is greater, lesser or even 
equal to another implicitly involves appealing to a further, higher order value to ascribe each 
its relative worth. This fails to appreciate the nature of values as distinct entities, which are 
not reducible to a common measure of evaluation.  
On the strongest understanding of this idea, one cannot claim that a particular choice to 
ascribe greater relative worth to values such as compassion, honesty or personal integrity is 
better grounded than any other. Without any ultimate principle to guide us, we cannot make 
any better or worse choice, all things considered, when incommensurable values clash. This 
would serve to undermine any hope of making clear and unqualified normative judgement 
that we regard as right in such instances. For there would be no preferable way of resolving 
the matter – a particular choice could only be said to be better than others relative to a 
particular value. For instance, in choosing whether to lie to protect the feelings of another or 
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not, we might judge lying to be most compassionate course of action and telling the truth to 
be most honest, but there would be no way of saying which action is most ‘right’. If this was 
true, there does not seem to be much productive that we can say when it comes to ethical 
prescription beyond highlighting the exact value trade-offs that we face in decision making. 
Whether we should proceed to make such trade-offs is a matter we could not tackle in a non-
arbitrary manner.  
Yet this strong account of value incommensurability is not reflected in how people tend to 
deliberate in situations of moral conflict. It is of course plausible that perceived values are 
distinct to such an extent that acting in such a way as to realise one does not make up for the 
loss of another. As argued earlier, the sense of moral remainder and tragic-remorse associated 
when attending to one of two or more conflicting considerations indicate that people do not 
easily weigh competing values by reference to a common factor. Nonetheless, people do not 
regard their judgements in most situations of moral conflict to be arbitrary. In fact many 
instances of moral conflict admit of a solution which seems obviously right to most people, 
despite the distinct nature of the incompatible considerations. For instance, few would hold 
that the choice between withholding and returning borrowed weapons to a friend who has 
subsequently gone mad in Plato’s famous case is a morally arbitrary one. We might well admit 
that there is distinct moral loss involved in refusing to return the weapon to the crazed friend, 
insofar as the agent involved breaks a promise to return them. Nevertheless, it would strike 
most as ludicrous to suggest that the values involved are incommensurable to the extent that 
this option can be evaluated as no better nor worse than returning it; it seems entirely clear 
that withholding the weapon is morally preferable. As E.J. Lemmon puts it in discussing a 
similar case, “Someone who thinks that it would really be better to return the gun must either 
hold the importance of a man’s giving his word to be fantastically high or else hold human 
life to be extremely cheap, and I regard both these attitudes as morally primitive.”49 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, even in harder cases where people are less certain of the best 
course of action, they are generally able to make a decision in a manner which they regard as 
non-arbitrary. Indeed, whilst after acting they may experience the tragic-remorse associated 
with moral remainders and regard this experience as appropriate, they do not cease to believe 
that they have acted in the best manner possible. In contrast, as Railton suggests, the 
situations in which the choice is regarded as entirely arbitrary are those in which the 
conflicting considerations at stake are identical in kind and of equal weight. These are the 
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only moral conflicts in which it seems appropriate to adopt an arbitrary decision making 
process such as flipping a coin. Yet if values were truly treated as incommensurable then this 
should hold true for all moral conflicts. Clearly, people manage to implicitly commensurate 
values in some manner or other.  
In fact, Berlin himself does not seem to adopt such a strong conception of value 
incommensurability in his understanding of value pluralism as that sketched above. An 
indication of this is his explicit support of liberalism and of the value of negative over positive 
liberty in particular, despite his admission that both represent distinct values of genuine 
worth. In fact, he seems to believe that value pluralism itself supports liberalism, suggesting 
that “if value pluralism is a valid view… then toleration and liberal consequences follow.”50 
If values were genuinely incommensurable to the extent outlined above then this would be 
an incoherent viewpoint. For whatever potential advantages Berlin might cite in favour of 
negative liberty, a strong interpretation of incommensurability renders the prospect that one 
value or set of values might be decisively preferable over another inconceivable. Indeed, 
George Crowder, Gerald Gaus and John Gray have reconstructed multiple possible 
arguments which Berlin might be attempting to deploy in favouring liberal over non-liberal 
values, and unanimously conclude that if one takes value incommensurability seriously then 
they all must ultimately fail.51 Far from lending support to non-interference, Crowder even 
suggests that pluralism might actually undermine the case for negative liberty. For as he 
claims, if we accept a strong account of the incommensurability of values, “it is always open 
to the pluralist to ask, why not the illiberal option?”52  
 
7. Commensurating the Incommensurable 
On the basis of philosophical charity, then, we shouldn’t attribute radical incommensurability 
to Berlin’s value pluralism – to do so would be to commit him to grave inconsistency. In fact, 
in response to Crowder’s claim that “choices among incommensurable values ‘are 
“underdetermined by reason””53, a short article co-authored by Berlin and Williams explains 
that they do in fact believe there to be a means by which seemingly incommensurable values 
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can be weighed against each other in a reasoned manner. They hold that Crowder has 
confused the notion that no single value, such as justice, has rational priority over all others 
in every possible instance, with the very different claim that when two values clash in a 
particular instance that reason has nothing to say about which takes priority. They maintain 
that whilst the first claim is of course a consequence of value pluralism’s ruling out of a 
‘priority rule’, the second is not implied by their doctrine. Thus, although it remains the case 
that “practical decision could not in principle be made completely algorithmic”54, in contrast 
with monistic ethical theories, pluralists are not condemned to the implausible position that 
any choice between incommensurable values is entirely arbitrary. 
However Berlin and Williams do not offer any details as to how we can weigh values in such 
a reasoned manner. They clearly believe that it is important that we take the contextual details 
of each particular situation of conflict into account when coming to a decision about which 
value takes priority there, but beyond this they are vague. Crowder interprets their rebuttal 
of his complaint as an indication that they hold a view similar to that of Aristotle. That is, 
although the prospect of a systematic, principle based normative theory is impossible, given 
the plurality of salient values and situational factors at play, one can develop a kind of moral 
sensitivity and practical wisdom which enables one to make reasoned ethical choices in 
situations of conflict. The most that we can hope for in terms of ethical principles are only 
very roughly accurate generalisations, which are always liable to come unstuck and admit of 
exceptions given the variable context of conflicts. For the most part, we must rely on our 
own sense of judgement when we face situations when principles conflict and fail to offer 
determinate advice. Conflicts between values are thus to be resolved in a manner akin to that 
recommended by moral particularists; through judging each particular tricky case on its own 
merit rather than appealing to a universally applicable principle.55  
This sort of account, though very vague, does seem to be how in fact people implicitly make 
moral judgements in situations of value conflict. As discussed, people do not regard their 
decisions as entirely arbitrary, and feel it would be inappropriate to simply flip a coin to decide 
when two distinct values are at stake, even in hard cases. However, neither do they decide 
what they judge to be the action which is all things considered morally preferable by 
prioritising a single value at the expense of others across all cases and determining how best 
to realise it. Rather, individuals typically take a middle course. They tend to take individual 
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situations and, consciously or not, weigh conflicting considerations up against each other in 
a context-sensitive manner. Their resolution may leave moral remainders, yet generally allow 
them to come to judgements which they feel to be all things considered for the best. Although 
some situations will involve particularly difficult trade-offs between values which people feel 
to be of almost equal importance in the context, they can usually manage to make judgements 
which minimise their sense of moral loss involved, if not eliminate it entirely. This implies 
that despite the fact that people do take many moral considerations to be distinctly reason-
giving, they do in fact have some vague means of commensurating values; they implicitly 
adopt a model of moral deliberation which incorporates the distinctness of value pluralism 
with the determinacy of judgement that monism enables. It is simply that this form of 
monism that they tacitly adhere to is not as clear cut as popular monistic theories of values 
prescribe. Again, this is a descriptive rather than a prescriptive claim; I am not suggesting that 
this is an objectively preferable means by which people should morally deliberate, merely that 
this is the method which people tend to implicitly use. 
This account of how people typically morally deliberate in situations of moral conflict sheds 
light upon the nature of moral disagreement. If people reach their moral judgements via a 
combination of developing a full understanding of the contextual details of a situation and 
then weighing the importance of the conflicting values in the context, then disagreement 
could arise at two different stages. Firstly, individuals may not share the same level of 
understanding of the descriptive details of a given situation, and thus not be aware of what 
value trade-offs are involved. For instance, to take Plato’s case of returning weapons to a 
friend, a person who was unaware that the friend had gone mad would probably regard it as 
wrong to refuse to return the weapons. In their mind, there is only one salient value at stake 
here – that of repaying one’s debts. They would thus morally disagree with the more fully 
informed individual, who would judge it wrong to return the weapons on the understanding 
that the friend had gone mad and might use the weapons to go on to commit senseless 
violence. However, this sort of disagreement does not necessarily reflect any deep, intractable 
difference in their ethical attitudes. It would most likely be a consequence of non-moral 
misunderstanding; if they shared the same knowledge concerning the contextual details of 
the situation, then they would probably come to the agreement that it would be wrong to 
return the weapons to their friend. 
Yet the account of moral deliberation sketched also concedes the possibility of a more 
fundamental disagreement, which does not admit of such easy resolution. For it does not rule 
out the possibility that two individuals may share identical knowledge of a situation of value 
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conflict and be equally sensitive to each contextual detail involved and yet make opposing 
moral judgements. They may simply disagree about the relative importance of each value 
consideration in that particular situation. For instance, in the case where one has to choose 
between telling a lie and hurting someone’s feelings, two individuals might possess precisely 
the same understanding of the context of the situation and both be acutely aware of the trade-
off involved. Nonetheless, one may feel that in this instance the value of honesty trumps 
compassion and thus judge it right to tell the truth here, whilst the other might hold the 
opposing view. The former may simply invest more importance in honesty relative to 
compassion either in general, and thus hold that it trumps the value of compassion in this 
particular instance and in many other instances where it conflicts with other values, or in this 
particular situation, whilst the latter weights these values differently.  
This proposed model of moral deliberation and disagreement may still seem vague, and 
further articulating the above example might help clarify it somewhat. Take two agents, James 
and Amanda, who face a moral conflict; each has to choose between lying to save their mutual 
friend Kevin’s feelings, or to tell the truth and thereby cause him distress. Let us imagine that 
for the sake of this example, the relevant contextual details of the situation each faces are to 
be taken as completely identical, and that both have the exact level of non-moral knowledge 
of said details, although this would admittedly be impossible to say for a pair of any real world 
situations. Now, let us say that Amanda judges that it would be wrong to lie to Kevin and 
accordingly tells the truth, whilst James judges that it is morally preferable to lie and save 
Kevin’s feelings, which he does. On my account, the best explanation for this discrepancy in 
their judgements is thus; James assigns a higher weight to the distinct value of compassion 
relative to honesty in this particular situation than Amanda does. This is not to say that James 
would always hold that compassion trumps honesty across multiple situations, and that 
Amanda would in contrast always feel that honesty trumps compassion. There may even be 
situations where Amanda would judge compassion as more important and act accordingly 
where James would disagree and prefer honesty: the relative importance of each value in each 
situation for each party might be highly dependent on particular contextual details, some of 
which will have greater salience for one party than the other.56 Nonetheless, let us say that in 
this situation, Amanda assigns x units of moral weight to honesty, and y units to compassion, 
whilst James assigns x units to compassion and y to honesty, where x > y.  
                                                          
56This being said, my TEA model’s account of moral disagreement articulated later suggests that 
individuals will generally place greater importance on the same values across multiple situations. 
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As previously explained, this model is part value pluralist, part value monist. It is pluralist to 
the extent that each individual would experience honesty and compassion as distinct reason-
giving factors, and thus suffer a sense of distinct moral loss in whichever way they act. Yet it 
is monist to the extent to which these values can in fact be commensurated on an extremely 
vague and abstract level. This enables agents to make judgements about the relative moral 
importance of distinct values in particular situations and further judgements about what 
would overall be for the best, thus minimising the sense of moral loss which they experience 
when acting upon these judgements.  
Of course, the example conjectured above is not necessarily possible on the account of moral 
deliberation I suggest; it is merely a theoretical possibility. It could still very well be the case 
that if everyone held the exact same non-moral knowledge of a situation, then moral 
disagreement would never occur. Individuals might implicitly weight each value exactly the 
same given an identical context. Nonetheless, if it were to be shown that some moral 
disagreement cannot be attributed to differences in non-moral understanding, then we could 
comfortably attribute it to differences in how individuals weight the importance of different 
values against each other. We would then require an explanation as to why some individuals 
were prone to make such varying value judgements despite sharing the same non-moral 
knowledge. In the chapters which follow, I intend to show that in fact some moral 
disagreement cannot be reduced to non-moral disagreement, and provide such an empirical 
explanation as to why people weigh the importance of values differently, before determining 
the normative consequences from the perspective of liberal political theory. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that monist theories of value such as utilitarianism and Kantianism cannot 
explain our experience of moral conflict without attributing it to implicit error regarding our 
own moral commitments, which runs against our intuitions concerning our appropriate 
reactions to it. We typically experience tragic-remorse when we act in particularly hard cases 
of moral conflict, even when we are sure that we have done the right thing, and regard the 
feeling of this emotion as appropriate, whereas value monists must judge this to be irrational 
and unjustified. Whilst this does not necessarily tell against normative value monism, it does 
suggest that value monism is false on a descriptive level.  
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Value pluralism, meanwhile, provides a descriptive account of the underlying structure of our 
moral thought which better accommodates the explicit phenomenology of moral conflict. 
This account suggests that humans are prone to experience tragic remorse when choosing in 
situations of moral conflict because it invokes the sense of distinct moral loss. Thus, 
individuals are not somehow misguided to experience such an emotion. It does not stem 
from a confusion, which they wouldn’t experience if they were ideally situated so as to 
understand that they in fact were committed to a single moral value, rendering such an 
emotion groundless. Rather, tragic remorse is a natural and appropriate response given the 
multiplicity of ends which people implicitly take to be reason-giving. However, people do 
manage to come to judgements about what is right and wrong in situations of moral conflict 
and do not think that any decision made would be a purely arbitrary choice.  Thus it is more 
plausible to suggest that values, although distinct, might not be experienced as strongly 
incommensurable as is suggested in the most radical versions of the theory.  
Descriptive value pluralism therefore offers a good basis upon which to conceptualise what 
could potentially be going on when we encounter moral disagreement. When people disagree 
over moral judgements they are not merely disagreeing about how best to realise a single 
moral value. Rather, they are implicitly treating the situation as one of value conflict, and 
could either be disagreeing about non-moral factors concerning the context of the conflict, 
or it could be a consequence of the individuals involved differing over the relative importance 
of distinct values. I will use this understanding of moral disagreement, derived from my 
exploration of the phenomenology of internal moral conflict, to inform my discussion of 
such disagreement between individuals in later chapters. 
 
39 
 
Chapter 2 – Intercultural Fundamental Moral 
Disagreement 
 
In the last chapter I argued that agents tend to treat multiple, distinct moral considerations 
as reason-giving, on the basis that individuals generally regard the experience of tragic 
remorse as an appropriate reaction after acting in situations of moral conflict. However, 
individuals manage to resolve the conflicts which often arise as a consequence of this 
underlying phenomenology of value by implicitly weighting each consideration differently. 
They then judge acting in accordance with the weightiest moral concern as all things 
considered right even if this leaves them tinged with the sense of distinct moral loss. Agents 
thus adopt a form of moral deliberation which is value pluralistic without strong 
incommensurability.  
I further suggested that this hints at a potential explanation of the basis of moral 
disagreement; when two individuals make diverging moral judgements, it could be the case 
that each assigns considerations different weights. For instance one agent might place more 
emphasis on the importance of compassion whilst another might place greater emphasis on 
honesty, which could lead the former to judge lying to save someone’s feelings in a particular 
situation as morally right, whilst the latter would judge this to be wrong. However, in section 
7, I was clear to note that this is not necessarily the implication of the account of moral 
deliberation I sketched. From what I’ve argued, it could yet be the case that people place an 
identical weight on each value. To the extent that they disagree, individuals may only differ 
over the contextual factors which determine the relative salience which they ascribe to each 
value in the particular situation. 
In this chapter, I argue that intercultural moral disagreement between agents cannot always 
be reduced to such contextual disagreement or otherwise dismissed as merely apparent, but 
is often fundamental, indicating a genuine conflict over the relative importance of values. In 
order to do so, in section 1 I  survey a range of anthropological and historical evidence which 
exemplifies the diversity of moral attitudes between members of distinct cultural groups. 
Section 2 critically discusses various defusing explanations that such cultural diversity is not 
necessarily indicative of genuine moral disagreement from theorists such as David Brink. 
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Next, section 3 reviews Richard Brandt’s study on the ethics of the Hopi tribe, which 
purports to reveal genuine moral disagreement, along with Michele Moody Adams’s 
response. In section 4 I articulate and expand upon John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’s 
argument in favour of fundamental intercultural moral disagreement, which draws on more 
recent evidence from studies conducted by psychologists/experimental philosophers such as 
Richard Nisbett and Steven Stich. I will conclude that this evidence provides the basis for a 
solid empirical case for fundamental moral disagreement between members of distinct 
cultural groups, before turning to the next chapter’s task of vindicating intracultural 
fundamental moral disagreement.  
 
1. Apparent Moral Disagreement Between Cultural Groups 
First we must scrutinise the basis for the claims of those who hold that there is, in fact, moral 
disagreement between those of different cultural groups. The precise meaning of the term 
‘cultural group’ is a controversial matter, with many different definitions applying depending 
on the discipline and theorist. In this context, I take it to refer to something like a group of 
people who have been exposed to similar cultural influences during the course of their life 
due to a shared locality, history, customs and traditions.57  
Moral disagreement is clearly most evident between different cultural groups and as a general 
rule the more historically and geographically distinct one cultural group is from one another, 
the greater the discrepancy between their moral norms. Practices such as polygamy, ritual 
sacrifice and cannibalism, almost universally regarded as self-evidently immoral in European 
cultures since the classical age, have long been known to be endorsed and practised by 
peoples of other times and places. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent through 
increased contact with geographically isolated communities and a greater understanding of 
history that such differences in moral judgements between members of different cultural 
groups are not rare aberrations, but the norm. This insight has been particularly buttressed 
through the findings from fieldwork conducted by cultural anthropologists and 
ethnographers, especially since around the beginning of the 20th century. These studies 
involved observing and integrating into the culture of societies of which little was previously 
                                                          
57 It is important to note that I do not define cultural groups in terms of the shared values of those within 
the group. If I were to define cultural groups in this way then my later claim that individuals within the 
same cultural group sometimes fundamentally disagree would be false by definition.  
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known, and highlighted the extent to which their values and beliefs differ from that of our 
own.  
Nonetheless, clear universal themes with regard to what ethical codes regulate can be 
discerned, with moral norms concerning such matters as violence, sexual relations, 
reciprocity, and equitable distribution of resources being particularly prevalent across cultural 
groups.58 This is a significant point which is worth highlighting; there is certainly evidence of 
a strong degree of commonality in terms of the sort of considerations that cultural groups 
tend to moralise. To put it in Berlin’s terminology, there does in fact seem to be a ‘human 
horizon’ of widely shared values – the range of moral diversity we encounter between cultural 
groups is constrained by human nature. When discussing moral disagreement we must keep 
in mind that it typically occurs within this backdrop of a common range of moral concerns. 
This point shall become more salient when addressing the question of how and why humans 
come to adopt the values that they do in my later chapters. Yet for now, the relevant issue is 
that variations between the norms which address such concerns are often found to be 
pervasive. In fact some have suggested that for every supposed cross-cultural moral universal 
one might identify, there exist past or present cultural groups which provide counter 
examples.59 
To take an extreme example of a cultural group which has a seemingly alien moral code to 
that of most contemporary societies, let us look to an infamous portrayal of the Ik people of 
north eastern Uganda. The norms and practices of this group were examined and publicised 
by the ethnographer Colin Turnbull in his 1972 work The Mountain People.60 Turnbull, who 
spent several years conducting first hand fieldwork within the tribe, portrays the Ik 
community as having a fiercely individualistic, ruthless and uncooperative cultural climate. 
He claims that individuals were expected to do whatever was necessary in order to survive 
the inhospitable conditions which they faced; selfishness to the point of theft and blackmail 
was not regarded as blameworthy, whilst helping others was seen as a sign of weakness rather 
than praiseworthy. Most noteworthy for Turnbull was his observation that bonds of familial 
                                                          
58 For a review of evidence for this claim, see Sekhar Sripada, C. “Nativism and Moral Psychology: Three 
Models of the Innate Structure that Shapes the Contents of Moral Norms” in W.Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) 
Moral Psychology Volume 2 - The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. (2008) p.322. 
59 See, for instance, Prinz, J. “Is Morality Innate?” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 
(ed.) Moral Psychology Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality – Adaptations and Innateness Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press (2008) pp. 367 –406. 
60 Turnbull, Colin M. The Mountain People. New York: Simon & Schuster, (1972) 
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kinship were particularly weak. Whilst most cultural groups tend to place a great deal of 
importance on moral obligations towards one’s kin, the Ik would routinely abandon their 
babies and elderly relatives to face starvation or to be eaten by wild animals. Children as 
young as three would be permanently expelled from their households, and left to join ‘age 
bands’ of their peers who would be forced to learn how to survive without adult guidance. 
On first blush, then, this might seem to be a good example of a cultural group which is 
prioritising values in a very different manner to our own. 
However, Turnbull emphasised that he conducted his study during a period of mass 
starvation, the area having suffered from devastating drought for a succession of years, and 
he suggested that the cruelty and selfishness endorsed by the Ik was a consequence of such 
extreme hardship. It might be argued that their practices do not necessarily reflect deep moral 
disagreement over the importance of the values of community, family and cooperation, but 
a practical, Hobbesian response to desperate circumstances of scarcity. Whether such a 
conditional waiving of moral norms reflects actual moral disagreement or not shall be 
considered in greater depth later. In any case the accuracy of the conclusions and 
methodology of Turnbull’s study has been criticised, with some arguing that the supposed 
selfishness and cruelty of the observed practices was not representative of the community as 
a whole.61 Therefore sweeping claims about the endemic nature of moral disagreement 
between different cultural groups cannot be derived from such exotic and potentially 
unreliable examples.  
Richard Miller makes this point, highlighting the difficulties in making inferences concerning 
moral diversity across cultures based on “pathetic refugees or demoralised remnants of a 
defeated society, too desperate to subject themselves to moral constraints or burdened by 
challenges for which they were not remotely prepared”, such as the Ik, denying that they can 
“present informative contrasts to our standards of behavior and assessment.”62 He instead 
points to the Tiv people of Nigeria, who operate under far less severe conditions and maintain 
a fairly stable and successful way of life, yet nonetheless seem to wholly reject the relative 
weighting typically assigned to moral values within western cultural groups. According to the 
description of their culture offered by the anthropologists Paul and Laura Bohannan, the Tiv 
are tribal agriculturalists who live within a loose confederacy of extended family compounds. 
                                                          
61 Heine, B, ‘The Mountain People: Some Notes on the Ik of North-Eastern Uganda’ Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, Vol. 55, No. 1, (1985), pp. 3-16. 
62 Miller, R.W. Moral Differences – Truth, Justice and Conscience in a World of Conflict Princeton: 
Princeton University Press (1992) p.21 
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There is no presiding central authority other than local councils of elders, whose role is 
restricted to mediating disputes in informal tribal courts, or so-called ‘jirs’. Such mediations, 
however, demonstrate a marked lack of concern for impartiality and what we might consider 
fairness in favour of promoting other values; resolutions are reached by primarily attending 
to the concerns of group harmony and family loyalty. For instance, marital disputes are 
resolved in a manner which is expected to result in the least disruption of the social order, 
rather than in terms of addressing who was guilty of wrong-doing within the couple or 
concern for the welfare of any children involved. Meanwhile, in jirs, family members of the 
disputants are expected to only provide testimony which portrays their kin in a good light 
rather than speaking the truth. If a witness were to willingly reveal facts which damaged the 
case of their family members, it would be regarded as an abhorrent violation of their moral 
duties towards their relatives. Similarly, the degree to which an act of violence or theft is 
regarded as blameworthy by the Tiv depends upon the relation of the accused to the victim; 
harming or stealing from one’s extended kin or friends is deemed to be far more deserving 
of punishment than doing the same to a stranger.63  
Of course family loyalty and group harmony are regarded as morally valuable to some extent 
in most societies. Some proportion of individuals within all cultural groups might even 
suggest that loyalty to one’s family and a concern for stability can, in some instances, override 
the need for impartiality, and judge that the Tiv’s way of resolving justice is in some respects 
justified. Nonetheless this attitude is publicly endorsed to a far lesser extent, at least in most 
contemporary western cultural groups – for the most part, people regard impartial justice and 
fair treatment to be paramount in such matters. We might understand, and even on some 
level admire, the parent who lies in court to save their child a life sentence in prison, or the 
judge who maintains the harmony of a community at the expense of delivering verdicts which 
are unfair to individuals. Yet presumably few would claim that they would be wrong to do 
otherwise, as would the Tiv. In contrast, there is a general attitude within contemporary 
western cultural groups that the morally preferable option lies in sacrificing family loyalty and 
stability when they conflict with the demands of justice. This indicates that although we too 
recognise the moral force of such concerns, as a cultural group we do not ascribe it the same 
level of salience as do the Tiv.  
However one might object to this inference made here. For the fact that certain moral norms 
are publicly endorsed within a cultural group does not necessarily imply that the value ranking 
                                                          
63 Bohannan, P. Justice and Judgement Amongst the Tiv Oxford: Oxford University Press (1968) 
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these norms imply is universally shared by all members of the group. An individual can 
outwardly claim that they endorse the moral judgements most common within their 
community whilst, deep down, and free from social pressure, admit that they regard them as 
wrong, and would prefer a different set of norms to reign. Thus one might argue that there 
is no conclusive basis for concluding that the Tiv generally rank values in a different order to 
most western cultural groups purely by looking at what moral norms they collectively follow 
in resolving disputes. It might be that family loyalty and group stability are valued by 
individuals within western cultural groups just as much as they are by members of the Tiv, 
relative to impartiality. It could simply be social dynamics which causes most westerners to 
endorse moral norms which enshrine the latter, whilst most Tiv endorse norms which 
promote the former.  
This is an interesting suggestion, and one which I will return to later when discussing moral 
disagreement within cultural groups.  Yet for now I take it that the fact that a particular moral 
norm is endorsed on a public level within a cultural group indicates that there is at least prima 
facie basis for assuming that, in general, individuals within the group morally value that which 
the norm promotes. Further, the particular set of moral norms which is endorsed in a cultural 
group can indicate the extent to which individuals within the cultural group prioritise values 
relative to one another. Say that a set of moral norms governing a social practice, such as 
conflict resolution, which realises impartiality, is generally endorsed within one cultural group, 
whilst a set of different moral norms concerning the same social practice, which instead 
realises family loyalty, is endorsed in another cultural group. In this situation, we have reason 
to believe that the members of the latter group generally value family loyalty more, and 
impartiality less, than members of the former group. This is entirely consistent with some 
individuals within each cultural group weighting group loyalty and impartiality in a different 
manner to their peers, and thus deep down rejecting the moral import of publicly endorsed 
norms in their group. On this interpretation, then, the example of the Tiv suggests that even 
in cultural groups where there is a relative lack of scarcity and instability, moral norms are 
such that they seem to reveal a very different weighting of values to that which we are more 
familiar with. 
Moving on, to provide further evidence for the claim that there is a huge range of moral 
diversity across cultural groups it might help to examine how differently a single practice is 
morally judged in different times and places. Let us take the example of incest, a practice 
which is sometimes assumed to be universally condemned within all human societies and 
thus a good candidate for something which might be thought not to be subject to cultural 
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moral disagreement. Sigmund Freud famously argued that we are naturally predisposed 
towards incestuous desires, and that all societies had constructed artificial prohibitions upon 
its practice as a means of repressing them.64 However others claim that humans possess an 
innate, adaptive psychological faculty which acts to minimise the incidence of incest. This 
psychological predisposition, it is suggested, cultivates a strong aversive response to the 
prospect of sexual contact with those whom we have lived in close proximity during the first 
three years of life, and leads to the development of taboos against it within all cultural groups. 
This is known as the ‘Westermarck effect’, after the Finnish anthropologist Edvard 
Westermarck, who was the first to suggest it as a universal feature of mankind.65  
It is indeed true that incest among immediate family relations is often moralised against across 
cultures in some form or another, and, as I will later argue to be the case for other almost 
universal themes in morality, this is most likely a consequence of there being some innate 
disposition to develop an aversion towards it. However, the extent to which a relationship is 
regarded as incestuous and/or considered a moral violation varies considerably from group 
to group. Contemporary western Judeo-Christian cultural groups tend to take a hard moral 
line on incestuous relations. Marriage between second cousins is often regarded as morally 
suspect, and there is a strong taboo against first cousin marriage. Yet other cultural groups 
of both past and present have held that marriage between cousins of any degree is 
permissible. For instance, marriage between cousins, such as Isaac and Rebecca, is 
documented in the Hebrew bible without any signs of moral condemnation of the practice. 
Moreover, first cousin marriage is strongly encouraged in some parts of India, Pakistan and 
the Middle East; it has been estimated that more than half of all contemporary Pakistani 
couplings are composed of first cousins.66 
Incestuous relations between more immediate family members, such as siblings, are far rarer 
than those between cousins in almost all cultural groups, and this may be thought to be due 
to the universality of moral norms condemning it. Yet the historical and anthropological 
record is not so unanimous; evidence suggests that brother-sister and parent-child marriage 
was not only the province of the elites in some pre-modern societies but that it was actively 
                                                          
64 See Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, trans. James Strachey. New York: Basic 
Books (1962) 
65 See Westermarck, E. A History of Human Marriage. New York: Macmillan (1891) 
66 Modell, B., and Darr, A. ’Genetic counselling and customary consanguineous marriage.’ Nature 
Reviews Genetics, 3, (2002) pp.225-9 
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encouraged at all levels of society by Ancient Zoroastrian scripture.67 Even more significant, 
a comprehensive study of a diverse sample of various cultural groups by Nancy Thornhill 
found that only 44% had norms against immediate family incest, and those that did enforced 
these norms to a highly variable degree.68 It would thus seem that although humans generally 
tend not to practice immediate family incest, there is yet much disagreement concerning the 
morality of such an act between different cultural groups. Whilst some groups condemn the 
practice as immoral, others regard it as morally neutral or even laudable.  
So it would appear on first glance that moral disagreement between cultural groups is clear – 
many groups exhibit behaviour which indicates an entirely different set of moral norms from 
many others, whether in conditions of scarcity or not, and moral norms often taken to be 
universal in actuality vary between groups. This can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting the 
fact that different cultural groups endorse different weightings of distinct values. However it 
is possible to yet maintain that such diversity in moral codes is not, in fact, a consequence of 
fundamental moral disagreement, but of something else, which is consistent with a moral 
consensus on the relative weight of values on a deeper level. I will now sketch and respond 
to the various arguments which claim that the sort of evidence discussed above does not 
indicate that there is actual moral disagreement between cultural groups. 
 
2.  Defusing Explanations of Moral Disagreement 
Much of the apparent moral disagreement between cultural groups such as that discussed 
could potentially be attributed to differences concerning non-moral knowledge, instrumental 
reasoning or other factors, rather than indicative of a disagreement concerning the relative 
importance of moral values. In the article ‘How to Argue about Disagreement’, Doris and 
Plakias note that such so called ‘defusing explanations’ of moral disagreement are often 
deployed by those moral realists who depend upon the theoretical possibility of a universal 
convergence on moral judgements to justify their position, and can take several broad forms. 
69 Here I will relate the most relevant of those offered by David Brink in his Moral Realism and 
                                                          
67 Scheidel, W. ‘Brother-sister and parent child marriage outside royal families in ancient Egypt and Iran: 
a challenge to the sociobiological view of incest avoidance?’ Ethology and Sociobiology 17: (1996) 
pp.319-340. 
68 Thornhill, N. W. ‘An Evolutionary Analysis of Rules Regulating Human Inbreeding and Marriage’ 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 14, (1991) pp.247-293. 
69 Doris, J. and Plakias, A. ‘How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism’  in 
Moral Psychology Volume 2 (2008) p.319 
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the Foundations of Ethics.70 Then, following Doris and Plakias, I will draw attention to a number 
of examples of moral disagreement which do not seem to be accountable in terms of such 
explanations.  
Firstly, it might be said that whilst different cultural groups in actuality possess the same 
weighting of moral values, different moral norms are required in order to realise them 
depending on the environmental circumstances which they live under. In the words of Brink, 
“people who live in different social, economic and environmental conditions might apply the 
same moral principle to justify quite different policies”.71 As alluded to earlier, this sort of 
explanation might be offered for the seeming absence of moral concern for one’s kin and 
tribesmen exhibited by the Ik and other groups which are reported to leave their relatives to 
die, or even kill them, if they become infirm. The lack of care they show towards their kin 
does not necessarily indicate that they in fact regard kinship relations as of negligible moral 
value. Rather, they might place a high value on one’s kin, and in different circumstances 
would regard caring for them as morally required, but are simply forced by extreme scarcity 
to prioritise their own survival over that of their relatives. If one were to expose any cultural 
group to such life threatening scarcity for an extended period of time, it might be supposed 
that they would react in a similar fashion and adapt their moral norms accordingly. Thus the 
apparent discrepancy in the moral values of the Ik compared to most cultural groups could 
actually reflect an underlying agreement concerning the importance of self-preservation.72 
Although we might reject self-preservation as a moral value which can legitimately override 
concerns for one’s family in our current context this might be only because we are lucky 
enough to live in a society where security and adequate sustenance are taken for granted. I 
refer to these sorts of defusing explanation as Varying Circumstances explanations.  
Secondly, cultural groups might live under the same environmental conditions relevant in 
determining whether the norm under dispute best realises the proper weighting of values, but 
hold different relevant non-moral beliefs or reasoning capacities.  For instance one might 
suggest that some of those cultural groups which share moral norms prohibiting incest do so 
                                                          
70 Brink, D.O. ‘Moral Disagreement’ in his Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (1989)    
71 Ibid, p.200 
72 As a side note, the Ik apparently did not regard their behaviour as a necessary evil given the lack of 
adequate sustenance; they were sometimes observed to find the suffering of the weak as amusing 
rather than a tragic necessity. This might cast doubt on the suggestion that they did, in fact, highly value 
altruism but held self -preservation to be of greater importance given the circumstances. However, one 
yet could suppose that their attitude towards their own behaviour did not accurately reflect their 
underlying moral concern.  
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chiefly as a consequence of their empirical understanding that the children of incestuous 
partnerships are prone to genetic defects, whilst those which do not moralise against incest 
lack such knowledge. Whilst these groups may agree that couplings between partners which 
are more likely to produce children who suffer from medical conditions is wrong, they simply 
disagree over which couplings are prone to produce such offspring. Thus, their moral 
disagreement might be merely apparent; if both groups shared the same non-moral 
understanding and reasoning regarding the relevant issue, they would potentially cease to 
disagree on the moral value of the prohibition on incest and so resolve their differences. This 
might seem fairly implausible in explaining the moral norms against incest within many small 
scale societies which have no understanding of genetic mutation. Nonetheless, in some such 
cultures non-moral understanding is directly relevant in determining which kind of inter-
familial sexual relations are regarded as morally wrong and which are not. For instance, 
Kwayne Antony Appiah points out that within the Akan tribe, where his father was born, 
whilst engaging in sexual relations with one’s mother’s sister’s child is regarded as morally 
abhorrent, one is actively encouraged to have sex with one’s father’s sister’s offspring.73 This 
may seem an inexplicable moral distinction until you understand the Akan’s background 
beliefs with respect to human composition.  The Akan hold that humans inherit their blood 
from their mothers, whilst a sort of spiritual essence, sunsum, is inherited from their fathers. 
Thus, whilst sex with one’s father’s sister’s children is not considered sex with a ‘blood’ 
relative, sex with one’s mother’s sister’s children is. The Akan’s non-moral understanding 
here goes some way towards explaining why their moral judgements concerning sex with 
one’s cousins differ from other cultural groups. Indeed, as Brink points out, this sort of 
explanation could potentially account for a whole range of moral disagreements which turn 
in some way on non-moral facts, concerning such matters as the relative malleability of 
human nature, the economic impact of various government policies and the truth or falsity 
of various religious claims.74 From here on, these sorts of defusing explanations shall be 
termed Non-Moral Disagreement explanations.  
                                                          
73 Appiah, K.A. ‘More Experiments in Ethics’, Neuroethics, (2010) pp.236-237 
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the nature of sin and the teleological structure of human nature. This chapter does not have the scope 
to discuss this issue in depth. For now, I will hold that particular religious beliefs can fall into either 
category depending on their nature, and thus one cannot simply cite differences in religious belief 
between parties as a form of defusing explanation for any moral disagreement.  
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Thirdly, it might be argued that many divergences in ethical norms between communities are 
attributable to self-serving biases, prejudice, or conflicts of interest, leading to a distortion of 
moral reasoning. Each cultural group might deep down recognise the same goods and evils, 
and regard them all as normatively salient to an identical extent, and yet be variable in the 
degree to which they are willing or able to translate these universally recognised values into 
their moral codes and judgements due to these factors. For instance, high status members of 
a cultural group might recognise that social equality is an important moral value and yet 
endorse a system which perpetuates extreme inequality and degradation, even slavery, 
because such a system benefits those in power. One might argue that at least some of the 
ruling classes who lived in the ancient world, for example, on some level recognised that the 
slavery which their civilisation was dependent upon was a morally unjustified breach of 
equality and human dignity. Nonetheless, most chose to wilfully ignore the wrongs that they 
were complicit in and cite ad hoc justifications of the practice, such as Aristotle’s claim that 
many individuals could be deemed ‘natural slaves’ who ultimately benefitted from their 
condition75, in order to reap the benefits which such a system afforded them. It was perhaps 
not the case that they truly believed that slavery was morally justified, but that it was simply 
convenient for them to exercise a form of self-deception over the issue. These types of 
explanations of apparent moral disagreement will go by the term Wilful Ignorance explanations. 
It is important to note that Wilful Ignorance explanations can only be legitimately posited when 
there is an obvious reason why an individual or cultural group would be biased or prejudiced 
with regards to the moral issue under dispute. Without this restriction, it would be too easy 
for one to attribute Wilful Ignorance to either or both parties engaged in a moral disagreement 
without adequate justification.   
 
3. Brandt vs. Moody-Adams on the Hopi 
The ethical theorist Richard Brandt, who wrote on the implications of moral disagreement 
for ethical theory, recognised that the anthropological evidence as it stood did not discount 
such explanations of differences in moral norms between cultural groups.76 He held that prior 
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to his efforts anthropology had failed to provide “an adequate account of a single case, clearly 
showing that there is ultimate disagreement in ethical principal.”77 This is because such 
disagreements as were found could not be said to have taken place under ideal conditions: 
conditions where those disagreeing could be conclusively said to possess similar levels of 
non-moral knowledge and reasoning capacities, be equally impartial, and to be situated within 
relevantly similar conditions. However, in arguably the first example of experimental 
philosophy, he conducted fieldwork which he claimed proved that moral disagreement can 
be sometimes in fact ‘ultimate’ or, in the terminology used here, fundamental. Brandt 
conducted a study to discern the source of some of the supposedly opposing moral norms 
of contemporary westerners and native Hopi peoples of the American southwest. He noted 
that within Hopi culture, children would regularly capture and keep small animals and birds 
as pets. However, they would treat these creatures in a way which, he claimed, most people 
within contemporary western society would find morally abhorrent. The children would 
routinely ‘play’ with their pets in a way which obviously caused them great suffering, broke 
their bones and eventually killed them. He asked the elders of the village whether they were 
aware of this practice, who confirmed that they were. Yet they did not seem to regard it as 
wrong in any way and were perplexed by Brandt’s concern about it.  
Brandt searched for evidence that this apparent moral disagreement concerning the treatment 
of animals could be explained by differences in non-moral understanding or reasoning; 
whether they could be explained away through Non-Moral Disagreement type explanations. He 
asked the Hopi questions such as whether they believed that the animals were capable of pain 
and suffering, that the animals would receive rewards in the afterlife for the entertainment 
they gave humans and for any other relevant non-moral beliefs which might seem to justify 
their ill-treatment. Yet the Hopi did not express any such beliefs: they seemingly had exactly 
the same non-moral understanding of the practice as contemporary westerners but simply 
did not attach the same moral significance to it. As a consequence of this work, Brandt 
concluded that there was a “basic difference of attitude,” 78 between the two cultural groups 
that could not possibly be attributed to non-moral disagreement since “groups do sometimes 
make divergent appraisals when they have identical beliefs about the objects.” 79 
Brandt’s fieldwork would seem to rule out Non-Moral Disagreement type explanations of the 
differences in attitude towards cruelty to animals amongst the Hopi and members of 
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79 Ibid, p.284 
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contemporary western cultural groups, as he conceived of them. Moreover, neither Varying 
Circumstances nor Wilful Ignorance explanations would seem to be able to plausibly account for 
the Hopi’s toleration of animal cruelty. The Hopi’s environmental circumstances are certainly 
dissimilar to that of contemporary westerners. However, there doesn’t seem to be anything 
obviously relevant about their different living conditions which would explain why animal 
suffering would become less morally salient relative to the entertainment of children in the 
light of our own moral principles. Furthermore, to argue that the Hopi deep down recognise 
animal cruelty to be as wrong as contemporary westerners supposedly believe it to be but are 
simply biased or selfish enough to practice self-deception on the issue is similarly far-fetched. 
The elders who tolerated the practice could only be regarded as benefitting from it to the 
extent to that it kept their children occupied which could have been easily achieved through 
many other means. Moreover, there is no good justification for attributing errors in reasoning 
to them in a manner that does not simply beg the question. It seems plausible to presume 
that the Hopi simply do not value the prevention of animal cruelty as much as Brandt thinks 
contemporary westerners do; as he claims, their disagreement is best conceived of as 
fundamental. 
However, in her book Fieldwork in Familiar Places Michele Moody Adams argues against the 
prospect of descriptive cultural relativism and, in particular, claims that Brandt is wrong to 
maintain that his work provides a conclusive example of fundamental moral disagreement 
between the Hopi and contemporary westerners.80 Firstly she suggests that in general it is in 
fact impossible to establish that actual as opposed to merely apparent moral disagreement is 
occurring between members of distinct cultural groups. This, she claims, is because no matter 
how well one considers oneself to understand the outlook and beliefs of a different group, 
one cannot ever be certain whether one is ascribing the same ‘situational meaning’ to the 
same event/act. If they do not in fact attribute the same situational meaning to an event, then 
this alone might be the source of the disagreement. Moody-Adams takes this potential 
interpretation of apparent moral disagreement from Gestalt psychology theorists, such as 
Karl Duncker and Solomon Asch, who held there to be culturally invariant laws of ethical 
valuation and thus deduced that descriptive cultural relativism must be a myth. As Moody-
Adams explains, “The situational meaning of any practice...would typically include a complex 
set of non-moral beliefs about both the “objective” (especially causal) properties and the 
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“subjective” features (or affective associations).”81 To illustrate, she relates Duncker’s own 
example of a culture wherein the elderly and infirm members are routinely killed by their own 
children. If this practice is interpreted by the members of such a cultural group as a means 
of sparing their parents a slow and painful death, or as increasing their chances of a happy 
afterlife, then the act is simply not the same as if the killing is interpreted as the unnecessary 
murder of an innocent person. Thus, when members of two cultural groups make different 
moral judgements about the same behaviour, one can never discount the possibility that each 
party is in fact assigning it a different situational meaning. If this is the case, then their 
disagreement might be conceived as purely one of interpretation, and does not constitute 
fundamental moral disagreement after all.  
This might simply be taken to be a nuanced version of the Non-Moral Disagreement defusing 
explanation, yet it presents itself as more difficult to rule out through the sort of interviewing 
techniques which Brandt employed. For even if one establishes that a member of a different 
cultural group reports to hold identical factual beliefs which we might take to be relevant in 
making their moral judgement, on this explanation their disagreement could yet be limited to 
a differing interpretation of the act/event itself rather than indicate a strictly evaluative 
divergence. We cannot ever be sure that the same act is interpreted against an identical 
background of situational meaning by members of two different cultural groups. Therefore, 
we cannot conclusively determine that they are disagreeing about the moral judgement of the 
same practice, as they interpret it.  
Now, it might possibly be the case that one needs to be entirely immersed within a particular 
cultural group in order to fully understand the precise situational meaning which an individual 
belonging to said culture ascribes to an action or event. The extent to which enculturation 
shapes our understanding and perception of reality is far-reaching, and it is probably 
impossible to regard the world in an identical manner as those brought up in unfamiliar 
environmental and social conditions.  Nonetheless, it is a big step to claim that as a 
consequence of this there is a principled and impervious barrier to identifying any form of 
cross-cultural disagreement as being distinctly evaluative. For although we might differ in the 
situational meaning that we ascribe to various practices depending on the particular cultural 
conditioning we have been exposed to, this does not necessarily entail that we cannot attempt 
to evaluate the act from the standpoint of one who interprets the practice in a different 
manner. If one was barred from at least roughly comprehending and imaginatively adopting 
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the different situational interpretations of those from a different cultural group to this extent, 
then we could expect to encounter far more difficulties in intercultural understanding and 
communication than we do at present. Although we might experience some difficulty in 
discerning how a member of an unfamiliar cultural group is interpreting something or other, 
humans have historically managed to translate the differing understandings of others well 
enough to facilitate cross-cultural interactions, such as, for instance, trade and diplomacy. 
Anthropologists and ethnographers, those who are most acutely aware of just how 
problematic cross-cultural interpretation can be and most familiar with tackling it, are 
themselves generally confident that inferences concerning genuinely evaluative diversity can 
be made given enough training, exposure and empathic sensitivity. We should not so easily 
dismiss their confidence as entirely misplaced on the basis of the supposed implications of 
an unproven and outmoded psychological theory.  
Moreover, as Jesse Prinz argues against this very point, it would be strange if it turned out 
that, whilst there could be the sort of extreme cultural relativism concerning non-moral 
understanding and interpretation that Moody-Adams envisions, there could be no descriptive 
cultural relativism in the field of value whatsoever. In his words, “Unless we have 
independent reasons for thinking values are fixed and immune to cultural permeation, we 
should take divergence in non-moral beliefs as evidence for the possibility of moral 
divergence.”82 Since Moody-Adams does not give us any such independent reasons to believe 
that non-moral and moral cultural relativism is different in this regard, the conclusions she 
draws are very much underdetermined.  
However, even if this interpretation of what is going on when different cultural groups 
apparently morally disagree isn’t taken as plausible, Moody-Adams denies that Brandt’s study 
would provide a good example of a fundamental moral disagreement in any case. She does 
not claim this need be on the grounds that a defusing explanation does in fact apply in this 
particular case, but for the far simpler reason that Brandt misrepresents the actual ethical 
commitments of such a diverse group as ‘contemporary westerners’. She argues that Brandt 
simply assumes both that ‘the reader’ will regard the way in which the Hopi are described as 
treating animals as abhorrent, and that such a disapproving response reflects a general cultural 
sensitivity towards animal suffering. It might indeed be true that most readers of Brandt’s 
work on ethics would morally disapprove of allowing one’s children to maim and kill animals 
for fun. However, Moody-Adams asks, “why should it be assumed that there will be some 
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one kind of response from all imaginable readers of Brandt’s Ethical Theory, and that such a 
response could legitimately be taken to represent a monolithic moral concern for animals in 
those reader’s culture(s)?”83 As she points out, sometimes parents in the western world also 
give pets to their children which they cannot possibly care for, leading to their inevitable 
neglect, abandonment and/or death. Moreover, whilst Brandt claims that the readers’ letters 
column of the New York Times often features letters complaining of the amount of suffering 
which animals endure in slaughterhouses and factory farms, this is hardly representative of 
the whole western culture’s moral outlook; many contemporary westerners remain unfazed 
by such practices. Meanwhile, it remains potentially the case that a minority of the Hopi do 
in fact disapprove of animal cruelty; Brandt’s work only shows that those of the small sample 
he interviewed did not regard it as morally wrong.  
On this point, one may respond that Brandt needn’t prove that every individual westerner 
places a high moral value on animal welfare whilst every single Hopi disregards it as 
unimportant in order to make his point. He need only show that, as a general rule of thumb, 
the Hopi tend to place a lower value on animal welfare than members of western cultural 
groups for reasons which cannot be explained by simple Non-Moral Disagreement, Wilful 
Ignorance or Contingent Circumstance, which is consistent with some westerners valuing it lower 
than some Hopi. This, one might argue, would be enough to establish the existence of at least 
some general fundamental moral disagreement between most members of different cultural 
groups. I return to this point and specifically the relation between moral disagreement 
between and within cultural groups in my next chapter. 
 
4. Doris and Plakias’s Case for Intercultural Moral Disagreement 
As Doris and Plakias note in their aforementioned article, since the work of Brandt more 
studies have been conducted which more conclusively establish decisive and prevalent moral 
disagreements between members of different cultural groups. Inspired by Richard Nisbett, 
who demonstrated that members of East Asian cultures tend to perceive and evaluate the 
world in more collectivist terms than westerners,84 Peng, Doris, Nichols and Stich set out to 
determine whether this translated to similar differences in moral judgements. To do this, they 
presented their participants – Americans of predominantly European descent and Chinese 
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living in China – with a vignette which described a variation of the classic ‘Magistrate and the 
Mob’ hypothetical moral conflict. It asked the reader to imagine a town where an unidentified 
member of an ethnic minority group is known to be responsible for a murder. The police 
chief and judge of the town, which already has a history of ethnic conflict, know for certain 
that unless they quickly find and punish the culprit, rioting against the ethnic group will swiftly 
follow. In order to avoid the considerable amount of property damage, injuries and deaths 
which will inevitably be the consequence of such rioting, they decide to arrest, convict and 
imprison Mr Smith, an entirely innocent member of the minority ethnic group.  
Since, as I discussed in my previous chapter, ethical theories are supposed to deliver answers 
to such cases of moral conflict which are widely held to be intuitively satisfactory, this 
example is often marshalled in attacks on utilitarianism. For it is widely assumed that the 
putative utilitarian response to this thought experiment – that the police chief and judge were 
right to frame Mr Smith, as it would maximise utility – would be intuitively regarded as wrong 
by the vast majority of people. Indeed, the prominent moral philosopher Elizabeth 
Anscombe famously poured scorn on any who would even consider framing the innocent as 
a viable option, declaring “I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.”85 
However, whilst this presumption proved to be correct with regard to the American 
participants, with the majority judging that the police chief and judge had acted wrongly and 
should be punished, the same did not prove true of the Chinese. In fact, Chinese participants 
were significantly more likely to judge that the police chief and judge did not act morally 
wrongly in doing what they did, and furthermore that the potential rioters were primarily 
responsible for the scapegoating. Tellingly however, they did not report that American 
participants universally condemned the police chief and judge as having acted wrongly, or 
that Chinese participants unanimously judged their action to have been permissible. A 
minority of Americans judged the scapegoating as morally permissible, whilst some Chinese 
judged it to be impermissible. The salience of this point shall be discussed in my next chapter. 
Yet for now, it remains significant that a general trend was discerned which reveals a moral 
disagreement between most Chinese and most American participants.  
Peng et al. also probed the participants on some of their non-moral beliefs relevant to the 
hypothetical situation, such as whether they believed the scapegoat would suffer from false 
imprisonment, or whether the riots would cause the members of the ethnic group to suffer. 
They found no significant differences in the answers to such questions between the Chinese 
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and American participants, ruling out any simple form of Non Moral Disagreement defusing 
explanations. It would therefore seem that the best explanation for the differences in moral 
judgements between the two groups is that, at least in this hypothetical situation, the Chinese 
participants generally valued community stability over justice, broadly conceived, whilst the 
North Americans generally ranked these values in the reverse order.  
Even between sub-cultural groups which both inhabit the same wider societal culture, recent 
studies have investigated and found general differences in moral judgements which resist 
defusing explanations. In an earlier work, Nisbett and Cohen set out to explore the relative 
attitudes towards violence between those raised in the northern and southern states of the 
US. Using a wide variety of evidence, such as results from various psychological experiments, 
survey data, crime statistics and legal practices, Nisbett and Cohen argued that southern US 
citizens are significantly more tolerant of the use of violence in response to affronts than 
their northern counterparts.86 This is, they argue, because southerners are brought up within 
a ‘culture of honor’, whereby individuals are expected to respond to affronts with aggression 
in order to maintain their reputation. For instance, they found through surveys that 
southerners were more likely to judge that violence was ‘extremely justified’ in response to 
many different forms of offence, and to regard those who would not react violently to such 
offences in a negative light. Moreover, utilising an imaginative methodology, they sent 
hundreds of identical letters of inquiry to US employers, purporting to be from ex-convict 
who had been convicted of manslaughter. The letter explained that he had accidently killed a 
man whilst in a fight, which came about after the victim publicly gloated that he was sleeping 
with his fiancé and challenged him to step outside “if he was man enough”. After analysing 
over 100 letters of response, they concluded that the southern employers tended to reply in 
a fashion which indicated sympathy and even respect for what he did, whilst northern 
employers were significantly less likely to express any such tolerance. Thus, it seems that there 
is a general disagreement between northern and southern US citizens over the extent to which 
violence is a morally appropriate response to offence.  
Nisbett and Cohen’s explanation as to why such a ‘culture of honor’ exists within the 
southern as opposed to the northern US states is that the former’s economic base used to 
primarily consist of livestock herding, whilst the latter relied chiefly on agrarian agriculture. 
Herd animals can easily be stolen in a way crops cannot, and thus the honor culture developed 
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as a means to deter would-be thieves at a time when the state’s weak law enforcement 
capabilities failed to offer an effective deterrent. This might suggest a potential Varying 
Circumstances defusing explanation for the original disagreement over the appropriate exercise 
of violence: one might claim that although the southerners are just as morally averse to 
violence as northerners, their particular circumstances force them to react violently to 
offences in order to prevent greater moral harms. However, given that the economies of the 
north and south of the US are no longer so focused on agriculture nor relevantly dissimilar 
in any other respect, this can only possibly be offered as an etiological explanation. It can no 
longer function as an adequate defusing explanation of the two different cultural groups’ 
attitudes towards violence, which persist despite the circumstances having evolved to be 
relevantly similar.  
Doris and Plakias cite the Nisbett and Peng studies in particular as providing sufficient 
empirical basis for verifying fundamental moral disagreement.87 They argue that none of the 
various defusing explanations offered by moral realists could possibly apply in either case. 
They go on to claim that forms of moral realism that rely upon the theoretical possibility of 
a universal convergence of moral beliefs based on shared non-moral understanding – 
‘convergentist’ moral realisms – are undermined in light of this empirical truth. As previously 
stated, I need not take a firm stance on the latter point. Nonetheless, Doris and Plakias do 
seem to be right that such studies are compelling evidence of fundamental moral 
disagreement, and of the sort which would support my suggestion that different people place 
a different relative priority on different moral values.  
Of course this is not entirely uncontroversial, with some arguing that these studies are not 
enough to vindicate the existence of fundamental moral disagreement. For instance, Brian 
Leiter contends that much of the data garnered from Nisbett’s study only conclusively proves 
that southerners are more likely to regard violence as more permissible in certain contexts than 
northerners, and thus excusable, which does not necessarily imply that they regard it as morally 
justified as such.88 On his view, this does not count as full blown moral disagreement. Ben 
Fraser and Marc Hauser agree with Leiter on this point, but go further in their critique.89 
They argue that even the cited data from surveys which directly ask the participants whether 
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they regard a hypothetical act of violence as morally justified or not does not necessarily 
indicate any concrete disagreement as such. For whilst Nisbett reports that southerners are 
more likely than northerners to strongly agree with statements such as ‘A man has the right to 
kill to defend his family’ (80% vs. 65%), and regard acts of violence in response to various 
insults as extremely justified (19% vs. 13%), they do not report on how the remainder of the 
participants answered in either case. Fraser and Hauser suggest that this data merely shows 
there to be a difference in degree of agreement, and does not constitute evidence of there 
being actual disagreement concerning the matter. For assuming that the remaining northern 
participants generally agreed to some extent that a man has the right to kill to defend his 
family, and that acts of violence in response to insults are at least somewhat justified, then 
the members of each cultural groups could not necessarily be said to regard each other as 
being in error. The northerners and southerners are still making the same moral judgements, 
only with the latter being more emphatic in them than the former.  
Nonetheless, even if we were to accept this interpretation, on my account this yet may count 
as a fundamental moral disagreement. For although members of the two groups might 
typically come to the same broad judgement concerning whether an action is permissible or 
justified or not, if they attribute a different degree of permissibility or justification to an action 
then this could indicate fundamental disagreement concerning the relative weight of values. 
In this case, southerners regard violence as generally more permissible across contexts and 
specifically more justified when inflicted in response to insults, as well as more strongly 
affirming that men have the right to defend their families than do northerners. This is 
indicative of northerners generally placing a higher weight on the values of peace and 
nonviolence than southerners, and southerners taking personal honour and self/other 
defence to be more weighty values than do northerners. Even if the difference in degree of 
weighting was not enough for the two groups to offer opposing moral judgements in the 
cases raised by Nisbett’s study, they still have value systems which are at odds with one 
another, if only slightly. If one were to ask more specific questions (such as ‘Do people have 
the right to shoot unarmed burglars on their property in the head?’ or ‘Is it 
justified/permissible to punch a total stranger who has called you an asshole in a bar, 
unprovoked, with a closed fist?’) then the underlying disagreement would no doubt make 
itself more clear and result in members of the two groups tending to offer different moral 
judgements. 
Moreover, despite these objections neither Leiter nor Fraser and Hauser argue against the 
prospect of fundamental moral disagreement as such. On the contrary, they present no 
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objection to the inferences made from the cross cultural data on the Magistrate and the Mob 
moral conflict, and even suggest more fruitful sources of evidence for its existence. As I 
discuss in my next chapter, Leiter contends that the long running debates found within 
western ethical philosophy is evidence enough of fundamental moral disagreement. 
Meanwhile, Fraser and Hauser point to a study which suggests that certain rural Mayan 
populations do not recognise the act/omission distinction as morally salient, in contrast with 
the vast majority of cultural groups, highlighting this evidence as a good starting point for 
empirically buttressing the case for fundamental moral disagreement.90 Thus, even those who 
have challenged Doris and Plakias’ analysis of some of the data they use generally agree that 
there is sufficient reason for accepting their general point. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that fundamental moral disagreements exist between members 
of distinct cultural groups. Some, notably those who subscribe to convergent moral realism, 
have offered various defusing explanations, such as Non-Moral Disagreement, Varying 
Circumstances or Wilful Ignorance, for the apparent moral disagreement that is observed between 
different cultures. Although such explanations can potentially account for many of the moral 
disagreements described by anthropologists and ethnographers, more recent cross-cultural 
studies conducted by experimental philosophers have provided examples which are more 
resistant to them. I thus propose that at least some intercultural moral disagreements are best 
explained by appealing to the phenomenological account of moral judgement that I argued 
for in my former chapter, whereby individuals settle conflicts between distinct values through 
reference to one’s own relative weighting of such values. When members of distinct cultural 
groups morally disagree with one another, it is often because each group tends to foster a 
different weighting of the relevant values amongst its members. 
I now wish to develop a more controversial premise which the aforementioned Nisbett 
studies hint at – the possibility of intracultural moral disagreement. In the next chapter, I will 
make the case that fundamental moral disagreement also exists between members of the same 
cultural group, albeit to a lesser extent.  
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Chapter 3 – Intracultural Fundamental Moral 
Disagreement 
 
In the last chapter I argued that given recent findings in moral anthropology, there are good 
grounds for taking members of distinct cultural groups to sometimes be engaged in 
fundamental moral disagreement. I discussed various potential defusing explanations of 
moral disagreement as only apparent, based on either Non-Moral Disagreement, Varying 
Circumstances or Wilful Ignorance.  I proceeded to identify some instances of intercultural moral 
disagreement where these defusing explanations do not seem to apply. I suggested that such 
instances can be more fruitfully explained by appealing to the notion that individuals of 
different cultural groups tend to assign different relative weight to distinct values.  
Here, I will go beyond arguing for there being fundamental moral disagreement between 
distinct cultural groups and develop a case for it also existing within cultural groups. In section 
1 I suggest that although there are some problems involved in identifying when fundamental 
moral disagreement is truly intracultural, depending on one’s conception of what constitutes 
a distinct cultural group, one can still make a strong case for it by establishing its existence 
within both broadly and narrowly defined groups. Section 2 moves on to discuss the sorts of 
intracultural moral disagreements that we encounter in everyday life. I argue that although 
Non-moral Disagreement defusing explanations may sometimes apply in such cases, there are 
reasons to judge that this is not always the case and that it is often fundamental. Next, section 
3 explores the instantiation of moral disagreement within more narrowly defined cultural 
groups. I acknowledge that, whilst moral disagreement is less apparent here, there is at least 
anecdotal evidence of it, and that there are plausible explanations as to why its true extent 
might remain obscured by other factors. In section 4 I present the diversity amongst the 
views of ethical theorists as a good candidate for fundamental intracultural moral 
disagreement. Finally, section 5 discusses evidence for intracultural moral disagreement from 
the same sort of moral anthropology studies discussed in my previous chapter. 
I will conclude that although the empirical case for intracultural fundamental moral 
disagreement is weaker than it is for intercultural fundamental moral disagreement, we are 
still nonetheless justified in inferring that it exists, albeit to a lesser extent. I further suggest 
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that to better understand the root causes of our value pluralistic moral phenomenology as 
well as intercultural and intracultural moral disagreement, we must develop an account of 
moral psychology which is best supported by the available empirical evidence and which 
explains these phenomena. A presentation of such an account forms the basis of my next 
two chapters.  
 
1. Identifying Intracultural vs. Intercultural Moral Disagreement 
The distinction between my claims that there exists fundamental moral disagreement between 
members of different cultural groups, and that such disagreement also exists between 
members of the same cultural group, may be seen as an ambiguous and problematic one. 
This is for two reasons. Firstly, it might be said that there is a tension between the two claims. 
By emphasising the extent to which members of different cultural groups tend to morally 
disagree with one another, one might suggest that I have implied that cultural groups are 
internally homogeneous in terms of the amount of moral concern that they ascribe to values. 
For instance, one might interpret my previous discussion of the Tiv as implying that every 
individual within the group places greater moral weight on family loyalty and group stability 
than every individual within contemporary western cultural groups. However, to the extent 
that this is the case it was but an unfortunate consequence of trying to emphasise the extent 
of intercultural moral disagreement. As I have tried to stipulate, my claims regarding moral 
disagreement between cultural groups are not intended to portray members of such groups 
as morally homogeneous. Whilst I do suggest that individuals within cultural groups are 
typically more likely to place the same sort of weight on values as each other relative to those 
from different cultural groups, this is not supposed to imply that all individuals within the 
same cultural group will weight values in the same manner. The claim is merely that the 
average member of the Tiv values group stability and family loyalty relative to impartiality 
more than the average westerner. This is entirely consistent with some Tiv weighting these 
values in a manner more similar to the average westerner in contrast with the majority of 
their community and vice versa, which would constitute fundamental moral disagreement 
within a cultural group. 
Secondly, it is not always clear where one cultural group begins and another ends. For 
instance, although ‘North Americans’ and even ‘westerners’ in general are sometimes spoken 
of as if inhabiting a single, relatively homogeneous cultural group, one can meaningfully 
categorise such groups as consisting of two or more distinct sub cultures, as Nisbett’s work 
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on the differences in cultural attitudes between northern and southern US citizens highlights. 
Moreover, people can be said to be members of multiple overlapping cultural groups, 
especially in contemporary pluralistic societies. For instance, one might belong to a particular 
ethnic, religious and socio-economic cultural group as well as a national or even regional one. 
Given this, it seems that one could draw the boundaries of cultural groups as loosely or tightly 
as one likes. We could then speak of ‘North Americans’ as a single cultural group, or insist 
that we speak only of such sharply delineated groups such as ‘Anglo-Saxon, working class, 
protestant West Virginians’. This makes the project of establishing the existence of 
fundamental moral disagreement within ‘cultural groups’ a potentially vague one. For whilst 
it might be relatively easy to make the case that such disagreement exists within broad cultural 
groups such as ‘North Americans’ (indeed, if one accepts Doris and Plakias’ analysis of 
Nisbett’s data which I discussed in the previous chapter, then the case has already been 
made), it is a lot trickier to establish it within more narrowly defined cultural groups. As a 
consequence of this ambiguity, it may seem impossible to conclusively determine whether 
fundamental moral disagreement within cultural groups has ever truly been established or 
not. Nonetheless, I will attempt to make the strongest case possible for it given this limitation.  
To clarify my aims, my thesis as a whole argues for the TEA model of moral psychology, 
whereby although socio-cultural influences are strong determinants of one’s particular 
interpretation and weighting of moral values, it is not the only one. In later chapters, I will 
argue that emotion plays a crucial role in moral judgement and that humans are predisposed 
to recognise a similar range of moral values as a consequence of our widely shared innate 
emotional repertoire. Because not only our moral concepts but also our emotional tendencies 
are subject to change through environmental influences, the relative weight that we assign to 
values is shaped by our cultural environment. However, given that humans possess innately 
variable emotional capacities, to some extent those subject to the same sort of culturally 
shared environmental influences might yet differ in the relative weight that they ascribe to 
values. If this is indeed the case, then whilst we should expect moral disagreement to be far 
more ubiquitous and of a stronger degree between those brought up within the same cultural 
groups, we should also see some signs of it within them, however tightly defined they may 
be. There may be more moral agreement within any particular cultural group, but we should 
not expect to see a perfect moral consensus. It is therefore incumbent on me to establish the 
existence of fundamental moral disagreement both between and, to a lesser extent, within 
cultural groups. 
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2. Everyday Intracultural Moral Disagreement  
The first source of evidence for fundamental moral disagreement within cultural groups can 
be derived from simply observing the kind of ethical debates which occur in everyday 
discourse. Whilst there may be a general moral consensus on many issues within most 
cultures, there are yet ethical controversies which provoke strong disagreement between 
members of the same cultural group, broadly defined. In the western world, these include 
such issues as abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia and same sex marriage. Given that 
the parties in disagreement over such issues reside within the same cultural group, and thus 
share similar environmental circumstances, Varying Circumstances defusing explanations can 
be largely ruled out here. Moreover, although each party might charge the other of Wilful 
Ignorance, there usually does not seem to be any obvious reason why either party would have 
a vested interest in maintaining a certain moral position with regard to many of these issues. 
Someone might suggest that pregnant young women who want abortions might have purely 
self-interested reasons to hold that abortion can be morally justified, or that career criminals 
might have non-moral reasons for morally opposing capital punishment. Yet, these sorts of 
cases are a rarity. Most of those who take a moral position in these sorts of issues have no 
obvious personal stake in the matter at hand. For instance, many of those who either morally 
condemn or support euthanasia are healthy individuals with no sick friends or relatives, and 
many heterosexuals support same sex marriage. This leaves it difficult to explain their 
disagreement in terms of the distorting influence of self-interest. 
However, as mentioned earlier, one could claim that these sorts of disagreements are best 
explained by Non-Moral Disagreement defusing explanations. There certainly are disagreements 
over non-moral facts which relate to these cases. For instance, there are debates concerning 
whether capital punishment does in fact constitute an effective deterrent, and whether 
foetuses become sentient earlier than 28 weeks after conception or not. Such non-moral 
considerations do certainly indeed bear on these issues, in terms of contributing to one’s 
understanding of the nature of the trade-off of distinct values that is at stake. For instance, if 
it is true that capital punishment does not effectively deter crime, then one who holds the 
capacity to deter as a morally salient consideration in the application of criminal punishment 
has less reason to endorse it than if it is does, in fact, provide an effective deterrence. 
Moreover, if one takes sentience to be a salient factor in determining the moral worth of a 
being, then the age at which a foetus achieves it is relevant in deciding up to what point after 
conception abortion can be justified. Nonetheless, I contend that at the core of intracultural 
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moral disagreements one can often identify a difference in how each party prioritises such 
values which cannot be resolved via such non-moral factors. 
For instance, in the case of capital punishment, some individuals accept that the evidence 
indicates that it does not constitute an effective deterrent, and yet still maintain that it is 
nonetheless morally justified. As evidence for this, a survey of police chiefs across the US 
found that although the participants rated the efficacy of a capital punishment as a deterrent 
as extremely low, they also were far more likely to support it than the average population.91 
This is most plausibly because, although they might take deterrence to be morally valuable, 
they ultimately believe that the value of retribution alone is more important than the value of 
the lives of those found guilty. In contrast, one who opposes capital punishment might 
concede that it effectively deters potential criminals, but that the right to life of criminals is 
stringent enough to override the moral benefits of its implementation. As a consequence, 
judgements concerning the moral status of capital punishment cannot necessarily be held to 
be entirely dependent on one’s views regarding its capacity for deterrence. Similarly, two 
parties might agree, at least for the sake of argument, that foetuses are sentient before they 
reach 28 weeks old. However, whether or not they believe that abortion can be morally 
justified still hinges on matters which cannot be resolved empirically, such as whether the 
value of women’s control over their bodies trumps that of the foetuses’ life. For instance, 
Judith Thomson famously argued that even if it were uncontroversial that foetuses possessed 
all the capabilities of an adult human, the right to abortion would still be justified.92 As a 
consequence, I maintain that the best explanation of such moral disagreements is that those 
who dissent simply weight the conflicting values at stake in a different manner, rather than 
their moral disagreement being grounded in non-moral disagreement.  
More generally, one could maintain that a significant proportion of political disagreements 
within all cultural groups, past and present, can be attributed to such differences in value 
weighting, and not just the more obviously ethically contentious examples cited above. When 
individuals differ, for instance, on the extent to which we should redistribute wealth, restrict 
free speech or engage in humanitarian intervention, they do not necessarily disagree on the 
costs and benefits of taking such measures. They often seem to merely disagree over whether 
the distinct benefits are worth the distinct costs, all things considered, in each instance. In 
other words, such political disputes as those I refer to above are best characterised in terms 
                                                          
91 Deiter, R. "The Death Penalty is not an Effective Law Enforcement Tool,” in Schonebaum, S.E (ed.): 
Does Capital Punishment Deter Crime? San Diego: Greenhaven Press, (1998) pp.23-27 
92 Thomson, J.J. ‘A Defense of Abortion’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.1 No.1 (1971) pp.47-66 
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of each party to the dispute disagreeing about not only how best to go about achieving certain 
ends, but on what ends are most morally important.  
However, can we ever be entirely sure that such fundamental moral disagreements of these 
sorts actually exist? One might claim that there is no conclusive example of a moral 
disagreement taking place within a cultural group that cannot potentially be attributed to 
some kind of non-moral disagreement(s), if one looks hard enough. To a certain extent, this 
is a fair point. Although philosophers and psychologists such as Brandt, Peng and Stich have 
attempted to rule out Non-Moral Disagreement defusing explanations of moral disagreements 
between members of different cultures through empirical investigation, there have been no 
equivalent studies of disagreements between members of the same culture. Secondly, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter when discussing claims that intercultural moral 
disagreements are only apparent, it is impossible to know for certain that each party involved 
in moral disagreement are in possession of the same situational meaning of an act or event. 
We might point to instances which seem to indicate disagreement over the relative 
importance of values rather than the most effective means of realising that which we all value 
to an equal extent. Nonetheless, we might yet be missing some background interpretational 
difference which is in some way relevant in determining the differing moral judgements.  
On the second point, whilst we might not be able to prove conclusively that those within the 
same cultural group are attributing the same situational meaning to the same practice when 
they morally disagree, this is less of a problematic assumption than it is between those of 
different cultural groups. As I argued in the previous chapter, there is sufficient reason to 
doubt the case that the situational meaning of the same acts varies enough between members 
of different cultural groups to fully explain their moral disagreements. There is even more 
justification for discarding this defusing explanation as applicable between members of the 
same cultural group. The chief reason Duncker and, later, Moody-Adams posit a difference 
in situational meaning as a possible explanation for apparent moral disagreement is that they 
believed that one’s pattern of enculturation in large part determined the meaning that one 
attributed to a practice. When two individuals have been subject to a set of similar socialising 
processes they are therefore likely to interpret the same practice in the same way. Thus, even 
if one accepts that a differing interpretation of the situational meaning of a practice 
sometimes explains a differing moral judgement towards it, this is rarely applicable in terms 
of explaining disagreements within cultural groups.  
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However the first point is the more important objection, and must be considered carefully. 
It is especially worrying given that, anecdotally, it seems that an individual’s moral judgement 
that a certain practice is justified or unjustified typically correlates with the relevant non-moral 
beliefs that would lend credence to their attitude. To take a case study, despite my suggestion 
above, most of those who support capital punishment do in fact tend also to report a belief 
that it is an effective deterrent, whilst those who oppose it generally deny that it effectively 
deters. Nonetheless, I contend that such common correlations do not necessarily entail that 
the moral judgements of such individuals are being driven by their non-moral beliefs. In 
actuality, the path of causation often runs in the opposite direction. This is because of the 
influence of a well-documented psychological tendency of humans called the ‘confirmation 
bias’ and related ‘attitude polarisation’ effect. The confirmation bias causes individuals to 
unintentionally gather, remember, evaluate and interpret evidence selectively, in a manner 
which supports their prior commitments and beliefs. Where the evidence is ambiguous they 
tend to interpret it as confirming their position as correct. This results in attitude polarisation, 
whereby disagreement becomes more rather than less extreme as different parties consider 
evidence relevant to the issue under dispute. This bias has been informally observed as an 
aspect of human reasoning since as far back as Ancient Greece: the historian Thucydides 
noted that "it is a habit of mankind ... to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do 
not fancy."93  However, in the 1960s Peter Wason conducted a series of empirical 
psychological studies on human reasoning which highlighted the effect as particularly 
pervasive, coining the term confirmation bias and using it as an explanation of his results.94  
Furthermore, although this psychological quirk has been noted as affecting all aspects of 
information processing, it has been discerned to be particularly prominent when it comes to 
the interpretation of evidence bearing on one’s political and ethical opinions. In 1979, a study 
led by psychologist Charles Lord was conducted to research the impact of the attitude 
polarisation effect upon those who held strong views on capital punishment.95 In the 
experiment, they first gathered data on participants’ attitudes towards capital punishment and 
their views on its efficacy as a deterrent, then selected those who were particularly strongly 
opposed or in favour of the practice. These participants were divided into small groups and 
                                                          
93 Thucydides, Crawley, Richard (trans) The History of the Peloponnesian War, (431 BCE) The Internet 
Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.mb.txt  
94 Wason, P.C. "On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task", Quarterly Journal of 
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95 Lord, C. Ross, L. and Lepper, M. 'Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
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presented with a short statement of empirical evidence from a purported piece of research, 
which either supported or disputed the notion that capital punishment is an effective 
deterrent. They were then given more information about the research projects which 
produced the evidence they were offered, including critiques and counter-critiques 
concerning their validity. The participants were finally subjected to the same procedure, this 
time presenting them with research which supported the opposite conclusion to that of the 
first piece of evidence they were given.  
The results showed that participants tended to hold their original position on capital 
punishment more strongly when presented with evidence which supported their initial 
beliefs. However, they were far more critical of the research which disputed their prior beliefs, 
typically judging it as poorly designed and conducted, and thus invalid, whilst taking the 
research which confirmed their views on face value. As the experimenters note, this is not 
necessarily an irrational response, depending on how substantiated one’s initial belief is: 
“When an "objective truth" is known or strongly assumed, then studies whose outcomes 
reflect that truth may reasonably be given greater credence than studies whose outcomes fail 
to reflect that truth.”96 Yet the participants were willing to interpret evidence in a biased 
manner to support the very same belief that justified the interpretational bias. They thus ran 
the risk of ensuring that their beliefs are unfalsifiable, and based upon an initial, 
unsubstantiated conviction. This conviction was itself not based upon a fair and balanced 
weighing up of the non-moral evidence, but rather driven by a prior moral commitment.  
Ultimately, the attitude polarisation effect led to the participants being more likely to hold 
their initial attitude towards capital punishment more strongly than before, after being 
presented with both sets of evidence. The results of Lord’s study therefore suggest that 
providing people with an identical range of ambiguous non-moral information relevant to 
making a moral judgement actually results in stronger disagreement, rather than convergence, 
in cases where both parties already hold existing moral beliefs about the matter at hand. 
From this we have good reason for doubting that the moral disagreement which we find 
within cultural groups is entirely the consequence of each party having a different non-moral 
understanding of the relevant issues. For it seems that disputing parties at least some of the 
time tend to assess and acquire non-moral knowledge in order to support their moral 
judgements, rather than basing their moral judgements on an even-handed evaluation of the 
evidence. This is not to say that the latter is impossible. There are certainly cases where one 
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might genuinely change one’s moral judgements when they are introduced to new 
information which suggests that their previous understanding of the nature of the trade-off 
of values was incorrect. However, given that those who live in a broadly similar cultural 
environment generally have access to the same range of non-moral information, this does 
not seem to be an adequate explanation of much of the moral disagreement within societies. 
The disagreements are often fundamentally moral; they are concerned with the relative weight 
that each party assigns to different values. The different non-moral knowledge which each 
party tends to report is often a red herring which does not play the chief role in causing the 
disagreement at hand, but is rather a mere consequence of their prior moral commitments.  
 
3. Moral Disagreement in Narrowly Defined Cultural Groups 
Moral disagreement, then, is evident within large scale cultural groups such as the USA and 
Britain, and we have good reason to believe that in some cases it is fundamental. However, 
in contrast to the level of disagreement we typically find when looking at national cultures as 
a whole, more sharply defined sub-cultural groups tend to share a stronger consensus on 
such ethically contentious issues. For instance, the beliefs that capital punishment is justified 
and that abortion, same sex marriage and euthanasia are morally wrong are widespread 
amongst southern, rural, working class and deeply religious communities in the US, whilst 
they are rarer within richer, urban and more secular east/west coast cultural groups. This is 
undoubtedly in large part due to the aforementioned impact of enculturation in shaping the 
weight one assigns to values, and thus determining one’s moral views. According to my model 
of moral psychology, which I will elaborate in later chapters, the more similar the 
environmental influences individuals are subjected to, the more likely that such individuals 
will weight values in the same manner and thus agree on particular issues. Given that the sort 
of environmental influences individuals within tightly defined sub cultural groups are exposed 
to are more likely to be similar, we should expect there to be more moral consensus within 
narrowly defined sub-cultural groups than within wider, societal cultural groups. Still, as 
noted earlier, on my view we should still expect there to be some fundamental moral 
disagreement within those raised in even strictly defined cultural groups.  
Yet this relative moral homogeneity within sub-cultural groups might also be partly explained 
by other factors. For a start, even if we did accept that sub-cultural groups are in fact generally 
morally homogeneous, this would not necessarily indicate that moral disagreement cannot 
emerge between those subjected to the same cultural influences. This is for the reason that 
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any moral disagreement which does arise might be swiftly resolved through the dissenting 
minority party leaving the cultural group. Iconoclast individuals, or groups of individuals, 
may voluntarily choose to leave the sub-cultural group in which they were raised and to join 
or form new sub-cultures whose value weighting more closely reflects that of their own, at 
least in more socially mobile societies. For instance, take someone born into a cultural group 
in which moral norms which maintain values associated with conservatism, such as order, 
tradition and security, were publicly endorsed. If such an individual rejected the importance 
ascribed to such values in their community, and regarded tolerance, liberty and equality as of 
greater moral salience, they might attempt to leave their cultural group and instead embed 
themselves within one of a more liberal bearing. Given the relative ease with which one may 
relocate and immerse oneself in a different community in, for instance, contemporary, 
pluralistic western societies, this is always an option for people who feel that their own moral 
views do not cohere with those of their native cultural group.  
This being the case, the fact that there is less moral disagreement within sub-cultural groups 
than within societal cultural groups might, in part, reflect individuals culturally migrating into 
groups which endorse the set of values that they most relate to. This is particularly true of 
those cultural groups which define themselves primarily in terms of the values that they 
adhere to, and whose membership mostly consists of those who voluntarily join precisely 
because of the values that they endorse. Thus, the fact that members of the hippie counter-
culture are almost unanimous in their endorsement of liberal as opposed to conservative 
values does not threaten the underlying point that I am trying to make when citing moral 
disagreement within cultural groups. As I note earlier, ultimately I am trying to show that 
cultural influences are not the only determinant of an individual’s values. If some individuals 
who have been exposed to differing cultural influences reject their native cultural group and 
come together to form a new cultural group in light of their shared values, this only goes to 
provide further evidence for my argument. All I need claim is that at least some of those who 
are born and raised within the context of this new group will sometimes morally disagree.  
Moreover, there are other ways in which one might account for apparent moral consensus 
within groups of those who have been exposed to similar cultural influences, and most 
especially within narrowly defined sub-cultures. One important factor is the probability that 
at least some of those who profess to share the same moral judgements of the majority of 
their sub-cultural group are merely reluctantly conforming, and in actual fact disagree with 
them. This suggestion was raised in my previous chapter’s discussion of the Tiv, where I 
posited the possibility that some members of this cultural group might only be endorsing the 
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prevalent moral norms on a public level, whilst privately rejecting them. There I made the 
point that an individual publicly endorsing a particular moral norm or judgement which is 
dominant within the cultural group is not necessarily indication that the individual is deep 
down in agreement with the ranking of values that the norm or judgement entails. They may 
in reality weight values differently and thus fundamentally disagree with the moral outlook 
endorsed by their cultural group, yet not have the courage or conviction to register their 
disagreement openly. I noted that we still have reason to accept that, in general, most 
individuals within the cultural group who openly endorse the common moral judgements of 
the cultural group are doing so authentically. It is too easy to suggest that those who express 
a prioritisation of values in contrast to one’s own are only doing so under social duress and 
deep down agree with our own. Nonetheless, given the extent to which humans are prone to 
social conformism, one certainly can’t discount the likelihood that a minority of those who 
claim to support an apparent moral consensus are in actuality silently dissenting.  
Yet even within narrowly defined cultural groups there still remains open moral disagreement 
which can be interpreted as being fundamental. Anecdotally at least, many admit to 
encountering at least some moral disagreements over certain issues with individuals from an 
almost identical cultural background. Although we might tend to morally agree with those 
from a similar background more often than with those hailing from a less familiar sub-cultural 
group, often we find ourselves in fierce ethical debates with them. Of course, one might 
dismiss this as a peculiarity of the pluralistic, liberal and tolerant cultural groups that we 
happen to inhabits. Whilst moral disagreement might exist in such groups, it is certainly not 
the norm universally, or so the claim would go. However, the tendency for humans to 
wrongly perceive cultural groups of which they are not a part to be more homogeneous than 
their own is also a known socio-psychological bias.97 This is called the ‘out-group 
homogeneity bias’, and has been proven in various studies to lead individuals to erroneously 
judge that members of different ethnic and cultural groups share similar traits, whilst 
attributing a higher level of individual variability within their own group. It is therefore not 
surprising that we might assume that, whilst our own cultural group is morally diverse, moral 
disagreement is non-existent within other cultural groups, given our tendencies to stereotype 
out-groups. Given all this, we should be wary of dismissing the notion that fundamental 
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moral disagreements are non-existent within cultural groups, even narrowly defined ones, on 
the basis of mere social perception. 
 
4. Moral Disagreement Amongst Ethicists 
Let us move now from moral disagreements found within general society to those between 
individuals who specialise in the study of ethics. As alluded to in my previous chapter, Leiter 
highlights the history of western philosophy as an alternative source of evidence for 
fundamental moral disagreement, which provides many prominent examples of ethical 
controversies. He points out that “Even the last hundred years of intensive systematic 
theorising about ethics has done essentially nothing to resolve fundamental disagreements 
between, for example, deontological and consequentialist moral theories. For this 
observation, we do not need empirical studies; we just need to know the history of 
philosophy.”98 These sorts of disagreements might be conceived as particularly good 
candidates for being fundamental, given the onus on specialised ethical theorists to acquaint 
themselves with all the relevant non-moral facts, avoid self-interest, bias and other errors of 
reasoning and focus primarily on the formulation of universal, generalizable ethical principles 
rather than their context-dependent applications. Therefore, at least in principle, they should 
not be easily explainable through Non-Moral Disagreement, Wilful Ignorance or Varying 
Circumstances defusing explanations. Although ethical theorists sometimes accuse each other 
of the former two factors to explain why their opponents have erred in identifying the 
uniquely correct ethical principle(s), they often do so with no real basis other than the 
persuasion of their own opposing intuitions. What’s more, these disagreements often take 
place within what one might regard as prime examples of relatively homogeneous sub-cultural 
groups. Since classical times, philosophers have been accused of being cut from the same 
cultural cloth of the isolated intellectual elites of the time. Today, the lack of cultural diversity 
reflected within university philosophy departments remains a constant worry – the majority 
of academic philosophers are still upper/middle class males of western upbringing and liberal 
cultural backgrounds. However, this does nothing to prevent the sort of disagreements over 
fundamental principles which have occurred among similarly situated ethical theorists since 
long before utilitarians and Kantians drew their lines in the sand.  
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One might object here that these sorts of disagreements, although concerning the nature of 
ethics, are not of the kind that I am looking for. Up to now I have been considering 
disagreements concerning whether certain acts, behaviours and practices are morally justified 
or not. Yet the disagreements between moral philosophers which Leiter highlights are 
primarily theoretical rather than applied. The different parties do not necessarily disagree 
about what is or is not justified, but upon what set of moral principles we should adopt to 
determine the rightness and wrongness of particular acts. For instance, a utilitarian and 
Kantian could both agree that the rule of law must be upheld impartially, yet the former 
might do so on the ultimate basis that this general rule maximises happiness in society, whilst 
the latter on the basis that it respects the dignity of persons. In fact one might claim that 
there is very little disagreement amongst contemporary ethicists upon what is right and wrong 
in particular instances, only about how to go about determining right and wrongness. This is 
a legitimate worry, as it is certainly true that there is more agreement with regard to, for 
instance, the permissibility of abortion and impermissibility of capital punishment amongst 
philosophers than there is concerning the theoretical justification of such stances. 
However there certainly are areas of disagreement within the realm of applied ethics which 
are not purely theoretical.  To offer a few examples, amongst philosophers who discuss the 
ethics of war, there is deep disagreement over such issues as under what conditions, if any, 
employing torture, exercising self-defence or engaging in humanitarian intervention is morally 
justified. Even when the vast majority of philosophers do agree that a certain action is right 
or wrong, there are those who attempt to defend a minority position. For instance, in a 
famous article Judith Jarvis Thompson assesses the moral justification of acting in various so 
called ‘trolley problems’. These are situations whereby saving a group of individuals standing 
on a train track who are about to be killed by a runaway trolley necessitates causing the death 
of a single individual in some manner or other.99 In the standard variation, one could flip a 
switch to redirect a runaway trolley onto another track with only one person there in order 
to save the lives of five individuals. In another, one could push a heavy man off a footbridge 
above the track, killing him in order to stop the runaway trolley and save the five. Although 
most who discussed the article agreed with Thompson’s normative analysis of the first two 
formulations of the problem, there were those who dissented, arguing that her judgements 
regarding the moral permissibility acting in the two variations were wrong.100  
                                                          
99 Thomson, J.J. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’, The Monist, 59, (2), (1976) pp.204-217 
100 For instance, both Peter Singer and Peter Unger have argued on different grounds that there is no 
morally relevant difference between the two chief variants of the trolley problem. (Singer, P. ’Ethics and 
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Moreover, there was more significant dissent over the more complex variations of the trolley 
problem she discussed. For instance, in one variation of the trolley problem, the trolley will 
hit and kill five individuals unless you flip a switch which will redirect the trolley onto a 
looping side track. Stood upon this side track is a heavy man, who will stop the trolley from 
re-joining the main track at the cost of his life, and thereby prevent the death of the five. 
Some philosophers have used this as suggestive that the Kantian prohibition on using people 
as a means to an end can’t quite explain the differences in our responses to the original two 
problems, since they assume we unanimously and intuitively believe it’s right to use the heavy 
man as a means to saving the five in this case. Yet Michael Otsuka simply rejects the notion 
that flipping the switch in the looping track case is permissible, arguing, in contrast, that such 
a judgement is counterintuitive.101 Thus, although philosophers tend to spend much of their 
time debating the potential implications of widely shared ethical intuitions about particular 
cases with regard to ethical theory, they do not always shy away from straight forwardly 
rejecting their opponents intuitions as mistaken.  
 
5. Evidence from Moral Judgement Surveys 
Moreover one can also detect signs of moral disagreement within cultural groups by analysing 
the data collected from various experimental studies in the field of moral psychology. The 
experimental designs of moral psychologists often involve testing folk responses to 
hypothetical cases of moral conflicts through surveying participants on whether they judge a 
potential action in a given situation to be right or wrong, as in the Magistrate and the Mob 
study conducted by Stich et al. Such studies attempt to discern general trends in the moral 
judgements of various populations and use these trends to inform their theories of the moral 
psychology of humans. To take a paradigm example of this methodology in action, the studies 
of John Mikhail ask participants to make judgements on which actions are morally 
permissible in the different variations of Thompson’s aforementioned trolley problems. On 
the back of the data gathered, Mikhail argued that humans are ‘intuitive lawyers’ when it 
comes to making moral judgements, generating them via an innate, unconscious “moral 
grammar” that is analogous in some respects to Noam Chomsky’s model of the innate 
                                                          
Intuitions’, The Journal of Ethics (2005) pp.347-349, Unger, P. ‘Causing and Preventing Serious Harm.’ 
Philosophical Studies 65 (1992) pp.227–255) 
101 Otsuka, M. ‘Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases’, 
Utilitas, 20 (1) (2008) pp.92-110 
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linguistic grammar which enables language development.102 Mikhail stressed the lack of 
variation in responses to his survey from members of very different nationalities, ages, levels 
of education and gender, arguing that moral principles such as the act/omission bias are not 
subject to cross cultural moral disagreement.103  
In a later chapter I will critically discuss Mikhail’s model of moral psychology in greater detail. 
For now, what is more relevant in analysing Mikhail’s own data is that whilst there is a general 
consensus amongst the majority of participants on which actions are morally permissible and 
which impermissible, supposedly regardless of their cultural background, there is a statistically 
significant minority of respondents who dissent in each case. For instance, in the standard 
case whereby a bystander notices a train about to hit and kill five individuals and has to 
choose whether or not to flip a switch that will redirect it onto a line to kill a single individual, 
Mikhail reports that 90% of those tested thought that it was morally permissible for the 
bystander to flip the switch. Meanwhile, in the ‘footbridge’ variation, only 10% thought that 
it was permissible to push a heavy man off a bridge onto the path of the oncoming train, 
killing him but stopping the train and saving the five. It was thus found that Thompson’s 
judgements were generally reflected by popular opinion: she had argued that it would be 
intuitively right to kill the one to save the five in the first case but wrong in the second case. 
However, just as a minority of philosophers have disagreed with Thompson here so too did 
some of the participants. In each case the 10% minority is betraying signs of a fundamental 
moral disagreement with the majority; there was no perfect consensus on what would be 
morally permissible. Meanwhile, other variations of the hypothetical moral conflict had far 
slimmer majorities – in the looping track case, a majority of only 52% of those who responded 
judged that it would be morally impermissible to kill the one to save the five given the 
particular circumstances. Moreover, as in the disagreements found by Peng et al. between 
respondents to the Magistrate and the Mob moral dilemma, there does not seem to be any 
obvious way in which the various defusing explanations could apply. The participants were 
all presented with identical relevant non-moral information and environmental circumstances 
in the vignettes, and there was no plausible reason why they would exercise wilful ignorance 
in making their judgements.  
                                                          
102 Mikhail, J. ‘Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
11, (2007) pp.143-152  
103 Hauser’s study on rural Mayan’s moral judgements in trolley problems discussed in the previous 
chapter might suggest that this is empirically contentious.  
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Although Mikhail is right to suggest that his work demonstrates the moral importance that 
humans generally attach to principles such as the act/omission distinction, the evidence 
suggests that not everyone attaches the same amount of significance to them in determining 
overall moral judgements such as permissibility. Thus, even data which is supposed to prove 
the universality of certain moral principles also indicates that there is still disagreement over 
the relative importance of such principles, even amongst members of the same cultural group. 
Mikhail’s study is just one example of this, but most psychological studies which reveal 
general trends in human moral judgement also show signs of such minority dissent; very 
rarely is there 100% agreement on any moral matter surveyed. A meta-analysis of a wide range 
of moral psychology studies would be required in order to reveal precisely how pervasive and 
robust this observation is. Nonetheless, this example alone goes a long way towards 
substantiating the existence of some fundamental moral disagreement, even within cultural 
groups.  
Of course one might maintain that despite the above evidence of ethical controversies within 
cultural groups, the suggestion that such disagreement is fundamental is yet empirically 
underdetermined. One could object that the mere observation of moral disagreement within 
contemporary western society is still too indeterminate to count as proof that such 
disagreement is truly fundamental. Perhaps, they might say, such disagreement could in fact 
be explained by a sophisticated range of defusing explanations, or at least attributed to 
intercultural disagreement, if one takes a sufficiently fine grained definition of a cultural 
group.  It might be more difficult for one to similarly dismiss the ethical debates found within 
the history of philosophy as either not being fundamental or not occurring between those of 
the same cultural group, yet one might charge that there is no conclusive evidence that strictly 
prevents such an interpretation. Finally, one could dispute the claim that the evidence of 
minority dissent within cultural groups from the data collected by moral psychological 
studies, such as Mikhail’s, really indicates fundamental moral disagreement amongst the 
participants. One might attempt to explain away such apparent dissent as reflecting 
insignificant ‘random noise’ in the results, the fact that some of the participants do not 
understand the questions asked, or that the survey methodology utilised in such studies does 
little to reveal the actual moral intuitions of those surveyed, as some have argued.104 None of 
these potential objections is entirely without basis, and it has to be admitted that each 
individual source of evidence in favour of fundamental moral disagreement within cultural 
                                                          
104 See for example Cullen, S. ‘Survey-Driven Romanticism’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, (2010) 
pp.275-296 
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groups can’t be deemed conclusive when considered in isolation. However, I contend that 
their combined force gives us sufficient reason to accept the existence of fundamental moral 
disagreement within cultural groups as an inference to the best explanation. Until more 
evidence or sophisticated argument arises challenging the notion that fundamental moral 
disagreement does in fact exist, or that such disagreement can only possibly be explained by 
cultural influences, we can provisionally assume that it exists within, as well as between, 
cultural groups.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided a robust case for fundamental intracultural moral 
disagreement. It may indeed be difficult to provide a conclusive proof, given the complexities 
involved in defining cultural groups and ruling out various defusing explanations.  Yet 
although there tends to be more moral consensus within cultures than between them, 
especially the more narrowly we define a cultural group, there are nonetheless good reasons 
for taking there to be intracultural fundamental moral disagreement. Some of the moral 
disagreement within cultural groups could be masked by conformism, or through individuals 
leaving groups which don’t share their weighting of values to join those that do. Moreover, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that moral disagreement does indeed occur between those of 
very similar cultural backgrounds. Although we might explain this as stemming from Non-
Moral Disagreement given the different non-moral beliefs disputants in such disagreements tend 
to hold, this might only indicate the influence of confirmation bias. Amongst the relatively 
culturally homogeneous field of ethicists there is not only disagreement concerning the 
theoretical basis of value, but normative disagreement which indicates variation in the 
weighting of values. Finally, whilst the results of moral judgement surveys typically establish 
a degree of commonality between the judgements of participants, they also invariably indicate 
some level moral disagreement, even between those of the same cultural group. Taking all 
this evidence together, I hope to have convinced the reader that we have a strong 
presumptive basis for taking moral disagreement within cultural groups as sometimes 
fundamental.  
In the next two chapters, I intend to provide a sketch of an account of human moral 
psychology which has the capacity to explain these conclusions and is independently 
supported by empirical evidence. More specifically, I will attempt to account for the following 
facts: 1) Agents experience a widely shared range of values as distinct across cultural groups, 
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2) There are vast disagreements over the relative importance of such values between cultural 
groups and 3) Some such disagreement emerges and persists even within cultural groups. My 
general claim will be that humans possess a psychology which is predisposed to recognise 
and internalise the moral norms and value ranking of the environment in which they are 
socialised. However, I also posit an important role for innate affect mechanisms in shaping 
our moral values, help account for both the general cross-cultural themes in morality and for 
the moral disagreement found within cultural groups.  
78 
 
Chapter 4: The TEA Model of Moral Psychology 
 
The latter two chapters argued that at least some of the moral disagreements which we 
encounter both between and within cultural groups are best understood as fundamental. This 
is to say that they are not easily conceived of as subject to defusing explanations, such as Non-
Moral Disagreement, Varying Circumstances or Wilful Ignorance. Rather, the most plausible 
explanation is that such disagreements are the consequence of different individuals ascribing 
different relative weights to the distinct considerations which they consider to be morally 
salient. In making my argument, I reviewed and analysed a range of empirical evidence 
garnered from psychological and anthropological studies. I further suggested that in order to 
better understand the root causes of fundamental moral disagreement, it would be useful to 
further explore the conclusions that moral psychologists have come to regarding how the 
human mind comes to attribute moral significance to various considerations.  
One thing to emphasise from the outset is that my approach in this regard is guided by my 
previous discussion on the scope of moral disagreement. There I claimed that there is some 
broad similarity in the moral values of all cultural groups, but that there is also fundamental 
moral disagreement, as a consequence of diversity in the weighting of values. This 
disagreement occurs most obviously between members of different groups but is also evident 
between members of the same cultural group. This motivates the general thought that our 
moral psychology is a product of some kind of interaction between innate psychological 
factors and cultural forces. There may be other explanations for the fact that certain values 
are widespread across many distinct cultural groups, but that such values stem from innate 
psychological features is most plausibly the case. Moreover, the fact that intercultural moral 
disagreement is more evident than intracultural moral disagreement indicates that some, but 
not all, of our value weighting is shaped by enculturation. I thereby take there to be a 
presumption in favour of a psycho-cultural interactionism account of moral psychology. The 
challenge is to elaborate on this, and determine just what kind of interaction is involved.  
In this chapter, I will attempt this task.  Section 1 briefly discusses Elliot Turiel’s 
moral/conventional distinction.  In section 2 I move on to explicate Shaun Nichols position 
on the psychology of moral judgement. In the course of doing so, I sympathetically highlight 
his contention that emotion plays a necessary and prominent role in individual moral 
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judgement and cite various sources of evidence in support of this claim. Section 3 introduces 
Nichols’ ‘Affective Resonance’ hypothesis, which holds that emotion also has an important 
part to play in the cultural evolution of moral norms. Whilst I agree with Nichols’ general 
framework, in section 4 I argue that it leaves more to be said about the precise relation 
between emotions, values and norms. In order to address this explanatory deficiency, in 
section 5 I turn to Jon Haidt’s account of the emotional foundations of moral concern. 
Section 6 explains how the fundamental insights of both Nichols’ and Haidt’s models of 
moral psychology can be combined to help furnish my own proposed TEA (Two-stage 
Enculturated Affect) model of moral psychology. This model explains both individual moral 
judgement and the cultural construction of moral concepts.  
I conclude by suggesting that the sketch of moral psychology which I present has the 
potential to help in our understanding of moral conflict and fundamental moral disagreement. 
It is well supported by a wide range of empirical evidence and, as such, we have good grounds 
for accepting it as a working model of moral psychology to adopt in order to explain the 
conclusions I drew in my previous chapters. In the next chapter, I will go on to discuss some 
competing models of moral psychology. I will argue that the account presented here is to be 
favoured for independent reasons, but also gains credence over the alternatives insofar as it 
is better situated to account for the phenomenology of moral conflict, along with intercultural 
and intracultural moral disagreement. 
 
1. The Moral/Conventional Distinction 
After the work of Kohlberg mentioned in the introduction, empirical investigation into the 
psychology of moral development continued with the work of Elliot Turiel, who designed 
and conducted the moral/conventional task to record the emergence of moral judgement in 
children.105 He found that when presented with an example of a prototypical moral 
transgression, children as young as three displayed a signature pattern of responses which 
tended to cluster together in a law-like fashion. These response patterns systematically 
differed from those which they offered towards transgressions of prototypical conventional 
rules. Participants consistently judged that moral transgressions, which typically involved 
harm, injustice or violation of rights, were, in contrast to violations of conventional rules, 
                                                          
105 See Turiel, E. The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. (1983) 
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universally wrong independently of whether any authority permitted it or not, or whether it 
occurred in a different locality or period in history. For instance, participants typically judged 
that it would be okay to talk in class if the teacher allowed it, or within a different community 
which had no rule against talking in class. However, they denied that it would ever be okay 
to hit or pull another child’s hair, regardless of the locality or if the teacher permitted it. 
Furthermore, moral transgressions were judged by participants to be more serious than 
violations of conventional rules. Finally, the justifications participants offered as to why moral 
transgressions were wrong invoked the harm or injustice suffered by the victim, whereas 
conventional transgressions were explained as wrong by virtue of their potential to upset the 
social order.  
The moral/conventional task was replicated many times across a wide variety of cultural 
groups and similar response patterns were reliably elicited from many diverse sets of 
participants. However, in some variations, transgressions which did not involve harm, 
injustice or rights violations were found to evoke a signature moral response pattern amongst 
members of certain cultural groups. For instance, Jon Haidt found that members of low 
socio-economic status groups in Brazil and the USA judged washing a toilet bowl with the 
national flag and masturbating with and then cooking and eating a dead chicken to be serious, 
authority independent transgressions which were universally impermissible.106 Yet although 
members of some cultural groups might treat transgressions involving disgusting or 
disrespectful acts as prototypically moral rather than conventional, this only suggests that 
individuals exposed to certain environmental influences take a wider range of considerations 
to be morally salient than those exposed to different conditions. It only expands the range of 
norms which people may treat as prototypically moral, depending on their cultural group, 
rather than directly threatening the existence of the moral/conventional distinction as 
psychologically real.107  
                                                          
106 Haidt, J. Koller, S. and Dias, M. ‘Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?’ Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, (1993), 613-628. 
107 Some recent studies have produced evidence which does purport to challenge the existence of the 
moral/conventional distinction – see Kelly, D et al. ‘Harm, Affect and the Moral Conventional Distinction’ 
in Mind & Language, Vol. 22 No. 2 (2007), pp. 117–131. I will not discuss this counter-evidence in detail, 
except to note that although Kelly et al. show that certain instances of harm do not elicit a pattern of 
moral response amongst participants, the instances of harm they tested for do not count, in the context 
presented, as obviously unjustified transgressions as such. The moral conventional task is not aiming to 
show that a moral response pattern will be necessarily be elicited when a participant is confronted with 
any instance of harm, only instances of clearly unjustified harm which transgress a social norm. See 
Sousa, P. ‘On Testing the ‘Moral Law’’, Mind and Language 24 (2009) pp.209-234. Thus, there is still a 
solid basis for us to conclude that the distinction between moral and conventional transgressions is one 
which people are typically psychologically disposed to make.  
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2. Nichols’ Account of Affect and Moral Judgement 
Shaun Nichols takes the aforementioned studies on the moral/conventional distinction as 
the starting point for articulating his thesis that emotional responses are heavily implicated in 
both individual moral judgement and the cultural development of moral norms. He promotes 
his account within a range of articles, but the most thorough-going account can be found in 
his book Sentimental Rules – On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement.108   
The evidence collected from the moral/conventional distinction task suggests that humans 
are almost universally psychologically disposed to treat certain norms as more morally salient 
than others. Nonetheless, James Blair found that individuals diagnosed with psychopathy and 
children with psychopathic tendencies, in contrast with individuals diagnosed with other 
types of mental disorder (notably autism), consistently fail to draw the moral/conventional 
distinction.109 As Nichols notes, it would seem that this evidence undermines those accounts 
of moral psychology which ground moral judgement primarily upon perspective-taking and 
mindreading, or ‘mentalizing’.110 Such psychological abilities are used in attributing, 
understanding and imaginatively adopting the mental states of other individuals. Since some 
of the major characteristics associated with autistic individuals are impaired mindreading and 
perspective-taking abilities, the proven ability of autistic individuals to successfully draw the 
moral/conventional distinction implies that these abilities are not necessarily the most 
important psychological capacities required for making characteristically moral judgements. 
Rather, the evidence suggests that the capacity for moral judgement is primarily facilitated by 
psychological features which are impaired in psychopathic individuals in particular. Such 
individuals typically suffer no impairment in their cognitive mindreading or perspective-
taking abilities and yet exhibit a reduced empathic response towards others.111 
                                                          
108 Nichols, S. Sentimental Rules – On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004 
109 See Blair, R. ‘A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath.’ 
Cognition, 57. (1995)  and Blair, R. ‘Moral Reasoning and the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies’ 
Personality and Individual Differences, 26. (1997) 
110 Ibid. pp.10-11 Nichols later holds that the fact that autistic individuals can successfully draw the moral 
conventional distinction is insufficient evidence for completely disassociating mindreading ability from 
moral judgement. He highlights evidence which suggests that although autistic individuals have impaired 
mindreading abilities, they can represent at least some mental states of others, given that they possess 
the ability to attribute simple emotions and desires to others. As such, drawing the moral/conventional 
distinction might yet actually require some minimal mindreading ability that autistic individuals do 
possess. Yet this does not challenge the central point, which is that mindreading ability is not the only, or 
even most the important, psychological capacity required for forming moral judgements.  
111 Blair, R. et al. ‘Theory of Mind in the Psychopath.’ Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 7 (1996) pp.15-25 
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Drawing on a range of evidence, Blair maintains that a major psychological feature which is 
impaired in psychopathic individuals is the Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM).112 The 
VIM is hypothesised as a feature of the psychologies of a range of social mammals and 
activates in response to the representation of distress cues or action types associated with 
distress cues. This elicits a withdrawal response, and through what Blair refers to as ‘meaning 
analysis’, is experienced by the subject as affectively aversive in nature. On Blair’s account, 
this aversion is what leads to the drawing of the moral/conventional distinction and 
represents the key component in making characteristically moral judgements. Those norm 
transgressions which activate the VIM generate an aversive response on the part of 
individuals, who then go on to identify such transgressions as seriously and universally wrong 
independent of authority, in contrast to conventional transgressions which do not activate 
the VIM. Psychopaths and children with psychopathic tendencies, however, have a defect in 
this mechanism, as evidenced by their abnormally low physiological response to distress cues, 
whilst autistic individuals show no such deficit in their distress response.113 Thus, psychopaths 
fail to make the moral/conventional distinction as a consequence of their tendency not to 
experience the aversive affective response associated with the activation of the VIM.  
Meanwhile, autistic individuals can typically draw the distinction since whilst they may have 
impaired perspective taking abilities, their VIM generally remains intact. 
Nichols argues that Blair’s research does much to highlight the crucial role that affective 
mechanisms play in moral judgement. Most accounts of psychopathy agree that the core 
symptoms are explainable in terms of emotional deficiencies. Moreover, given the evidence 
that Blair cites, the impairment of something like the VIM is plausibly an important feature 
of psychopathy (although most accounts suggest that this is not the only affective impairment 
characteristic of the disorder).114 Yet, as Nichols explains, psychopathic individuals do not 
seem to possess any characteristic impairment of their general reasoning capacities.115 In 
contrast psychopathic individuals are often highly adept at deliberation and manipulation, 
which they utilise in order to advance their own self-interest; they simply lack the inclination 
                                                          
112 Blair, R. ‘A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath.’ Cognition, 
57. (1995)   
113 See Blair, R. et al. ‘The Psychopathic Individual: A Lack of Responsiveness to Distress Cues?’ 
Psychophysiology 34 (1997) pp.192-98, Blair, R. ‘Reponsiveness to Distress Cues in the Child with 
Psychopathic Tendencies.’ Personality and Individual Differences 27 (1999) pp.135-45 and Blair, R. 
‘Psychophysiological responsiveness to the Distress of Others in Children with Autism’ Personality and 
Individual Differences 26 (1999) pp.477-85 
114 See Blair, R. Mitchell, D. and Blair, K. The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing (2005) for an account of the broader range of affective impairments involved in psychopathy.  
115 Nichols, S. Sentimental Rules, pp.77-82 
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to moderate their behaviour out of concern for others. It would thus seem that their inability 
to draw the moral/conventional distinction, as well as their associated lack of moral regard 
exemplified by their behaviour, stems chiefly from some sort of affective impairment. 
As we have seen from Haidt’s study on disgust based transgressions, members of some 
cultural groups typically offer a prototypically moral pattern of responses to transgressions 
which we would not expect to activate the VIM. It therefore seems likely that prototypically 
moral judgements can sometimes be motivated by affective aversions other than those 
generated through distress cues specifically. This will be discussed further in section 3, where 
I articulate Haidt’s account of the emotional foundations of moral judgement. In any case, 
the evidence from the moral/conventional distinction task points to the conclusion that our 
affective responses have a strong causal role in facilitating the moral judgements of 
individuals. Before moving on, though, I will first highlight some further evidence for this 
proposition.  
Haidt is another moral psychologist who emphasises the extent to which moral judgement is 
governed by affective psychological mechanisms which form our moral intuitions. In contrast 
to Kohlberg, he suggests that our explicit moral reasoning has only a very weak role in 
shaping our moral judgements. To the extent that reasoning does have a causal role in moral 
judgement, Haidt maintains that it lies mainly in the moral reasoning which others within the 
individual’s social group offer for their judgements. For the most part, private, conscious 
moral reasoning only serves to provide post-hoc rationalisations and justifications for the 
moral judgements that the individual has already intuitively arrived at. In his famous and 
influential 2001 paper, ‘The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail’, Haidt presents this ‘Social 
Intuitionist’ model of moral judgement, which refers to an impressive range of empirical 
evidence to support his claims.116 
Haidt’s major source of evidence for the automatic, unconscious nature of moral judgement 
comes from his own research into ‘moral dumbfounding’. Dumbfounding occurs when an 
individual experiences a strong moral response towards something, and yet is unable to 
provide adequate reasons to justify the judgement that they deliver. Haidt observed this 
phenomenon upon conducting a study where participants were presented with the following 
story: 
                                                          
116 Haidt, J. ‘The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.’ 
Psychological Review. 108, (2001) pp.814-834. 
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‘Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in 
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying 
alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be 
interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it 
would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking 
birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They 
both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They 
keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer 
to each other.’  
Participants tended to immediately judge that Julie and Mark acted wrongly, before being 
asked to offer reasons for their condemnation. Yet the reasons typically offered were not 
applicable to this specific example.  For instance, they would claim that it was wrong because 
of the deleterious genetic effects of inbreeding, or because it would cause emotional harm. 
Yet the story specifically stipulates that Mark and Julie used two forms of birth control and 
were not in any way traumatised by the event. Confronted with the inapplicability of their 
objections, participants would often, stutter, laugh and concede that they could not provide 
any satisfactory justification for their moral condemnation. Nonetheless, they would continue 
to forcefully maintain their original conclusion that Mark and Julie’s actions were 
impermissible. On the basis of this, Haidt claims that moral judgements cannot always be the 
product of conscious deliberation, but often stem from gut responses which we later try to 
rationally justify to ourselves and others, sometimes unsuccessfully.  
The fact that we often do not have conscious access to the processes which determine our 
moral intuitions alone does not prove that they are a product of emotion rather than reason. 
Nonetheless, Haidt maintains that these intuitions are affective rather than cognitive in 
nature. He highlights a range of evidence to support this claim, but the most important comes 
from studies which he himself conducted. In one such study Haidt and his colleague Thalia 
Wheatley manipulated participants through hypnotic suggestion to feel a pang of disgust 
when confronted with affectively neutral words, such as ‘take’ or ‘often’. They were then 
asked to read stories which contained the words ‘take’ or ‘often’, then make moral judgements 
regarding them. Participants made higher ratings of both disgust and moral condemnation 
towards those stories which contained the word that they had been primed to feel disgust 
upon encountering. This suggests both that the hypnotic suggestion technique did 
successfully manage to manipulate the disgust of the participants, and that disgust had at least 
some causal role in moderating the strength of the moral judgement they arrived at. 117  The 
                                                          
117 Wheatley, T. Haidt, J. ‘Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgements More Severe’ Psychological Science 
Vol.16 No.10 (2005) pp.780-784 
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evidence for this claim has been replicated through experiments which employed alternative 
means of priming for disgust. These studies found that participants who had been exposed 
to disgusting smells and environments whilst making moral judgements tended to make more 
severe judgements, especially towards transgressions of norms regulating certain behaviours 
(such as drug consumption and sexual promiscuity), than those who hadn’t been so exposed 
to disgusting stimulus.118 Moreover, although most of the research on the causal influence of 
emotion on moral judgement has concentrated on disgust, priming for other emotional states 
such as anger, anxiety, sadness and amusement has also been found to have an influence.119  
Further evidence for the role of affective responses being causally involved in moral 
judgement comes from the work of Joshua Greene. Greene conducted experiments which 
subjected participants to functional neuroimaging (fMRI) whilst engaging with the sort of 
trolley problems mentioned in chapter three, along with other moral conflicts. He found that 
trolley problems which involved personal harm violations (such as the footbridge variation 
mentioned in the previous chapter) activated areas of the brain associated with emotional 
response. 120   Moreover, areas of the brain associated with cognitive control and working 
memory were activated amongst participants who gave characteristically utilitarian 
judgements (such as pushing the heavy man off the bridge to stop the trolley) in such 
scenarios, and their reaction time was slower. Greene argues that this supports a dual-
processing model of moral judgement, whereby characteristically deontological judgements 
are produced by an automatic, emotional system, whilst characteristically utilitarian 
judgements are driven by more controlled cognitive processes. This neatly explains the 
differences in the neural activity and reaction time between individuals who came to opposing 
moral judgements. According to Greene, those who made deontological judgements went 
with their emotional gut instinct, whilst those who made utilitarian judgements experienced 
an emotional response, but through exercising cognitive control managed to override it and 
deliver a utilitarian judgement. 
                                                          
118 Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G.L., Jordan, H. ‘Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment.’ Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 34 8, (2008) pp.1096-1109. 
119 See Horberg, E.J, Oveis, C, Keltner, D. ‘Emotions as Moral Amplifiers: An Appraisal Tendency Approach 
to the Influences of Distinct Emotions upon Moral Judgment’ Emotion Review Vol.3 No.3 (2011) pp.239-
240, Perkins, A. M. et al. ‘A Dose of Ruthlessness: Interpersonal Moral judgment is Hardened by the Anti-
anxiety Drug Lorazepam’ Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, (2013) pp.612–620 and 
Youssef, F. et al. ‘Stress Alters Personal Moral Decision Making’, Psychoneuroendocrinology, 37, (2012) 
pp.491–498. 
120 Greene, J.D. et al. ‘An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment’. Science 293, 
(2001)  pp.2105–2108 
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This position gains further support from evidence that brain injury patients with emotion-
related damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are prone to make highly 
utilitarian judgements when faced with moral dilemmas.  On Greene’s account, these patients 
experienced no emotional response when faced with personal harm violation. The resulting 
lack of conflict between their emotional and cognitive systems then led them to arrive at the 
default utilitarian judgement. This entails that emotional response does indeed have a causal 
role in moral judgement, at least insofar as it causes some individuals to come to deontological 
moral judgements. In fact, this represents just one example of a wide range of evidence from 
various brain injury patients which all implicate the importance of the VMPFC and other 
areas of the brain associated with emotion shaping interpersonal and social reasoning. 121   
Finally, there is also evidence that the particular emotional dispositions of individuals can 
predict their moral judgements in particular areas. In a study by Inbar et al., it was found that 
participants who ranked highly on a measure of general disgust sensitivity were more likely 
to make judgements which indicated an intuitive moral disapproval of gay men kissing in 
public. This effect did not occur when participants were asked about public kissing between 
heterosexual couples. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the stronger the effect 
was, despite most participants not offering explicit moral condemnation of homosexuality.122 
This suggests that one’s particular affective dispositions have the capacity to influence one’s 
moral judgements, at least on the implicit level. 
Considered collectively, this evidence strongly supports Blair’s contention that affective 
responses play an important role in shaping moral judgement. Nonetheless, Nichols points 
out that there is an important explanatory gap within Blair’s account; its failure to account 
for the distinction between judgements of badness and judgements of moral wrongness. 
Badness and wrongness are no doubt related, insofar as an action is often considered wrong 
to the extent that it involves badness. However, although we might judge certain events which 
would activate the VIM or other negative affective responses as bad, we might not necessarily 
judge them to be wrong.123 We do not, for instance, consider pains such as toothache or 
natural disasters as ‘wrong’, nor make moral judgements when we witness accidental injuries. 
So although something like the VIM and other affective dispositions might help explain how 
                                                          
121 Koenigs, M. et al. ‘Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements’ Nature 
446, (2007) pp.908–911 
122 Inbar, Y. et al. ‘Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays.’ Emotion 9 (3) (2009) pp.435-
439 
123 Nichols, S. “Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment.” Cognition, 84 
(2002) pp.221-236. 
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we come to judge something as bad, it is not sufficient for explaining why we judge some of 
these things as also being wrong. Nichols therefore suggests that there is a further 
psychological mechanism underpinning the capacity to make characteristically moral 
judgements; the ability to retain a body of internally represented rules prohibiting certain 
behaviours, which constitutes a ‘normative theory’. Thus, one can fail to make a 
characteristically moral judgement by either lacking the relevant component of one’s 
normative theory or the affective mechanism which facilitates the distinction between 
conventional norms and moral norms. Although psychopathic individuals are capable of 
developing such a normative theory through social transmission, their lack of an affective 
response to the transgression of certain norms explains their inability to draw the 
moral/conventional distinction. 
Nichols thereby conjectures two main features of human moral psychology; the normative 
theory, and the affective dispositions which facilitate our tendency to treat some norms as 
moral and others as merely conventional. Although we might evaluate various behaviours 
and events as good or bad on the basis of our affective responses to them, we also require a 
normative theory which prohibits and recommends certain behaviours in order to judge them 
as right or wrong. Where, then, do the contents of our normative theory come from?  
Although our capacity to develop a normative theory is presumably innate, Nichols conceives 
the content of each individual’s normative theory itself as for the most part shaped by the 
cultural environment in which they are raised. Nonetheless, the norms which happen to 
originate and persist within cultural environments are not conceived of as arbitrary. Rather, 
according to Nichols ‘Affective Resonance’ hypothesis, the affective dispositions of 
individuals also influences the sorts of norms which are liable to originate and persist within 
a particular cultural environment, and thus end up as part of our normative theory. The next 
section will elaborate on this proposed account of the cultural evolution of moral norms.  
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3. Nichols’ Affective Resonance Hypothesis 
In articulating his Affective Resonance hypothesis, Nichols builds on the work of the 
anthropologist Dan Sperber. Utilising an epidemiological approach to cultural evolution, 
Sperber argues that our innate biases, which are a product of evolutionary processes, have 
the potential to significantly impact the development of cultural norms and beliefs.124  He 
suggests that much of the innate structure of our minds is composed of domain specific 
learning modules which shape the learning process, making some outcomes more likely than 
others. During the process of social learning, the learner, or so called ‘cultural child’, does 
not absorb and retain all norms and beliefs of the ‘cultural parent’ indiscriminately. Rather, 
the process of cultural transmission of information is moderated through the innate biases 
generated by the cultural child’s learning modules, or so called ‘attractors’. These attractors 
render certain norms and belief more appealing and easier to detect, infer, remember and 
store than others. To couch it in terms of cultural evolution, those norms and beliefs which 
are more compatible with the innate biases arising from our learning modules gain a fitness 
advantage over those that aren’t, and are more likely to survive and spread across the 
generations than those that are less congruent with our psychological predispositions.  
However, Sperber is not an adherent of the meme theory of culture, which he holds takes 
the analogy between cultural and biological evolution too far. In contrast, he argues that 
“...there is much greater slack between descent and similarity in the case of cultural 
transmission than there is in the biological case. Most cultural descendants are 
transformations, not replicas.’125 For he maintains that attractors not only influence which 
norms and beliefs survive the process of cultural transmission but also have the potential to 
modify the content of what is culturally transmitted.  For instance, if a cultural parent tells 
the cultural child a story, that child’s psychological attractors might lead them to 
misremember the precise details of the plot and characters, then go on to retell her own, 
slightly modified version which is more attuned to their attractors. Although such attractors 
might only have a weak effect on an individual level, over the span of generations they have 
the potential to significantly influence the path which cultural development follows. This 
provides a potential explanation as to why there are many common themes in the norms and 
beliefs of distinct cultural groups, despite the evident diversity between them. 
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Sperber, along with his followers, generally concentrate on innate cognitive psychological 
features such as folk biology, physics and psychology, as the most important bases of the 
attractors which influence cultural development. For instance, Pascal Boyer applies the 
Sperberian, epidemiological account of cultural evolution to explain the cross-cultural 
commonalities found in religious beliefs. In doing so he invokes learning biases which are 
the result of our innate tendencies to attribute mental states such as intentions, beliefs and 
desires towards sentient beings, even those which are conceived of as supernatural. 126 
However, Nichols argues that our innate emotional tendencies are also prime candidates for 
taking the role of Sperberian learning biases in the cultural evolution of moral norms. It seems 
intuitive that a stimulus which elicits an affective response strikes us as more important and 
distinctive than a stimulus which doesn’t, and Nichols suggests that this common-sense 
notion is to some extent vindicated from psychological studies on memory. He points to 
evidence which indicates that descriptions and images which elicit affective responses are 
more easily retained and recalled in the long term by participants than affectively neutral 
stimuli. For instance, in one study, participants were given lists of affectively-charged words 
(such as ‘rape’ or ‘vomit’) and affectively-neutral words.127 It was found that participants were 
far better at recalling the affectively-charged words than the neutral words after a week. These 
sorts of findings have been replicated in a range of further studies, which collectively suggest 
that long term retention is generally enhanced when an emotionally salient stimulus is 
invoked.128 The potential for long term retention of a norm or belief is one of the most 
important determinants of its cultural fitness. It follows that those norms and beliefs which 
concern behaviour that we are innately prepared to take as emotionally salient will be more 
likely to survive the process of cultural evolution than those concerning behaviour which we 
are less disposed to be emotionally aroused by.  
However, Nichols does not take this for granted, but offers independent evidence for his 
Affective Resonance hypothesis in the form of a systematic review of the genealogy of 
etiquette norms. 129 Noting that historians of etiquette have emphasised the role that disgust 
has played in the cultural development of table manners, Nichols decided to test whether 
norms prohibiting actions that we are innately disposed to experience a disgust response 
                                                          
126 See Boyer, P. Religion Explained, New York: Basic Books (2001),  
127 Kleinsmith, L., Kaplan, S. ‘Paired-associate Learning as a Function of Arousal and Interpolated Interval’ 
Journal of Experimental Psychology (1963) pp.190-193 
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towards are, in fact, more likely to survive the process of cultural evolution. To achieve this 
he performed a statistical comparison of the norms detailed in one of the first influential 
etiquette manuals in Western Europe (Desiderius Erasmus’s Good Manners For Boys of 1530) 
with contemporary etiquette norms. He employed individuals who had no knowledge of his 
hypothesis to code for those norms in the manual which prohibit actions which elicit core 
disgust (namely those involving bodily fluids, such as norms prohibiting spitting, vomiting 
and urinating) and those which didn’t, then determine whether each norm remained part of 
contemporary etiquette standards. Upon performing his analysis from the independent 
encoder data, he concluded that those norms mentioned which prohibit disgusting actions 
did indeed exemplify the increased cultural fitness which he refers to. Not only were these 
rules more likely to survive the process of cultural evolution, but they now are so strongly 
embedded within our culture that it appears odd to our contemporary minds that they needed 
to be formally prohibited in the form of written norms at all.  In his words, “While the norms 
prohibiting core-disgusting actions have gained in normative strength, the non-core-disgust 
norms have often simply disappeared from the culture.”130  
Etiquette norms concerning the particulars of table manners which do not elicit core disgust, 
such as those regulating the proper use and positioning of various items of cutlery, are found 
within Erasmus’ work, and a few do indeed remain recognisable as part of current-day 
Western etiquette: “For instance, Erasmus tells us that: “The cup and small eating knife, duly 
cleaned, should be on the right-hand side” (281). This remains part of our tradition of 
etiquette today.”131 However, Nichols’ analysis shows that such norms were far less likely to 
survive as a feature of contemporary etiquette standards. In all, whilst more than 90% of 
actions which elicit core disgust have survived the cultural transmission of etiquette norms 
to the present day, only 30% of those which do not elicit core disgust have survived. However 
Nichols does not maintain that emotion is the only force in the cultural evolution of norms 
and that we should therefore expect all affectively backed norms to survive and all affectively 
neutral norms to perish. He thus claims that “…this in no way threatens our hypothesis, 
which is probabilistic, not categorical: norms prohibiting actions that elicit negative emotions 
are more likely to survive than affectively neutral norms.”132   
On the basis of this evidence, Nichols suggests that other innate affective dispositions which 
have ‘core stimuli’ (such as, in the case of disgust, the sight and smell of potential 
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contaminants like bodily fluids or rotting meat) will also have had an impact on the cultural 
evolution of moral norms. Specifically, Nichols emphasises the degree to which norms 
regulating the infliction of harm have been shaped by the human innate disposition to have 
an aversive affective response upon perceiving or imagining distress cues, perhaps arising 
from something akin to what Blair would call the VIM. Recall that Blair hypothesised the 
VIM as a psychological mechanism which causes us to experience an aversive affective 
response when prompted by distress cues. This is a particularly good candidate for an innate 
affective response to certain eliciting conditions which would have the sort of influence on 
the cultural development of moral norms which Nichols has in mind.133 There is much 
evidence indicating that such a disposition for an aversive response to distress cues develops 
in most humans at a very early age and is perhaps present at birth, thus representing a cross 
culturally universal feature of the human emotional repertoire. 134 Therefore, if the Affective 
Resonance hypothesis is correct, we can expect norms which prohibit actions which trigger 
something like the VIM to be cross-culturally ubiquitous. Given their enhanced cultural 
fitness, stemming from the affective backing that they enjoy, such norms are more likely to 
have survived and gained greater prominence in the cultural evolution of the moral systems 
of cultural groups. 
As it turns out, we do in fact find that harm norms are extremely prominent, although not 
universal, amongst the wide range of moral norms that we find when we examine the 
anthropological record. Of course, some cultural groups do seem to accord relatively little 
moral weight to the prevention of harm to others. For instance, amongst the Yanomani of 
South America there are relatively few norms prohibiting the causing of harm. Moreover, the 
use of violence to settle disputes, claim resources or display dominance is commonplace and 
                                                          
133  Fiery Cushman and Ryan Miller have made a compelling case for there being two distinct forms of 
harm aversion – ‘Outcome Aversion’, an aversive emotional response which derives from imagining or 
witnessing the consequences of harmful acts, and ‘Action Aversion’, a similarly aversive response which 
instead derives from imaginative engagement with what it would be like to inflict the harm oneself. See 
Miller, R. and Cushman, F. ‘Aversive for Me, Wrong for You: First-person Behavioral Aversions Underlie 
the Moral Condemnation of Harm’ Social and Personality Psychology Compass (2013) pp.707-718 
Additionally, it might also be suggested that there is a sense in which humans are innately disposed to 
experience a positive affective response towards harm, given that many people of various cultural 
groups seemingly enjoy witnessing or causing the infliction of violence, especially towards those they 
deem as members of an out-group or those perceived to be guilty of wrongdoing. However, this 
possibility is not ruled out by hypothesising the influence of something like the VIM on the cultural 
evolution of harm norms. The claim is only that most individuals are disposed to experience a 
predominantly negative affective response towards harm, although this may in some instances be 
countervailed by perceived justifications of the harm, which might cause them to experience no negative 
affect or even enjoy witnessing or inflicting it. 
134 See Simner, M. ‘Newborn's Response to the Cry of Another Infant’, Developmental Psychology, 5 
(1971) pp.136-150. 
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regarded as praiseworthy rather than morally condemned.135 Yet this is perfectly consistent 
with the Affective Resonance Hypothesis. Again, according to Nichols, it is not simply the 
case that we are innately hard wired to morally object to the infliction of harm, and that this 
is reflected in the cross-cultural abundance of harm norms. Although we are innately disposed 
to have affective responses towards harm, and judge instances of harm as bad, these 
judgements of badness do not in themselves constitute moral judgements. The story is more 
complex; our emotional dispositions lead norms prohibiting behaviour which harms others 
to be particularly memorable and seem distinctive to us, improving their cultural fitness, but 
not ensuring that they become entrenched in the moral norms of every cultural group.  
However, although Nichols himself neglects to make the point, we can attribute a greater 
role to emotional dispositions in the development of moral norms than merely that of 
Sperberian biases which improve the cultural fitness of affectively-backed norms. Although 
Nichols generally emphasises the role of affect in influencing the cultural transmission of 
norms, we might also say that affect will also influence which norms happen to emerge within 
a cultural group. For if norms which are associated with emotionally salient stimuli are more 
compelling to the recipients of cultural transmission, it seems extremely plausible that they 
will also be more psychologically appealing to the originators of cultural norms, and thus 
more likely to emerge as a product of cultural invention. For norms do not merely randomly 
occur amongst cultural groups, but at some point were constructed by individuals or groups 
of individuals, and are thus from the outset likely to have been shaped by the innate 
psychological dispositions of such individuals. This is a point which Chandra Stripada notes, 
suggesting that such ‘origination biases’ are equally important in shaping the moral norms of 
cultural groups as the Sperberian biases which Nichols focuses on.136 
To sum up so far, on Shaun Nichols account our affective dispositions play two major roles 
in influencing our moral judgements. In the first instance, and on the individual level, the 
extent to which we experience witnessed or imagined events or patterns of behaviour as good 
or bad is determined by our affective response towards the stimuli. Whether or not the 
behaviour which constitutes any given norm violation elicits an affective response or not 
leads individuals to treat particular internalised norms differently. If the behaviour comprising 
the violation of a norm does cause them to experience an independent aversive affective 
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response, then they take it to be a moral norm violation, and react as such. Meanwhile a norm 
violation which does not involve behaviour that elicits an independent aversive affective 
response is judged to be an instance of a conventional norm violation. Secondly, on a 
population level, if a norm is concerned with regulating behaviour which we are disposed to 
have an independent affective response towards, then it is more likely to originate and survive 
the process of cumulative cultural evolution over time.  
We may also conceive of another sense in which affective responses have an important role 
in moral judgement, and this is in terms of their capacity as norm compliance enforcers. 
When someone judges that an individual has acted wrongfully they are typically motivated to 
punish the transgressor in some way, and make a further moral judgement that it is right that 
they are punished. The level of punishment that individuals are motivated to administer and 
which they judge as appropriate is proportionate to the perceived wrongness of the 
behaviour.137 All this may seem entirely intuitive and obvious, but it is worth noting that 
recent experimental evidence in the field of behavioural economics indicates that such 
punitive motivations are best interpreted as at least partly intrinsic, rather than as purely 
instrumental in satisfying another end, such as deterrence. This is a point which Stich and 
Stripada emphasise in their account of norm acquisition and enforcement. 138  Put briefly, the 
evidence suggests that individuals are motivated to punish norm transgressors when it serves 
no further end, when such punishment costs them personally to administer, and even when 
they are not personally harmed by the transgression of the norm. Stich and Stripada also cite 
evidence that such an intrinsic motivation to punish norm violators is culturally universal, 
does not need to be taught and, importantly, derives its felt normative force from affective 
responses. This, again, is intuitive – both our other-regarding and self-regarding reactive 
attitudes towards wrongful behaviour are most plausibly to be conceived as stemming from 
emotional responses, such as anger and guilt respectively. 
Note that such punitive attitudes do not exclusively apply in cases where we judge a person 
to have acted wrongly in terms of the prototypical moral response pattern found in the studies 
relating to the moral/conventional distinction. In some cases, we might judge an individual 
to have transgressed a norm that we take to be merely conventional (that is, authority 
                                                          
137 A similar account of our disposition to praise and reward those who act in a manner we judge as 
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Stich, S. (eds.) The Innate Mind Volume 2: Culture and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007) 
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dependent, culturally relative, taken as less important than moral norms and not regulating a 
behaviour we are independently disposed to emotionally respond to in itself), and yet still be 
intrinsically motivated to punish that individual. The very fact that a norm has been violated 
is often enough to provoke an affective response which motivates punishment, even if the 
behaviour doesn’t provoke an independent affective response in itself.  Therefore being 
intrinsically motivated to punish a person who violates a norm is not necessarily an indication 
that such a norm is being treated as prototypically moral. Nonetheless, given that affective 
dispositions which motivate punishment are typically far stronger in the case of moral norm 
violations, and further impinge upon when we think punishment to be morally justified, we 
can hypothesise that they are an important way in which affective responses play a role in the 
overall psychology of moral judgement.  
 
4. The Missing Links in Nichols’ Account 
Nichols’ account is impressive in terms of both its evidential support and explanatory power. 
It is grounded by a wide range of empirical evidence and provides a compelling account of 
why we encounter, for instance, a ubiquity of harm and disgust based norms across a wide 
range of cultural groups, and why these norms are typically treated as moral rather than 
merely conventional. Nonetheless, his articulation of the relation between emotion and moral 
judgement needs further elaboration if we are to fully understand how human moral 
psychology yields the similarity and diversity in moral judgement which I noted in previous 
chapters. I will now highlight three respects in which Nichols’ presentation is insufficient to 
explain adequately the psychology behind moral disagreement. The first concerns the extent 
to which affective dispositions are in fact innate, rather than a product of cultural influences. 
The second concerns the range of dispositions which should be conceived as innate. The third 
concerns the relation between moral norms and values.  
Firstly, Nichols focuses specifically on the role of innate affective dispositions in particular in 
shaping the development of individual moral judgement and population level moral norms. 
Yet he says little on how and why these dispositions are to be conceived of as innate. Are 
they entirely fixed from birth, or are they somewhat malleable, in that the particular 
environment that one is exposed to can have an influence upon their development? Whilst 
Nichols speaks as though it is a given that the VIM is a purely innate psychological faculty, 
the extent to which an individual experiences harm aversion and other affective responses 
towards stimuli could itself be dependent on the sort of enculturation that they have been 
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exposed to. If this is the case, then the story of how affective dispositions influence the 
cultural evolution of moral norms is far more complex than Nichols suggests. If his account 
is to explain the similarities and variations between the moralities of different cultures, we 
need a clearer understanding of the extent to which such dispositions are themselves shaped 
by cultural influences. 
In terms of the second insufficiency, aside from his focus on harm aversion, Nichols does 
not offer much insight into the range of additional affective dispositions which might also 
influence moral judgement and cultural evolution. Yet many culturally ubiquitous moral 
norms are concerned with the regulation of behaviours which have little to do with the 
infliction of harm, such as norms regulating fairness and sexual conduct. In fact, in some 
cultural groups such norms are considered more morally salient than harm norms. Are these 
norms similarly ubiquitous, and widely treated as moral, due to the impact of affective 
resonance deriving from different affective dispositions? Although Nichols maintains that 
disgust also influences the cultural evolution of etiquette norms, he does not refer to any 
other affective dispositions besides this. If Nichols is to provide a comprehensive explanation 
of the common themes that crop up in the moral codes of cultural groups, then he ought to 
appeal to more than harm aversion alone.  
The third lacuna which needs to be addressed regards the role that emotional dispositions 
have in determining the sort of moral values humans are disposed to internalise, as well as 
moral norms. In my current chapter, I have been exploring how emotion relates to moral 
judgement and norms. However, in my previous chapters, I suggested that fundamental moral 
disagreement, both between and within cultural groups, is best cashed out in terms of 
disagreement concerning the relative moral weight of values. I take a moral value to be a 
cluster of considerations that an agent takes to be genuinely and independently reason giving. 
Moral norms and values are intricately linked – a moral norm is typically advocated and 
followed in service of a moral value. For instance, moral norms prohibiting lying and promise 
keeping are designed so as to preserve the value of honesty and trust. Thus, values are more 
basic than norms, and a variation in moral norms can be taken as an indication of 
disagreement over the relative moral weight of the values that they serve. To take an example, 
one who denies the force of moral norms prohibiting harm is indicating less of a concern for 
the value of compassion towards others than one who upholds the importance of harm 
norms.  
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Nichols does imply something akin to this in his discussion of the difference between ‘bads’ 
and ‘wrongs’, which I highlighted earlier. On his view, emotional responses inform 
judgements of goodness and badness, which relate to the underlying standards of evaluation 
which roughly constitute what I mean by values. Norms regulating actions and behaviour 
which individuals judge good or bad are treated as distinctly moral norms by such individuals, 
as opposed to being merely conventional. A norm thus constitutes a moral norm if it regulates 
behaviour which our underlying values mark out as morally salient. Yet Nichols doesn’t 
explain much about how individuals and cultural groups come to have such values. Although 
he clearly regards values as intimately connected with emotional dispositions, given their role 
as determinants of what is good and bad, it would be too simplistic to hold that a moral value 
just is a disposition to experience an emotional response in relation to obedience or violation 
of a norm. More needs to be said about the relation between emotional responses and values. 
Yet his account is chiefly concerned with the role of emotional dispositions in the 
development of moral norms rather than how they relate to the values which underlie them. 
 
In order to help plug these explanatory gaps, I will now turn to Haidt’s ‘Moral Foundations 
Theory’. This offers a more thorough explanation of how emotional dispositions are shaped 
within human psychology, and helps flesh out the range of emotional dispositions which 
influence the cultural construction of moral norms. Moreover, given its focus, it allows us to 
better understand the link between emotion and moral values as an intermediary between our 
affective dispositions and moral norms.  
 
5. Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory 
As discussed earlier, Haidt, like Nichols, holds that emotion plays an important role in moral 
judgement. More specifically, he holds that our emotional responses to stimuli provide us 
with instinctive moral intuitions, which are the primary source of moral judgement. This 
forms part of his ‘Social Intuitionist’ theory of moral judgement. However, Haidt also 
provides a categorisation of those innate emotional dispositions that are particularly related 
to moral judgement, and how each maps onto a distinct range of moral considerations. He 
suggests that certain clusters of innate emotional dispositions lead to the cultural construction 
and recognition of moral values. 
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In the first articulation of this idea, he built upon the work of the cultural anthropologist 
Richard Shweder, who suggested that the major ethical concerns found across all cultural 
groups generally fall into one of the ‘Big three’ ethics of community, autonomy or divinity.139 
Haidt’s hypothesis, based on empirical studies performed by Paul Rozin and himself, was 
that the emotions of contempt, anger and disgust map onto concerns of community, 
autonomy and divinity, referring to this model through the acronym CAD.140 He held that 
we are innately disposed to emotionally respond with contempt to violations of community, 
anger towards violations of autonomy and disgust towards violations of divinity, and that as 
such, these emotions are responsible for our moral treatment of such concerns. However, in 
developing this model further, Haidt, along with Craig Joseph, later further delineated his list 
of emotionally-induced values. He identified those clusters of considerations which are most 
widely recognised as morally salient across cultural groups, along with the emotional 
precursors which can be observed amongst non-human primates, to inform his 
categorisation. This led him to divide the ethic of autonomy into the concerns of harm/care 
and fairness/reciprocity, whilst the ethic of community was divided between the concerns of 
ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect. The ethic of divinity was rephrased in terms of 
concern for purity/sanctity.141  
 
Haidt holds that each of these five foundations of morality is constituted by a cluster of 
emotional dispositions, which represent an innate product of our evolved psychology. This 
is consistent with the psychological theory of ‘basic emotions’. To elaborate: although some 
anthropologists, such as Franz Boas and his follower Margaret Mead, historically emphasised 
the extent to which emotions are socially constructed and a product of cultural 
conditioning,142 evidence from the work of Paul Ekman has convinced most psychologists 
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Community, and Divinity), and the “Big Three” Explanations of Suffering. In A. Brandt and P. Rozin (Eds.), 
Morality and health New York: Routledge, (1997) pp.119–169. 
140 Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S. and Haidt, J. The Moral-Emotion Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between 
Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Ethics (Community, Autonomy, 
Divinity) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, (1999) pp.574-586. 
141 Haidt, J. Craig, J. ‘The Moral Mind: How 5 Sets of Innate Moral Intuitions Guide the Development of 
Many Culture-Specific Virtues, and perhaps even Modules.’ In Carruthers, P. Laurence, S. and Stich, S. 
(eds.) The Innate Mind, Volume 3: Foundations and Future. New York: Oxford, (2008) Note that in his 
later works Haidt accepts that there are probably additional foundations which give rise to moral 
concerns which the five listed do not cover, such as liberty/oppression, waste/efficiency and 
honesty/deception. He limits his focus to the five foundations because he holds that these are the ones 
we have the best case for, but is open to the possibility that we will eventually be able to substantiate 
more than these.  
142 See Mead, M. Coming of age in Samoa: A psychological study of primitive youth for western 
civilization. New York: Morrow (1961) 
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that there are at least some emotions which are ‘basic’ or ‘primary’. Basic emotions are 
biological in origin; the genes which encode for their development have reached fixation 
within the human population and are thus universal across cultural groups. In 1969, Ekman 
investigated the extent to which emotions are basic through cross-cultural studies on the 
interpretation of facial expressions, building on the insights of Charles Darwin on the 
universal expression of emotions and their precursors in non-human animals.143 Ekman 
discerned that even individuals from extremely isolated cultural groups were able to reliably 
identify the facial expressions of certain emotions in photographs of strangers. Moreover, 
they were able to match these expressions with descriptions of situations and stimuli which 
would normally elicit such an emotion. For instance, they would associate a facial expression 
depicting sadness with a situation describing the loss of a child, and the expression of disgust 
with encountering rotten food.144 Given this universal recognition of such emotions there is 
a strong case that they are also universally instantiated in some form in human nature.  
 
From his initial research, Ekman concluded that there are at least 6 basic emotions – anger, 
fear, disgust, happiness, sadness and surprise. More recently he has expanded the list of 
emotions he holds to be basic up to 17. It now includes emotions such as contempt, guilt, 
shame, contentment, excitement and amusement.145 The suggestion is that humans are 
innately disposed to develop such emotions, or ‘affect programs’, and that they are typically 
elicited by the same core stimuli universally. Haidt maintains that this range of basic emotions 
help psychologically dispose us to attribute moral weight to certain social concerns, and these 
psychological dispositions constitute the five moral foundations. Similar to Nichols, he argues 
that the foundations are best conceived of as Sperberian ‘learning modules’; that is, they are 
innate learning biases which act so as to constrain and shape the development of our moral 
values.  However, he insists that the account is not necessarily tied to such a modular 
approach to learning capacities, adding that 
                                                          
143 Darwin C, Ekman P and Rodger P. "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals" Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. (1998)  
144 Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R. and Friesen. W. V. ‘Pan-cultural elements in facial displays of emotions.’ 
Science, 164, (1969), pp. 86-88 
145 Ekman, P. ‘Basic emotions’ in T. Dalgleish and T. Power (Eds.) The Handbook of Cognition and 
Emotion. New York: John Wiley & Sons. (1999)  pp. 45-60 See also, Haidt, J. Keltner, D. ‘Culture and Facial 
Expression: Open-ended Methods Find More Expressions and a Gradient of Recognition’ Cognition and 
Emotion, 13 3 (1999) pp.225-266, which reports that the facial expressions of an extended range of 
emotions are recognised cross culturally, although the level of recognition of some of these emotions 
varied depending on the cultural group. This suggests that some emotions are more basic than others, so 
to speak, to the extent that their expressions are more readily identifiable cross culturally. 
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 “…readers who do not like modularity theories can think of each 
one as an evolutionary preparedness to link certain patterns of social 
appraisal to specific emotional and motivational reactions. All we 
insist upon is that the moral mind is partially structured in advance 
of experience so that five (or more) classes of social concerns are 
likely to become moralized during development. Social issues that 
cannot be related to one of the foundations are much harder to 
teach, or to inspire people to care about.”146  
 
 
Table 1 below provides a useful representation of Moral Foundations Theory, illustrating the 
adaptive challenge, proper domain, actual domain, characteristic emotions and relevant 
virtues for each of the proposed moral foundations. According to Haidt, each foundation 
evolved to solve a particular adaptive challenge, such as the emotional concern for harm/care 
evolving to motivate individuals to care for the vulnerable and first and foremost their 
offspring.  Moreover, whilst each evolved to respond to a ‘proper domain’ of eliciting stimuli, 
a by-product of the evolution of such foundations is that they lead us to be disposed to 
emotionally respond to a wider range of stimuli than they were originally adapted to respond 
to. For instance, cheating individuals and inequitable resource distributions form part of the 
proper domain of the fairness/reciprocity foundation. In terms of their etiological function, 
we are disposed to morally respond to such stimuli precisely because of the adaptive benefits 
of doing so. Nonetheless, such an evolved emotional disposition also serves to trigger a moral 
response towards stimuli like broken vending machines, despite this not serving any adaptive 
purpose and thus not constituting part of the proper domain of the disposition. All stimuli 
which are, in fact, associated with the moral foundation represent the ‘actual domain’; the 
proper domain represents the subset of these stimuli which the psychological disposition is 
specifically adapted to trigger a moral response towards. Furthermore, each distinct moral 
foundation has its characteristic emotions associated with it. Whilst there is not a clear 
mapping of a single emotion to each foundational value, as Haidt’s earlier CAD model, each 
foundation nonetheless has a cluster of widely cross-culturally recognisable emotional 
dispositions motivating the particular concern.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146 Haidt, J. and Joseph, C. ‘The Moral Mind.’ in The Innate Mind, Vol. 3 p.383 
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Table 1 – ‘The Five Foundations of Intuitive Ethics’147 
 
 
As the final row of the table demonstrates, Haidt also holds that each foundation provides 
the basis for particular groups of virtues and vices. He argues that conceptions of what 
constitutes ethically virtuous and vicious behaviours and character traits are often culturally 
specific, and thus partly a product of social construction. Nonetheless, such constructions 
ultimately derive from one or more of the five innate affective bases for our moral intuitions. 
                                                          
147 Taken from Haidt, J. Joseph, C. ‘The Moral Mind.’ pp. 367-391 
 Harm/Care Fairness/ 
Reciprocity 
Ingroup/ 
Loyalty 
Authority/ 
Respect 
Purity/ 
Sanctity 
Adaptive 
challenge 
Protect and 
care for young, 
vulnerable, or 
injured kin 
Reap benefits 
of dyadic 
cooperation 
with non-kin 
Reap benefits 
of group 
cooperation 
Negotiate 
hierarchy, 
defer 
selectively 
Avoid 
microbes and 
parasites 
Proper domain 
(adaptive 
triggers) 
Suffering, 
distress, or 
threat to one’s 
kin 
Cheating, 
cooperation, 
deception 
Threat or 
challenge to 
group 
Signs of 
dominance 
and 
submission 
Waste 
products, 
diseased 
people 
Actual domain 
(the set of all 
triggers) 
Baby seals, 
cartoon 
characters 
Marital 
fidelity, broken 
vending 
machines 
Sports teams 
one roots for 
Bosses, 
respected 
professionals 
Taboo ideas 
(communism, 
racism] 
Characteristic 
emotions 
Compassion Anger, 
gratitude, guilt 
Group pride, 
belongingness; 
rage at traitors 
Respect, fear Disgust 
Relevant virtues 
[and vices] 
Caring, 
kindness,  
[cruelty] 
Fairness, 
justice, 
honesty,  
trustworthines
s [dishonesty] 
Loyalty, 
patriotism, 
self-sacrifice 
[treason, 
cowardice] 
Obedience, 
deference 
[disobedience
, uppitiness] 
Temperance, 
chastity, piety, 
cleanliness 
[lust, 
intemperance
] 
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Such bases represent the ‘first draft of morality’, which predispose us to experience automatic 
flashes of approval or disapproval when we encounter certain patterns of social behaviour, 
but like Nichols, he admits that these flashes do not by themselves constitute what we might 
call moral judgements. As Haidt puts it, “Mature moral functioning does not consist only, or 
even primarily, of simple affective or intuitive reactions to social stimuli. Disgust felt towards 
dog feces, or even towards an act of homosexual intercourse, is not in itself a moral 
judgment.”148 Rather, in order for us to possess full-blown morality, we must develop moral 
concepts such as the virtues he speaks of through the process of enculturation. My contention 
is that along with the virtues Haidt focuses his discussion on, we could also represent moral 
values as falling under the heading of such socially constructed moral concepts.  
 
Haidt holds that each cultural group draws upon the five foundations of morality in a 
different fashion, emphasising each to a greater or lesser degree in the development of their 
moral concepts. For instance, in contemporary western liberal cultural groups, moral 
concepts are to a large extent constructed from the two foundations of harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity. The values of autonomy, equality and impartial justice are given 
precedence, whilst honesty, kindness and fair-mindedness are taken to be amongst the chief 
virtues. However, in other cultural groups both past and present, the moral concepts 
internalised and employed by individuals stem more from the affective bases which make up 
the ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity building blocks of morality. In this 
way, different cultural groups selectively cultivate and foster the moralisation of different 
intuitive flashes of affect amongst their members, fine-tuning their initial first draft of 
morality to construct more particular and conceptually intricate value systems.  
 
To help explain, Haidt sometimes invokes a rough analogy between cultural diversity in 
morality and gastronomy.149 He compares the five foundations of morality he proposes to 
different types of taste buds, each acting as a receptor of a basic flavour. Such flavours 
provide adaptive perceptual information on the chemical composition of potential foodstuffs 
in the form of automatic, affectively valenced experiences which motivate us to either avoid 
or consume what we taste. Generally we choose to avoid eating anything with an 
overwhelmingly bitter or sour flavour, and this is adaptive insofar as strong bitterness 
                                                          
148 Ibid, p.387 
149 See, for instance, Haidt, J. Bjorklund, F. ‘Social Intuitionists Answer 6 Questions about Moral 
Psychology’ in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of 
Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (2008) p.202 
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typically indicates something being nutritionally unsuitable for humans. Food which is 
moderately sweet, salty or fatty, however, generally provides us with a positive taste 
experience which indicates the nutritional suitability of what is sampled, and motivates us to 
eat more of it. In a similar fashion, the five foundations act as receptors of social information 
which provide either positive or negative affective experiences that help regulate our 
motivations towards others. Humans come hard-wired with both taste buds and the affective 
dispositions of the moral foundations, but this is not to say that our sense of morality or 
gastronomy is entirely innate. Rather, through the process of enculturation, our morality is 
shaped in a similar way as our palate develops in response to cultural feedback. As a 
consequence, whilst individuals brought up in a culinary environment which emphasises the 
heavy use of spicing and meat might experience a dish like macaroni cheese as bland and 
unappetising, one who has been raised within a cultural group whose gastronomy 
concentrates on the use of fatty dairy and pasta products is likely to find it delicious. Similarly, 
whilst an individual whose cultural background cultivated impartial compassion might take 
an act like killing a member of an out-group as morally wrong, one encultured in such a way 
as to foster in-group loyalty might judge it to be morally praiseworthy.  
 
However, beyond invoking this analogy and briefly highlighting the role of cultural narratives, 
Haidt is vague on what form this ‘fine-tuning’ through enculturation takes precisely, and more 
needs to be said. For understanding how, exactly, cultural forces shape the moral concepts 
of individuals is important when it comes to understanding why people weight values 
differently. I will now propose two ways in which an individual’s cultural environment can 
influence their development of moral concepts. Firstly, enculturation can influence the 
development of our affective dispositions themselves. Secondly, it can help determine which 
affective responses we take to be morally salient, and which we consciously reject as morally 
irrelevant. 
 
Let us begin by exploring the first point. For one thing, enculturation can moderate the 
intensity of one’s affective responses and the range of eliciting stimuli. If this influences an 
affective disposition which forms part of a particular moral foundation, then this will go on 
to shape an individual’s set of moral concepts. There may well be core stimuli and a similar 
phenomenology associated with the basic emotions cross-culturally.  For instance, danger is 
the core stimuli of fear. Still, it is widely accepted that there remains some cultural variation 
CHAPTER 4 – THE TEA MODEL OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
103 
 
in affective dispositions. It thus seems likely that affective dispositions are malleable in the 
face of cultural influences: I will now elaborate three ways in which I take this to be the case.  
 
Firstly, the cultural influences that an individual is exposed to can adjust the intensity to which 
the core stimuli of a basic emotion will in fact elicit an affective response. For example, if 
one is raised within a hierarchical society, one is likely to develop a strong disposition to 
experience contempt when observing another failing to demonstrate respect towards a higher 
status individual. Meanwhile, being raised in a more egalitarian community will dampen one’s 
disposition towards responding with contempt in such a situation. Thus, the extent to which 
the core stimuli of contempt (instances of disrespect) elicit this affective response on the part 
of group members depends upon the cultural practices which such group members have 
been influenced by.  
 
Secondly, cultural influences can expand upon the range of stimuli that will elicit an affective 
response beyond that of the core stimuli. This is often achieved through cultural mechanisms 
which act so as to associate a particular practice, institution or object with the core stimuli of 
a particular emotion. For instance, within many cultural groups, members of low status 
classes are strongly associated with core disgust stimuli, so as to justify and maintain the 
hierarchical structure of the group by entrenching it within the group’s affective 
dispositions.150 
 
Thirdly, there may be scope for some cultural mechanisms to influence the particular emotion 
that a stimulus elicits. For instance, in cultural anthropology it is generally agreed that whilst 
wrongdoing primarily elicits guilt on the part of the wrongdoer in Western societies, in more 
collectivist societies one’s own wrongdoing elicits the phenomenologically and conceptually 
distinct emotion of shame.151 This is even more so the case when it comes to the higher 
cognitive, non-basic emotions, which can be cultural specific in terms of their 
phenomenology and eliciting stimuli. Many of these emotions are widely recognised within a 
certain cultural group yet do not have an obvious correlate in others. For instance, take the 
Japanese emotion of ‘amae’, which represents a pleasurable feeling of dependency akin to 
that of a child towards a parent, but is experienced by an adult towards an institution. 
                                                          
150 For instance, within the Indian caste system, the low status ‘untouchable’ caste is associated with 
faeces and other disgusting stimuli, whereas the high status Brahma caste is associated with cleanliess 
and purity. 
151 See Hiebert, P.G., Anthropological Insights for Missionaries, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, (1985) 
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Although those from another cultural group might be able to vaguely understand and 
experience such an emotion, it is certainly not clearly defined or strongly felt in the way in 
which it generally is amongst the Japanese.152  
 
It would then seem that despite the case for basic emotions representing an innate, evolved 
feature of our psychology, to at least some extent affective dispositions can be moulded by 
enculturation. However this point must not be overstated. Although our emotional repertoire 
is certainly not fixed from birth, neither is it purely the product of socialisation. As Haidt 
suggests, there is a level of innate preparedness when it comes to the development of our 
affective dispositions, which constrains the range of potential outcomes and ensures that 
some are far more likely than others. This point will be expanded upon in the next chapter.  
 
Moving on to the second level, there is also the more cognitive reinforcement which 
determines whether or not the implicated affective responses are taken by the subject as 
legitimately morally salient. When we experience an affective response to a stimulus, we 
sometimes endorse it on a second order level and judge it as normatively relevant, and 
sometimes not. For instance, within western liberal cultural groups the experience of affective 
harm and inequity aversion is typically automatically endorsed as an indicator of the genuine 
wrongness of the stimulus.  On the other hand, the experience of disgust towards, for 
instance, certain sexual behaviours is not necessarily taken to be appropriate, nor a good 
reason for judging it as morally problematic. This is part of the explanation as to why western 
liberal cultural groups are less likely to possess moral concepts relating to the purity domain, 
or weight them especially highly. Although individuals of such groups might experience the 
disgust responses associated with the domain, they reject its normative import.153  
 
This is not to say that if a cultural group does not collectively conceive of a particular affective 
response as legitimately normative then its members do not let it implicitly influence their 
moral judgements. Recall Haidt’s dumbfounding experiments, whereby participants 
condemned a hypothetical act of incest whilst offering inapplicable justifications for their 
disapproval.  A plausible interpretation is that the participant’s condemnation was motivated 
by an intense disgust response. However, since disgust-based purity is not recognised as a 
                                                          
152 For more on Amae, along with an account of many other culturally-specific emotions, see Prinz, J. Gut 
Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2004) pp.131-157  
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morally salient concern in the western world, they attempted to rationalise their in terms of 
a widely accepted concern, such as harm. Yet this does not entail that our conscious beliefs 
regarding the relative normative salience of affective responses have no capacity to influence 
our moral judgements. It only establishes that, in some case, these beliefs are not enough to 
override the moralising tendencies of our affective responses. In fact, the FMRI studies 
conducted by Greene attest to the ability of some individuals to override their initial 
emotional response to stimuli in arriving at moral judgements. Participants who judged that 
it would be permissible to kill one to save five lives in the ‘footbridge’ variation of the moral 
dilemma ultimately dismissed their aversive affective response as morally irrelevant, deciding 
to privilege utilitarian concerns as paramount in this instance.154  
 
In any case, enculturation generally takes the form of both direct and indirect feedback from 
elders and peers within a child’s everyday experience concerning appropriate affective 
responses and what is and what is not morally salient, but Haidt also emphasises the impact 
of storytelling in shaping the moral concepts of individuals. Since different cultural 
environments provide different sorts of feedback and stories which emphasise the moral 
value of different intuitive foundations, the developed moral concepts of individuals from 
different cultural groups will tend to differ, leading to conflicting moral judgements, values 
and virtues. This, Haidt contends, is the primary source of the moral diversity that we 
encounter between cultural groups: In his words, “Moral diversity, on our account, results 
from differences in moral education and enculturation.”155 I will elaborate and expand upon 
this explanation of the root cause of moral disagreement in my next chapter.  
 
6. The TEA Model of Moral Psychology 
I hold that the accounts of Haidt and Nichols offer compatible explanations of the general 
pattern of similarity in moral norms and values that we observe across cultural groups. They 
both highlight the role of universal innate affective dispositions along with more culturally 
                                                          
154 Greene, J.D. et al. ‘An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment’. pp.2105–
2108 In additional support of this, several studies suggest that some of the moral disagreement between 
liberals and conservatives results from liberals experiencing similar affective responses to social stimuli, 
but liberals consciously rejecting their normative import, whilst the conservatives endorse them. See 
Skitka, L. J., et al. (2002). ‘Dispositions, Scripts, or Motivated Correction?: Understanding Ideological 
Differences in Explanations for Social Problems.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(2), 
p.470 
155 Haidt, J. Joseph, C. ‘Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable 
Virtues”, Daedalus, (2004) p.65 
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specific influences in shaping the moral psychology of individuals. These accounts thus tie 
together the evidence I referred to earlier, which indicates both that moral judgement is 
intimately bound up with emotional responses and that humans are born innately prepared 
to learn to respond with certain emotions to certain stimuli. Nonetheless, they both leave 
room for the impact of enculturation as an important factor in determining our moral 
judgements.    
 
Yet whilst Nichols offers a useful framework for understanding the cultural evolution of 
moral norms, Haidt’s account provides a more developed picture of the universal affective 
dispositions which prompt the moralisation of certain social concerns across cultural groups. 
The moral concerns which derive from the proposed five foundations of morality go beyond 
the harm norms which Nichols focuses his discussion on, and Haidt’s discussion helps to 
illuminate how exactly cultural forces interact with these foundations in the development of 
moral concepts. Moreover, Haidt’s evolutionary account provides an account of how and 
why humans came to be universally psychologically predisposed to develop the particular 
affective dispositions which make up the foundations. These aspects of Haidt’s theory help 
to plug the explanatory deficiencies which render Nichols’ account problematic when 
considered in isolation. 
 
On the other hand it would not be correct to say that Haidt’s account is simply an expanded 
and improved version of Nichols’. For each focuses on different, but related, aspects of 
morality, leaving space for each to benefit from the other’s insights, and thus combine to 
offer a fuller picture of moral psychology as a whole. Nichols’ epidemiological account of the 
cultural evolution of moral norms offers a historical explanation as to why norms regulating 
certain types of conduct are more common across cultural groups than others. Such 
behaviours, he holds, invoke affective responses which make the norms associated with them 
more distinct and memorable for the individuals who learn them, increasing the chances that 
they will both emerge and persist over time. Meanwhile, Haidt’s account focuses more on 
the cultivation of the underlying values and virtues which individuals are disposed to regard 
as morally salient across cultural groups, which give rise to the moral appraisals from which 
moral norms derive their distinct normative force. On his view, moral concepts such as values 
and virtues are culturally constructed through building upon the intuitive, emotional 
foundations, which represent an innate feature of our evolved psychology.  
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Now, insofar as these two accounts deal with different aspects of morality, I hold that the 
central points of both can be fruitfully combined to furnish a single model of moral 
psychology. To this end, we should conceive the cultural construction of morality as working 
in a two stage process. The first stage in this process is covered by my developed version of 
Haidt’s account: some of our innate emotional dispositions are selectively cultivated and 
moralised, whereas others are suppressed and represented as normatively redundant by 
cultural influences. This leads to the cultural construction and internalisation of moral values 
such as compassion, equality and fairness by members of the particular cultural group. 
Humans are innately disposed towards developing and moralising certain affective 
dispositions rather than others as a consequence of evolutionary influences. Thus, most 
values which are culturally constructed, or at least those which persist for any length of time, 
could be categorised under one or more of Haidt’s foundations.  
 
It is at this point that Nichols’ account can be applied to help explain the cultural 
development of moral norms in the second stage. For the particular moral concepts that are 
propounded within a cultural group go on to further influence the cultural fitness of moral 
norms, over and above the influence of innate affective dispositions alone, helping to 
determine which moral norms are most likely to both originate and persist over time. Thus, 
the strength of the selection advantage conferred on a particular norm is partly dependent 
upon the extent to which the affective disposition which gives the norm its perceived 
normative force has been cultivated and moralised by the particular cultural group.  
 
Together, then, the fundamental insights from Nichols’ and Haidt’s accounts can be 
combined to provide a deeper explanation for the basis of cultural similarity in both moral 
values and norms than when taken in isolation.156  I will refer to this account as the Two-
stage Enculturated Affect (TEA) model of moral psychology. This name derives from the 
model explaining our internalisation and particular weighting of values as emerging from a 
two-stage enculturating process, with affective dispositions being the central mechanism 
through which group member’s values and norms are shaped. 
 
                                                          
156 Jessy Giroux also attempts to combine these models in a different way, arguing for a combination of 
Nichols ‘Input’ model of the role of innate emotional tendencies in shaping the evolution moral norms 
with Haidt’s ‘Output’ model of how these same tendencies naturally give rise to certain moral concepts 
in individuals to constitute a ‘Moderate Nativism’ model. See Giroux, J. ‘The Origin of Moral Norms: A 
Moderate Nativism Account’ Dialogue 50 (2011) pp.281-306 
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To clarify how this model can explain how the moral values and norms of individuals are 
shaped, I will now illustrate how it is conceived to work through a pair of relatively extreme 
examples of groups which regulate harm in radically different ways. Let us first take a cultural 
group which enshrines peace as a particularly weighty moral value, and has norms which 
heavily restrict the infliction of violence. The Moriori people of the Chatham Islands, close 
to the New Zealand archipelago, were famously pacifist. They lived by a code of non-violence 
called ‘Nunuku’s law’, after Nunuku-whenua, a prominent chief who established it following 
a series of inter-tribal conflicts.157  This code came to be so strongly recognised that when 
Maori invaded the Chatham Islands in 1835, the Moriori gathered a council where the elders 
determined that Nunuku’s law forbade any armed resistance, and were subsequently 
conquered and enslaved.158   
 
On the TEA model, this extreme respect for peace became enshrined in the following 
manner. Firstly, the Moriori adopted a set of norms, Nunuku’s law, which over time led to 
the cultural construction of peace as a moral concept within the group. This shaped the 
cultural environment and practices of the group, and this in turn went on to influence the 
affective dispositions of those raised within it.159  Since humans are innately disposed towards 
developing and moralising something like the VIM (Violence Inhibition Mechanism), this 
bare affective response was culturally elaborated and moralised relatively easily. The innate 
aversion of violence of members of the group was cultivated to produce a response which 
was stronger than usual and elicited under a wider range of conditions, and those who 
experienced this aversion grew to take it to have legitimate reason-giving status. This amounts 
to the first stage in the TEA model of moral psychology. 
 
Once the value of peace came to be an important part of the morality of the Moriori in this 
manner, the second stage kicked in. Whereas those who were first exposed to Nunuku’s law 
might not have taken it to be that normatively weighty, it had increased affective resonance 
for those later generations who had internalised the value of peace from an earlier age. This 
                                                          
157 Davis, D and Solomon, M 'Moriori - The migrations from Hawaiki', Te Ara - The Encyclopedia of New 
Zealand, found at http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/moriori/page-2 updated 13-Jul-12 
158 Ibid, ‘Moirori – Impact of new arrivals’ 
159 The TEA model is not strongly wedded to any particular theory regarding how such initial changes 
come about. As I note in my concluding remarks, one plausible mechanism by which changes in moral 
values occur is through high status individuals directly or indirectly influencing the rest of their cultural 
group to adopt the norms and values which are more in line with their particular affective dispositions. 
This particular case seems to be a prime example of this. 
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ensured that those norms which governed the regulation of violence were more memorable, 
and taken to have increased normative weight. This eventually reached the point where the 
Moriori, who had initially been a warlike people, had so much respect for the value of peace 
that they chose to sacrifice their lives and liberty rather than defend themselves.  
 
This example can be contrasted with a cultural group which readily embraces violence. As 
previously mentioned, the Yanomani are reported to have adopted norms and values which 
foster warfare between tribes and violence against one another at the slightest provocation. 
The TEA model again explains such a situation as being perpetuated by the social 
environment suppressing the development and narrowing the eliciting conditions of the VIM 
amongst its members. Whilst this would likely leave at least some members of the group still 
experiencing an aversion to violence, they would be encouraged to reject the normative 
import of this affective disposition. With non-violence thereby not having been culturally 
constructed as a value of the group, norms aiming to regulate the infliction of violence are 
less likely to originate and persist amongst them. If such a set of norms were to be introduced, 
say by an authoritative leader like Nunuku, the current generation would likely only 
grudgingly accept its normative import. Given that the VIM is something we are innately 
disposed to develop and attach normative significance to, over time the change in cultural 
environment may shift the group’s value system. Nonetheless, in the short term norms 
regulating violence would suffer from poor cultural fitness, and it would require some 
generations before the values of the group were adequately in sync with the norms in such a 
way that they would reliably persist over time. 
 
Note that the TEA model presented here is only a sketch, and is it is not by any means 
intended as an exhaustive account of moral psychology. Many other psychological features 
are clearly complicit in the myriad different aspects of moral thought, and despite my 
concentration on affective dispositions, this is not to dismiss the impact of more cognitive 
processes on moral judgement. Nonetheless, it is meant to capture the major mechanisms 
through which moral values and norms originate, are internalised and persist across 
generations. As I will show in my next chapter, this is enough to serve my purpose of 
explaining the phenomena of moral conflict and disagreement. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have advocated an affect based account of moral judgement, which I call 
the Two-stage Enculturated Affect (TEA) model. I suggested that a range of evidence from 
studies in moral psychology, psychopathology and neuroscience implies that affect has a 
strong causal role in shaping moral judgement. Such findings, I have argued, are best captured 
by Nichols and Haidt’s complementary accounts of moral psychology. Although neither is 
sufficient when considered on its own, the fundamental insights of each can be combined to 
give a deeper overall picture of how innate dispositions and cultural forces interact to mould 
our moral values and norms. On this picture, our innate affective dispositions are to a certain 
extent malleable in terms of intensity, range of eliciting stimuli and perceived normative 
weight in the face of cultural influences. This enculturating process gives rise to the members 
of cultural groups possessing moral concepts such as virtues and values, and the presence of 
such concepts within a cultural group partly determines the extent to which particular moral 
norms have cultural fitness.  
 
However, I accept that these considerations alone might not be taken by everyone to 
constitute a firm enough basis to ground the TEA model of moral psychology. Even taking 
on board the independent evidence from psychological studies which support such an 
account, it could be said that the case for it is still far from conclusive. Moreover, I am still 
yet to show how all of this relates to our understanding of moral conflict and disagreement. 
In the next chapter, I hope to remedy this by articulating the two major competing accounts 
of moral psychology and offering arguments why the TEA model is more plausible. In the 
course of doing so, I will illustrate how the TEA model makes sense of moral conflict and 
moral disagreement, and suggest that it possesses further explanatory power with regard to 
moral conflict and moral disagreement than these competing accounts.  
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Chapter 5 – Explaining Moral Conflict and 
Disagreement 
 
In this chapter, I will set out how the conclusions regarding moral conflict and moral 
disagreement which I established in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 can be best explained by appealing 
to my proposed Two Stage Enculturated Affect (TEA) model of moral psychology argued 
for in Chapter 4. That is, this model provides the most compelling explanation of the 
phenomenology of moral conflict, as well as the evidence regarding the fundamental nature 
of intercultural and intracultural moral disagreement, when compared with competing 
accounts of moral psychology. Establishing this will allow us to get a better understanding of 
the underlying nature of moral conflict and disagreement. Moreover, insofar as it is the case, 
it reveals an additional layer of explanatory power for the TEA model and thus lends it some 
extra credence in its own right.  
 
In section 1 I explicate two rival accounts of moral psychology, Jesse Prinz’s Emotional 
Constructivism and John Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar, which offer an understanding 
of the origins of moral norms and values which differ from the TEA model. In my 
articulation I offer reasons for preferring the TEA model over these alternative models of 
moral psychology independent of the facts concerning moral conflict and moral 
disagreement. Section 2 goes on to compare how the accounts might explain the 
phenomenology of moral conflict. I argue that the TEA model can offer a neat explanation 
of this phenomenon by appealing to the distinctness of the affective dispositions which 
underlie our moral values, whilst Universal Moral Grammar cannot. However, Emotional 
Constructionism could account for the phenomenology of moral conflict in a similar manner 
to the TEA model. In section 3 I will go on to explain how the various accounts might explain 
the pattern of intercultural similarity and variation in moral values and norms. I suggest that 
whilst both alternative accounts have explanatory resources to bring to bear here, the TEA 
model offers a better explanation than either. Finally, section 4 will evaluate how each account 
could potentially explain intracultural moral disagreement. On the TEA model genetic 
differences and differences in upbringing both contribute to intracultural differences in 
emotional dispositions, which help explain intracultural moral disagreement. On the other 
hand, moral grammarians have no plausible explanation to hand, whilst Emotional 
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constructivists must explain intercultural moral disagreement purely in terms of differences 
in upbringing, which does not cohere with evidence from behavioural genetics. 
  
I will conclude by clarifying how the explanation of moral conflict and disagreement drawn 
from the TEA model help to deepen our understanding of the phenomena. My next chapter 
will go on to highlight how this improved understanding can have indirect normative 
implications when considered in relation to political liberalism.  
 
1. Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism  
To recap, on the TEA model of moral psychology which I endorse, our affective dispositions 
play the role of the raw material of moral judgement. Such dispositions heavily inform our 
evaluations of particular stimuli as good or bad. Moreover, they play a crucial role in the 
cultural construction of moral concepts (values and virtues) and norms; such cultural 
constructions originate from and are taken as morally salient by individuals insofar as they 
appeal to our affective dispositions. Although such dispositions are to some extent malleable 
in the face of cultural influences, our innate learning biases tend to shape them in certain 
directions, such that we will more readily experience certain emotional responses when 
encountering certain stimuli than others as a consequence of their evolutionary adaptive 
value. Those affective dispositions which we are innately prepared to develop and which lend 
themselves to the cultural development of moral concepts have been clustered by Haidt into 
five foundations of moral judgement; harm/care, reciprocity/fairness, group/loyalty, 
authority/respect and purity/divinity. These foundations lead cultural groups to construct 
values based around these concerns, which further influences the cultural fitness of norms 
regulating behaviour relevant to such concerns.  
 
Thus, the TEA model of moral psychology explains moral values and norms as stemming 
from an interaction between innate psychological factors and cultural forces. Almost all 
contemporary accounts of moral psychology would agree with this to some extent. Where 
the differences lie is in the relative importance that each account attributes to innate and 
cultural influences in the development of our moral values and norms. To take one extreme, 
one could take the position that humans are passive receptacles who simply internalise the 
moral concepts of their surrounding culture uncritically, either during a critical socialisation 
period or throughout the entirety of their lives. This is not to necessarily rule out the role of 
an innate psychological capacity in the internalisation process. For instance, Chandra Sripada 
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and Stephen Stich suggest that we need to posit an innate psychological mechanism in order 
to explain and shed light on the universal tendency of humans to culturally acquire and be 
intrinsically motivated by norms. In their paper A Framework for the Psychology of Norms, they 
do just this, and whilst they emphasise that there are many open questions as to what kind of 
mechanism is responsible for norm acquisition, they shed some light on what they think the 
basic framework involves.160 In the sketch that they set out, they point out that such a 
mechanism must typically emerge early in psychological development, be activated 
automatically, and respond to proximal cues in the environment. Such cues can take the form 
of both inferences from the behaviour of others within the social environment and explicit 
verbal instruction, which allow us to identify and internalise the norms of our particular social 
group.  
This model suggests that the ability to acquire norms at the very least stems from an innate 
capacity. However, it says nothing about the extent to which other innate factors might 
influence which norms are acquired. Stich and Sripada remain neutral on this issue. Yet they 
do consider what they call the ‘Pac Man thesis’ (a reference to the old arcade game character 
which consumes all that it touches) as a null hypothesis. According to the Pac Man thesis, 
the norm acquisition mechanism exhibits no constraints or biases in terms of which norms 
will be acquired and internalised – it simply detects and absorbs all norms which are present 
in the individual’s social environment in an unselective manner. Therefore, proponents of 
the Pac Man thesis would have it that norms are to be conceived of as chiefly the product of 
cultural forces – what set of norms we happen to have is entirely determined by the norms 
which are present within our social environment.161 To reiterate, the TEA model agrees here, 
insofar as it holds that our moral values and norms are culturally constructed. But as I have 
emphasised, the account of norm acquisition it offers is importantly different, insofar as it 
conceives of it as subject to biases and constraints in terms of the values and norms which 
are likely to be internalised and treated as moral rather than conventional.   
The best contemporary example of such an anti-nativist conception of our internalisation of 
moral norms and values is Jesse Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism. Prinz most obviously 
marks himself out as a critic of moral nativism in terms of his contention that morality 
represents an accidental by-product of general features of human psychology rather than a 
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functional adaptation.162 This aspect of his anti-nativism is irrelevant to the question at hand: 
what is at issue is the extent to which innate psychological dispositions shape the content of 
our moral concepts and norms rather than whether these dispositions evolved to specifically 
serve that purpose. Nonetheless, his account of the unconstrained and relatively unbiased 
means by which we internalise the moral concepts of our social environment also represents 
the closest approximation to the Pac Man thesis. Like Nichols and Haidt, Prinz heavily 
emphasises the relation between emotion and moral judgement. In fact, Prinz advocates an 
extreme form of sentimentalism, holding that emotional responses not only motivate moral 
judgements, but that certain emotions constitute our moral concepts; specifically, the emotions 
of guilt and blame.163 He further argues that humans are innately endowed with a set of basic 
emotions, each of which evolved in order to fulfil the functional role of representing concerns 
which influence our survival chances. Moreover, these emotional dispositions facilitate the 
development of moral concepts amongst cultural groups. As he concedes, “Natural selection 
has probably furnished us with a variety of behavioural and affective dispositions that 
contribute to the emergence of moral values.”164  
 
So far so good. Nonetheless, Prinz ultimately holds that those innate dispositions which we 
possess are not fixed or strong enough to be a deciding factor in shaping the content of our 
moral norms and concepts, arguing that such dispositions are most significant insofar as they 
provide us with a bare capacity for morality itself. He accepts that humans are somewhat 
more likely to socially construct certain moral concepts over others due to dispositions such 
as harm aversion, referring to such influences as ‘biocultural interactions’. Yet he suggests 
that these are far too weak to form a significant basis of an explanation for the pattern of 
moral variation and similarity that can be observed across cultural groups.165 Different 
cultures might draw upon the same range of innate psychological dispositions to inculcate 
the moral concepts which they construct, and such dispositions might have some small role 
in directing the content of such norms and values, but we should not conceive of them in 
terms of the moral foundations which Haidt speaks of.  Rather, Prinz suggests that our 
affective natures are far more malleable, susceptible as they are to cultural calibration, and do 
not tend us strongly towards any particular intuitive moral responses over others. In his 
                                                          
162 See, for example, Prinz, J. ‘Is Morality Innate?’ in Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) Moral Psychology 
Volume 1 pp.367-406 
163  Prinz, J. ‘Can Moral Obligations be Empirically Discovered?’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007) 
pp.271-291 
164 Prinz, J. The Emotional Construction of Morals Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007) p.255 
165 Ibid, pp.274-287 
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words, “I propose that biologically based behaviors pertaining to kindness, fairness, and 
reciprocity are culturally malleable and insufficient to guide our behavior without cultural 
elaboration.”166 On his view, then, the moral norms and concepts of cultural groups are 
relatively independent of our innate psychological features 
 
The main issue with Prinz’s account is that it does not seem to give sufficient weight to the 
fact that some emotional associations are far easier to learn, and moralise, than others. I 
argued in my previous chapter that the elicitors and relative strength of our affective 
dispositions are somewhat pliable in the face of cultural influences. Nonetheless, innate 
learning biases relating to emotional development ensure that the extent of their malleability 
is constrained. To elaborate: I have previously highlighted evidence which suggests that some 
emotions are basic; that is, cross culturally recognised as having the same facial expression 
and core stimuli. Moreover, there is evidence that some great apes and other primates, our  
closest evolutionary ancestors, exhibit homologous bodily changes, facial expressions and 
typical behaviour when faced with the core stimuli of some of these basic emotions.167 This 
indicates that to a large extent our emotional dispositions are, as the TEA model contends, 
an innate feature of our psychologies, whose presence predates the emergence of Homo sapiens 
and which evolved in order to solve various adaptive challenges. 
 
This much Prinz agrees with. However in addition he holds that our affective dispositions 
can be moulded in pretty much any direction, giving rise to culturally-specific emotions, 
through what he refers to as calibration.168 Prinz posits two mechanisms by which this 
calibration process takes place. Firstly, basic emotions can be combined together to produce 
an emotional blend – he gives the example of contempt, which he suggests is a blend of anger 
and disgust. Secondly, basic emotions can be linked to a particular set of eliciting conditions 
to produce a new emotion, such as pride representing joy which is elicited by one’s own 
success. Recall from the previous chapter that the TEA model also maintains that affective 
dispositions can be calibrated in a similar manner. Nonetheless, whilst there I suggested that 
such malleability is constrained by our evolved nature, Prinz does not seem to take this to be 
the case. Although he holds that the basic emotions function so as to represent adaptive 
concerns, and that recalibration often works by elaborating on a subset of the core eliciting 
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stimuli of a particular basic emotion, the process is conceived of as relatively open-ended. 
Given this understanding of affective dispositions as unconstrained by innate factors, so too 
are our moral values. Hence his statement that “I tend to think, somewhat cynically, that the 
range of moral rules is relatively unconstrained…I adamantly believe that we could teach 
people to value the recreational torture of small babies.”169  
 
However, although humans in particular have also evolved to be susceptible to environmental 
influences in the shaping of what elicits emotional responses, given their initial etiological 
function we should expect that this malleability will not go all the way down. For if a complex 
psychological characteristic has a long evolutionary heritage and specified function, we 
should expect that it should be fairly resistant to dramatic modification. If our emotional 
dispositions were utterly plastic, then their chances of in fact motivating us to behave in an 
adaptive manner would be entirely hostage to the influences we were exposed to in our 
surrounding environment. 
 
Of course, we cannot come to firm conclusions regarding just how flexible our emotional 
repertoire is based purely on the logic of adaptation. As many rightfully stress, evolution is 
not an optimising nor predictable process, and natural selection is by no means the sole force 
involved.170 Nonetheless, there is independent evidence that humans and other social 
mammals exhibit various learning biases when it comes to developing emotional associations. 
Preliminary proof for such biased learning was first demonstrated in the 1960s by researchers 
studying the capacity of rats to learn avoidance responses towards stimuli associated with 
negative bodily effects, based on environmental cues. Robert Koelling and John Garcia 
designed and ran an experiment whereby rats were exposed to different combinations of 
stimuli and negative bodily feedback.171 They found that whilst rats quickly learned to avoid 
flavoured water which triggered nausea or emitters of lights and noises which triggered 
physical pain, they failed to learn to avoid flavoured water which triggered physical pain, or 
lights and noise which triggered nausea. An obvious explanation as to why the groups of rats 
under these conditions did or did not develop avoidances in the particular pattern that they 
did is because their learning mechanisms were already predisposed to associate certain 
                                                          
169 Prinz, J. ‘Reply to Dwyer and Tiberius.” in Moral Psychology Volume 1, p.429 
170 For instance, see Gould, S.J. and Lewontin, R.C. ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
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aversive bodily responses to certain types of environmental cues. In their natural 
environment, rats are more likely to experience nausea after having consumed something of 
a distinctive taste, given the link between flavour and poisonous food. Conversely, they are 
more likely to experience physical pain after contact with prominent visual and auditory 
danger cues. Hence, rats are innately prepared for learning certain types of connections, but 
not others, based on the adaptive value of making the sorts of connections which are typically 
found in their natural environment, and hence more likely to be reliable. 
 
With this in mind, it is highly plausible to suppose that the psychological mechanisms which 
facilitate the calibration of our emotions also involve a strong degree of preparedness which 
biases us towards forming some associations and aversions much more easily than others. 
For instance, it is common knowledge that snakes and spiders often provoke intense fear 
amongst humans, and that phobias of these animals are common. This is despite the fact that 
few individuals are ever physically harmed by such creatures, at least in contemporary 
Western societies. Based on this, some have suggested that humans are born with an innate 
fear of potentially dangerous animals which were common in the environment where human 
evolution took place. However, recent studies suggest that rather than being born with a fully 
developed, innate fear of such creatures directly encoded into our psychology, humans 
instead possess psychological biases which lead us to very easily learn to fear them. Such 
studies demonstrated that both humans and non-human primates are easily inculcated to fear 
snakes, as they possess certain characteristics which we are innately disposed to associate with 
danger, whilst we are not similarly inclined to develop a fear of other features of the 
environment, such as rabbits and flowers.172 Just as the learning mechanisms of rats are biased 
towards more easily developing an aversion to a taste which leads to nausea rather than 
physical pain, so too do humans more easily develop fear towards snakes than other 
organisms which would have presented less of a threat to our survival chances. Thus, our 
emotional malleability, such as it is, is in certain respects directed to develop in such a way 
that typically has adaptive value. This helps explain why although there are some generalisable 
differences in the emotional tendencies found within distinct cultural groups, basic emotions 
tend to have cross-culturally universal core stimuli. Whilst we may not be born with, for 
instance, an innately fixed psychological association between faeces or rotting meat and a 
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disgust response, humans typically have such an association because it is one which we are 
so strongly predisposed to learn to make.  
 
This all being the case, it seems that Prinz’s claim that our affective dispositions are culturally 
malleable enough to ensure that our moral concerns are equally flexible is implausible. Again, 
Prinz does not deny that there is an element of innate preparedness which shapes our 
emotional dispositions, and as mentioned, he is even willing to grant that our innate affective 
tendencies facilitate the social construction of values and norms. Yet it is his insistence that 
these tendencies don’t play a significant role in shaping the content of such values and norms 
is at odds with the above portrayal of our emotional learning biases. If we are strongly 
disposed to, for instance, learn to experience an aversive affective response when we witness 
or imagine distress cues, and if values and norms gain their perceived normative force from 
affective responses, then we will surely in turn be equally strongly disposed to endorse and 
internalise values and norms which dissuade behaviour which elicits distress cues rather than 
those which permit or promote them.  Similarly, if we are innately prepared to learn to 
respond positively to an equitable distribution of resources and respect for group loyalty or 
hierarchy, it will be far easier to learn to accept values and norms which encourage such states 
of affairs than those which don’t.  Moreover, that this is in fact the case is evident from 
everyday experience and the lessons of history. As Haidt points out, just as it is notoriously 
difficult to foster a preference for vegetables over sweet and fatty foods in children, even the 
most persistent socialisation attempts to inculcate certain moral values (such as impartial 
concern for all humankind over prioritising one’s family and friends) typically meet with 
difficulty, as in the case of various communes like the Israeli kibbutzim.173   
 
In sum, Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism might draw plausibility from the evidence 
indicating that moral judgement is strongly related to our emotional responses, and that such 
emotions are somewhat malleable in the face of cultural influences. However, it does not 
make enough room for the influence of innate emotional learning association biases in 
shaping the cultural construction of moral concepts.  I will now move on to consider another 
alternative account of the origin of moral concepts, the Universal Moral Grammar account, 
which I argue makes the opposite mistake insofar as it places too much weight on the import 
of innate psychological factors. 
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2. Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar 
On the other end of the moral nativist/anti-nativist spectrum is the position that some moral 
concepts are almost entirely the product of an innate component of our psychology, without 
the need for much contribution from experience. A proponent of this position denies that 
we necessarily require specific cultural input in order to develop moral concepts. It is true 
that we do not make moral judgements whenever we experience an affective response which 
causes us to evaluate something as good or bad, and thus there must be more to moral 
judgement than emotional responses alone. However this is not to say that in judging 
something as morally right or wrong we can only do so in virtue of its relation to a culturally 
acquired value or norm. Perhaps some innate principles of human moral reasoning can play 
the role that the TEA model ascribes to culturally supplied values and norms. 
For instance, moral judgements may sometimes result simply from the evaluation of a 
particular event as good or bad combined with a tacit inference that such an event can be 
causally attributed to individual or collective human agency. For instance, if I witness Jane 
step down hard on Edward’s foot, and Edward exhibits distress cues as a consequence, I 
might experience an aversive emotional response which causes me to judge the event as bad. 
If I infer that the action was intentional and deliberate on the part of Jane, this might be 
enough for me to go on to judge it as morally wrong, whilst I would refrain from making 
such a judgement if I were to judge the action as merely accidental, or if it were done to 
prevent greater badness (such as if it was the only effective means of alerting Edward to an 
incoming threat).  
This moral judgement could stem from the perceived violation of the internalised norm 
‘Don’t deliberately cause harm to others (without good reason)’, which gains its normative 
force from the culturally constructed value of compassion. Nonetheless, an individual who 
had not internalised such an explicit norm through the process of enculturation might yet 
judge it as wrong purely on the basis that it constituted harm, and that it was deliberately 
caused by Jane for no good reason. Such a judgement of wrongness might arise automatically 
due to an innate principle of reasoning rather than a culturally specific moral concept or 
norm. 
Something akin to this proposition is suggested by Universal Moral Grammar, which 
represents one of the strongest forms of moral nativism. This approach is favoured by a 
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range of theorists, such as Susan Dwyer174 and Marc Hauser175, but I will concentrate on John 
Mikhail’s presentation, given his status as the leading proponent of this position. Mikhail 
argues that in morally evaluating behaviour we automatically and unconsciously engage in a 
form of action analysis, which influences our judgement in relation to the event, and that 
humans are innately disposed to make moral judgements towards transgressions involving 
harms, injustice and rights. 176 For Mikhail, this is a consequence of our species typical innate 
psychological mechanisms, which cause us to come to similar resolutions in certain moral 
conflicts.  
 
This may sound similar to the line that the TEA model takes, which also explains cross-
cultural commonalities in moral norms in terms of widely shared psychological characteristics 
that indirectly shape moral judgement. Nonetheless, there are two differences on Mikhail’s 
model. Firstly, he denies that affective dispositions are the source of the similarities in moral 
judgements across cultures, and secondly he holds that our innate psychological 
characteristics influence our moral judgements more directly than the TEA model suggests. 
He maintains that such psychological characteristics take the form of implicit principles of 
reasoning which directly lead us to make certain moral judgements, rather than indirectly 
shape them through the medium of cultural construction.177  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Mikhail claims to have found a high level of cross-cultural 
agreement amongst even very young participants in their responses to trolley problem moral 
conflicts.  He combines these findings with a ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument in making 
the case for innate moral principles: children must be endowed with innate moral principles, 
since they cannot possibly have learned the complex principles that they implicitly employ in 
resolving these conflicts. This move is explicitly inspired by Noam Chomsky’s Universal 
Grammar hypothesis, wherein the ease with which children acquire language without much 
instruction is cited as the basis for contending that humans possess an innate psychological 
faculty which facilitates their grasp of grammar. Similarly, Mikhail suggests that children are 
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not exposed to the necessary proximal cues which would allow them to deduce and imitate 
or internalise the kinds of complex rules and principles which explain the pattern of moral 
judgements that they consistently and cross-culturally make. Although children are often 
given explicit or implicit moral instructions, such as “Don’t hit” or “Share your toys”, Mikhail 
argues that their solutions to moral conflicts like trolley problems imply a faculty enabling a 
sophisticated level of implicit moral reasoning which could not possibly be acquired through 
their limited range of experience.  For when confronted with trolley problems, “children must 
represent and evaluate these novel fact patterns in terms of properties like ends, means, side 
effects, and prima facie wrongs such as battery, even where the stimulus contains no evidence 
of these properties. These concepts and the principles which underlie them are as far 
removed from experience as the hierarchical tree structures and recursive rules of linguistic 
grammars. It is implausible to think they are acquired by means of explicit verbal instruction 
or examples in the child’s environment”178 
 
Mikhail thus argues that humans possess an innate, dedicated moral faculty that leads us to 
make the same sorts of moral judgements from an early age across all cultural groups. He 
suggests that to the extent that moral concepts are required in order for us to make 
judgements of right and wrong, they need not be primarily the product of cultural forces. 
Rather, the most salient principles responsible for our moral reasoning are innately endowed, 
thus making it possible to develop and internalise moral values or norms without the need 
for any specific cultural input in shaping them.179  
However, as noted in chapter 3, the level of agreement amongst participants which Mikhail 
cites, although significant, is not as impressive as he claims. His data reveals high levels of 
intracultural moral disagreement, especially regarding what is permissible in non-standard 
variations of trolley problems. Furthermore, also as previously mentioned, Hauser has 
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produced evidence that members of certain cultural groups are not typically inclined to make 
the sorts of moral distinctions which Mikhail suggests we are innately disposed to make.180  
It has further been argued that the poverty of the stimulus argument that Mikhail utilises is 
less plausible when applied to the learning of moral rules than it is concerning the learning of 
grammatical rules, as Mikhail underestimates the level of feedback related to moral rules that 
children are exposed to. It might be that we cannot plausibly account for the widespread and 
early internalisation of complex norms which children apparently make judgements in 
accordance with from an early age, if we take explicit verbal instruction to be the sole means 
by which children infer the local norms of their social environment. Nonetheless, there are 
alternative means by which children can infer, identify and go on to internalise the norms of 
their cultural environment which supplement such explicit socialisation processes. For 
instance, Kim Sterelny points out that children can also make inferences from the rich variety 
of moral exemplars in the various narrative devices (such as songs, stories and fables) that 
cultural groups typically expose them to. Further, children can also pick up moral concepts 
and norms from their interactions with others of their community; interactions which will be 
particularly emotionally charged and thus memorable when involving morally salient 
behaviour.181 So, there may yet be sufficient proximal cues for children to detect and learn 
complex moral principles through mechanisms such as the emotional feedback they receive 
from parents and others, without the need for the principles behind them to be necessarily 
innately encoded. Moreover, remember that the TEA model does not deny that humans are 
innately prepared to acquire and moralise certain concepts and norms, thus partially 
explaining the moral precociousness of young children. It merely maintains that this range of 
concepts and norms is less determinate than Mikhail would have us believe. Thus, although 
the poverty of the stimulus argument may have some bite against more strongly anti-nativist 
positions, such as emotional constructivism, it does not necessarily tell against the TEA 
model.  
Another issue with the Universal Moral Grammar account is that, insofar as Mikhail takes 
the innate factors which guide our moral judgements as principles of reasoning rather than 
affective in nature, it flies in the face of evidence which implies the causal efficacy of emotion 
in moral judgement. On Mikhail’s model, emotion is merely a by-product of moral 
judgement; the rational principles of our innate, dedicated moral faculties are doing the causal 
                                                          
180 Abarbanell, L. and Hauser, M.D. ‘Mayan Morality: An Exploration of Permissible Harms’ Cognition, 115 
(2010) pp.207-224 
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work.182 Yet recall from the previous chapter that evidence from various psychological and 
neuroscientific studies imply a strong causal role for affect in moral judgement. Given this, 
the Universal Moral Grammar account stands on shaky empirical ground.  
One way in which this could be avoided is to modify the theory in such a way as to divorce 
it from its rationalist implications. One could easily offer a more emotivist interpretation of 
the moral grammar model by portraying the innate principles of action evaluation which 
Mikhail posits as necessary, but not sufficient for full-blown moral judgement. On this 
reinterpretation, we may be born with an innate faculty for analysing actions which influences 
our emotional responses to actions, but the emotional response itself is still ultimately 
responsible for delivering the moral judgement. Indeed, in a response to Nichols, Blair 
conjectures this sort of faculty as constituting an important part of the VIM (Violence 
Inhibition Mechanism).183 The extent to which we experience an action or event as affectively 
charged could be partly dependent on whether we analyse the event as, for instance, 
intentionally caused and for what reason, and this further influences whether we judge it as 
wrongful or not. Upon analysing an emotionally salient event as attributable to human agency, 
we might automatically go on to morally evaluate it. Our tendency to engage in such an 
analysis and make corresponding judgements based on it could be part of our innate 
psychological framework, and thus facilitates the formation of moral judgements. 
In any case, it must be noted that even if this alternative interpretation of strong moral 
nativism is taken as a plausible explanation of at least some moral judgements, it is not 
necessarily incompatible with the TEA model. It may be the case that we are so strongly 
innately disposed to endorse certain moral principles that they reliably arise independent of 
the specific content of cultural input. Yet such principles are only minimal in scope, and 
culturally constructed norms and values remain the primary source of our moral judgements. 
Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar model, meanwhile, suggests that our evaluation of 
actions as right or wrong stems more from innate principles than culturally constructed 
values, which stands in contrast with the TEA model.  
I have now critically discussed two alternative accounts of moral psychology, each differing 
in the extent to which they attribute the source of moral values and norms to cultural versus 
innate psychological factors. Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism takes moral concepts to be 
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almost entirely socially constructed, whereas Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar conceives 
them as primarily the product of an innate, dedicated moral faculty. During my discussion I 
have offered reasons for favouring the TEA model: Emotional Constructivism does not seem 
to afford enough weight to the influence of innate biases in the learning of emotional 
associations, whereas the basis of the poverty of the stimulus argument which grounds 
Universal Moral Grammar is dubious. I now mean to show that the TEA model has an 
additional advantage over these alternatives, in that it has more explanatory power with 
regards to the pattern of moral conflict and intercultural and intracultural moral disagreement 
that I discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 3. Drawing out how exactly this is the case will not only 
improve the plausibility of the TEA model, but can help us make further sense of the causes 
of such phenomena.  
 
3. Explaining Intrapersonal Moral Conflict 
Recall that in Chapter 1 I suggested that when individuals are faced with situations of moral 
conflict, they are often able to come to solutions which they consider to be morally best, all 
things considered. Nonetheless, their resolutions are also accompanied by the experience of 
‘tragic remorse’, a disquieting feeling of moral loss, which we endorse as an appropriate 
response to the situation. Such tragic remorse is more commonly associated with conflicts 
between distinct moral concerns rather than between two instantiations of the same value. 
This, I argued, suggests that individuals are implicitly committed to a range of distinct values, 
which are to some extent incommensurable: the realisation of one does not make up for the 
loss of another. I referred to this phenomena as descriptive value pluralism. 
 
On first blush each of the accounts of moral psychology which I have previously considered 
can explain descriptive value pluralism.  For each allows that humans possess multiple, 
distinct moral concepts and norms. The accounts simply disagree over the relative extent to 
which these concepts and norms derive from innate psychological characteristics versus 
cultural construction. This being the case, each can make sense of individuals recognising a 
range of moral concerns which might sometimes come into conflict.  
 
Nonetheless, I contend that the TEA model can go further than this and offer a more 
comprehensive explanation of descriptive value pluralism. For this model maintains that our 
moral concerns derive their perceived normative force from a range of affective bases. 
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Individuals are apt to internalise moral concepts and feel moral evaluative force because of 
their relation to phenomenologically distinct emotional responses. For instance, whilst 
compassion and harm norms are grounded ultimately in our capacity to experience harm 
aversion, purity-based values and norms regulating sexual conduct are treated as morally 
significant on the basis of disgust. Assuming that this is the case, we can readily explain the 
characteristic phenomenology of moral conflict. When moral concerns conflict, we find it so 
difficult to resolve them in an ultimately satisfactory way because distinct affective responses 
underpin each concern. Although we often still can come to an all-things-considered best 
judgement in such cases, we are left with tragic remorse since, whatever we prioritise, we 
experience the normative force of the neglected value as phenomenologically distinct.  
 
The potential to experience tragic remorse is, to some extent, mitigated by the enculturating 
process. As Haidt emphasises, cultural groups tend not to draw upon the full range of the 
five foundations in culturally constructing their moral concepts, in order to minimise these 
sorts of value conflicts within the group. A culture cannot cultivate and moralise each 
affective base, he argues, because this “would risk paralysis, as every action triggered multiple 
conflicting intuitions”.184 Rather, the affective bases which constitute some moral 
foundations are culturally elaborated upon at the expense of neglecting or even deliberately 
suppressing the others, in order to cement moral solidarity within the group. Moreover, 
individuals assign culturally constructed moral concepts and norms different relative weights 
which enables them to balance their relative importance against each other when they 
conflict. This ensures that individuals do not experience tragic remorse too often, since some 
considerations will not be regarded as morally salient, and they seldom encounter moral 
conflicts which they take to be dilemmas which cannot be resolved.  However, when an 
individual does encounter a situation where their internalised values or norms prescribe 
conflicting courses of action, then the fact that this ultimately involves a conflict between 
distinct affective sources of normativity lends itself to a consequent experience of tragic 
remorse. Understanding culturally constructed moral concepts as deriving from a plurality of 
distinct emotions helps to explain our experience of values as partly incommensurable. 
 
Meanwhile, Mikhail has less resources at his disposal to explain descriptive value pluralism. 
Universal Moral Grammar says nothing of the innate, underlying principles of morality which 
it hypothesises as deriving from distinct psychological sources. Indeed, the model holds that 
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humans are innately endowed with dedicated moral faculty, which has the specific function 
of providing an integrated body of principles which are designed to work smoothly together. 
If this was the case, then although we might still expect individuals to encounter conflicts 
between prima facie moral rules, we would not predict that they would experience tragic 
remorse to the extent that they do. After all, the faculty would require some mechanism to 
resolve apparent moral tensions arising from situations when principles recommend 
incompatible judgements, such as principles having set ‘lexical order’185 relative to each other. 
For the system to then go on to produce an accompanying phenomenology of distinct moral 
loss after such resolutions would be extraneous – tragic remorse seems not to have any 
obvious functional application, after all. Of course, an advocate of Universal Moral Grammar 
might deny that their model of moral psychology need be conceived as so efficiently designed. 
Perhaps tragic remorse is a necessary side effect of having the capacity for moral judgement, 
which even a dedicated moral faculty cannot overcome. Yet even so, the phenomena of tragic 
remorse brings out just how distinct we experience moral values to be from one another. 
This is less congruent with the notion that moral intuitions are the product of a single 
organised faculty than the TEA model’s contention that they derive from a range of distinct 
affective bases.   
 
Emotional Constructivism, on the other hand, can explain the phenomenon handily. After 
all, like the TEA model, it conceives of emotions as the primary source of felt normativity, 
and Prinz could equally explain the phenomenology of moral conflict as a by-product of 
distinct moral concerns mapping onto distinct affective bases. Furthermore, despite Prinz 
rejecting Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory, he does endorse its precursor – the CAD 
hypothesis mentioned in the previous chapter.186 Recall that this thesis explicitly holds that 
different emotions arise from different classes of moral transgressions: transgressions against 
community trigger contempt, autonomy based transgressions cause anger and transgressions 
of divinity elicit disgust. Furthermore, Prinz holds that other emotions such as guilt, shame, 
sympathy, admiration and gratitude are also culturally calibrated in the social construction of 
morality. This plurality of moral emotions could be said to contribute to the sense of 
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fragmentation in our moral phenomenology.187 Insofar as Emotional Constructivism accepts 
this, then it is equally well situated to explain descriptive value pluralism as is the TEA model. 
Whilst Universal Moral Grammar fares poorly in this regard, we will have to look elsewhere 
to vindicate my contention that the TEA model has greater explanatory power overall than 
Emotional Constructivism. 
 
4. Explaining Intercultural Moral Disagreement 
Let us move on to see how each account fares in explaining intercultural moral disagreement. 
I will concentrate on the cultural diversity that we observe concerning moral concepts and 
norms associated with harm. As previously mentioned, the anthropological record reveals 
that many cultural groups have norms regulating the infliction of violence. Furthermore, as 
we would expect given the prevalence of these norms, many cultural groups consider the 
caring for and defence of the weak and vulnerable as morally valuable, and praise those who 
act in accordance with compassion as virtuous. However, some cultural groups have wider 
range of harm norms than others, and the extent and range of conditions under which harm 
is recognised as morally wrong differs considerably from group to group.188  
 
The TEA model of moral psychology has great explanatory power in this regard. This 
account has it that, in the first stage, those affective dispositions which constitute the 
harm/care foundation are likely, but not guaranteed, to be drawn upon in the cultural 
construction of moral concepts. Because humans are innately disposed to respond to distress 
cues with an aversive emotional response, and to moralise this response, cultural groups are 
liable to construct values and virtues which represent harm as morally wrong. The harm 
aversion of members of such groups will be intensified, and they will come to treat this 
affective response as morally salient. Within such groups, norms which regulate the infliction 
of harm will enjoy increased cultural fitness, and are likely to originate and persist over time.  
 
However, again, the extent to which this happens is partly dependent on the particulars of 
the cultural environment in which we are raised. If the harm/care foundation is not 
emphasised by the moral concepts of a particular cultural group, harm might not feature as 
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188 See Silverberg, J. Gray, P. Aggression and Peacefulness in Humans and Other Primates New York: 
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much of a consideration within its values and virtues. Not only will the emotional 
development of the group’s members thereby be shaped in such a way that harm will not 
elicit as strong an affective response as it will amongst members of other groups, but the 
response itself will not be deemed as morally relevant. This will entail that norms which 
regulate harm will not be as likely to originate and persist within such a group.  
 
The Universal Moral Grammar account of Mikhail struggles more to explain such cultural 
variation in harm norms and moral concepts which moralise the prevention of harm. As I 
mention in section 1, there certainly could be a sense in which such accounts have something 
to them, insofar as it may well be the case that we are so strongly disposed towards some key 
moral principles that they do not necessarily need to be specifically culturally supplied for us 
to make moral judgements based on them. Nonetheless, this can at best be only a partial story 
regarding why humans make the range of moral judgements that they do. For if our moral 
psychology is comprised entirely of a dedicated moral reasoning system, complete with a 
range of innately encoded moral principles, then why do the values and norms of many 
cultural groups exhibit so much variation?  
 
It has been suggested that nativist positions such as Universal Moral Grammar can, in fact, 
attribute some of the moral variation that we observe between cultural groups to the input 
of cultural influences. Some Moral Grammar theorists, such as Gilbert Harman argue that a 
so-called ‘Principles and Parameters’ model of moral psychology can plausibly explain the 
pattern of cultural variation we observe in moral norms and values.189  Developing the analogy 
of Chomskian linguistic grammar, Harman argues that we could be born with an innate 
underlying structure of moral principles which shapes and restricts the more culturally 
specific moral rules. Such an innate mechanism ensures that some moral principles are 
genuinely culturally universal, yet leaves room for a restricted range of variability within the 
bounds of certain parameters. For instance, our innate psychology might contain the 
underlying principle ‘Do not inflict harm upon X’, where the parameter X can be culturally 
specified as narrowly as ‘one’s immediate family’ or as widely as ‘any living creature’.  
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I contend that such an account by itself is less well positioned to fully explicate the pattern 
of moral diversity that we encounter between cultural groups. For as Stripada explains, the 
range of variation that exists between the harm norms of different cultural groups is more 
complex and subtle, going beyond that of differentiation over a few mere parameters.190 
Across cultural groups, there is variation in the moral norms concerning what kind of harms 
are prohibited, what class of people should be protected from such harms, under what 
circumstances such otherwise prohibited harms may be justified, and to what extent the level 
of harm inflicted may be appropriate. For instance, in some cultural groups any kind of 
infliction of harm to any degree towards any member of an in-group is prohibited, regardless 
of the circumstances. However, in others, the infliction of certain types of harm (e.g. open 
hand beating) is regarded as morally justified towards certain individuals (e.g. one’s wife), to 
certain degrees (e.g. without leaving bruises) and under certain circumstances (e.g. if insulted).  
 
One could attempt to explain this in terms of there being a particularly wide range of 
parameters which are culturally specified, but which all operate within the framework of 
innately encoded overarching moral principles. Mikhail, for one, would probably not be 
willing to accept this level of cultural input: if he did, it wouldn’t be clear why he was appealing 
to cross-cultural similarities in the solution to trolley problems in order to substantiate his 
case. Still, if a Universal Moral Grammar theorist was willing to concede that the bulk of the 
content our moral concepts and norms are the product of culture rather innate psychological 
principles, then this explanation of intercultural moral disagreement is viable. I yet maintain 
that the TEA model which I advocate offers a more plausible interpretation of such variation 
in harm norms. Nonetheless, we cannot discount Universal Moral Grammar purely on the 
basis that it fails to offer a strong account of intercultural moral disagreement. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, I similarly contend that Emotional Constructivism may 
offer an explanation of the pattern of cross-cultural moral variation that we observe, but that 
it is less plausible. Prinz emphasises the role of cultural construction in terms of the 
development and inculcation of moral concepts and norms, claiming that our shared innate 
psychological tendencies facilitate such social constructions, but only influence their content 
in a very minimal sense. Of course, this entails that Prinz can very easily account for cultural 
variation in moral concepts and norms, but he is less well equipped to explain cross-cultural 
similarities in these areas. He suggests that, to the extent that cross-cultural similarities in 
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moral concepts exist, they are primarily to be explained through reference to the co-
ordination problems that human groups all face. These are difficulties which all human 
groups share, leading them to construct similar moral concepts and norms on pragmatic 
grounds. In his words: 
 
 “There are some social pressures that all human beings face. In 
living together, we need to devise rules of conduct, and we need to 
transmit those rules in ways which are readily internalised…Cultures 
need to make sure that people feel badly about harming members of 
their in-group and taking possessions from their neighbours….The 
rules are as varied as the problems, but the universal need to achieve 
social stability guarantees that some system of moral rules will be 
devised.”191  
 
Thus, Prinz would explain the preponderance of norms, values and virtues associated with 
the infliction of harm across cultural groups by reference to the importance of preventing 
violence and aggression in order to maintain social stability and cohesion within human 
groups. Although he accepts that such social solutions are readily facilitated by the innate 
disposition to experience vicarious distress, this disposition is conceived of as merely a 
convenient tool which is often exploited by cultural groups, rather than influencing their 
moral codes.192  
 
Certainly, social problems and the necessity of solving them is bound to have had some 
importance influence in the development of the moral norms of cultural groups. Yet I take 
it to be a stretch to suggest that such problems are the sole factor which we should refer to 
when trying to explain the range of cross-culturally common themes in morality. If the moral 
concepts and norms that a cultural group developed were guided and constrained only by the 
needs of social practicality, we should expect a less consistent pattern in terms of what sort 
of issues are moralised across cultural groups. After all, cultures will generally instil a wide 
range of norms which act so as to maintain social stability amongst their members. Yet recall 
from the previous chapter that only those norms which regulate certain types of behaviour 
are typically treated as moral rather than conventional, and this has be proven to be the case 
across a wide range of cultural groups. It would be highly coincidental if it just so happened 
that each of those groups where the moral/conventional task was tested assigned exactly the 
same sorts of norms moral rather than conventional status, if social necessity was indeed the 
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only influencing factor in their construction. However, it must be conceded that Prinz’ 
explanation of intercultural moral similarity is plausible enough that we cannot discount 
Emotional Constructivism yet. 
 
In sum, whilst there seems to be too much moral variation across cultural groups for 
Universal Moral Grammar to easily explain, what variation we do observe is patterned in such 
a way that Emotional Constructivism equally finds it difficult to account for. Nonetheless, 
both theories do have some explanatory resources at hand that they can apply here. I take it 
that my proposed TEA model has a preferable explanation for intercultural moral 
disagreement, but I cannot claim a knock-down victory against either alternative on this 
score. 
 
5. Explaining Intracultural Moral Disagreement 
How, then, does the TEA model explain the diversity in moral judgements between members 
of the same cultural group, which I emphasised in chapter 3? The most obvious means by 
which it can explain it is through differences in the particular manner in which individuals 
have been socialised. Especially within broad societal cultural group, it is clear that the social 
environments in which individuals are raised are not uniform. As I argued in chapter 3, when 
we take broadly construed cultural groups such as ‘North American’, we typically find much 
moral diversity within them, especially within such contemporary pluralistic societies. I 
further noted that in contrast we tend to find less widespread disagreement concerning value 
weighting within relatively narrowly defined sub cultural groups, such as ‘Anglo-Saxon, 
working class, protestant Virginians’. There I gave reasons to be sceptical that such a pattern 
could be explained purely in terms of environmental influences upon the members’ moral 
development, but it cannot be denied that such influences do play a large role in explaining 
it.  
 
The TEA model which I propose can readily accept this. After all, it hypothesises a strong 
degree of environmental influence in the shaping of the moral outlook of individuals.  For 
one, the account of the development of one’s affective dispositions I offered suggests that 
they are malleable to some degree. The extent to which we will experience an affective 
response towards a certain stimuli, and whether we take it to be morally significant, is in part 
dependent upon the sort of socio-environmental influences that we have been exposed to. 
Thus, for example, the strength of the aversive affective response which we are disposed to 
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experience when witnessing or imagining the distress cues of others will depend upon 
whether or not the social environment in which we were raised encouraged the cultivation 
and moralisation of such a response. More importantly, the particular cultural environment 
in which we are raised will heavily determine our moral concepts and norms. The TEA model 
admits that the social construction and cultural evolution of such moral concepts are to a 
large extent influenced by our affective dispositions. But given that such affective responses 
are somewhat socially malleable in the first place, and that in any case the particular content 
of the norms, values and virtues are underdetermined by such dispositions, they will differ 
from sub-cultural group to sub-cultural group. It makes perfect sense that the more similar 
the social environment different individuals are exposed to, the more likely they are to share 
the same values and norms, and regard them as having a similar degree of salience when 
informing their moral judgements. Thus, intracultural disagreement will of course be less 
significant when we are considering more narrowly defined cultural groups wherein the 
members are exposed to more similar social influences.  
 
Nonetheless, as I further noted in Chapter 3, there is reason for us to believe that even 
amongst individuals exposed to very similar environmental conditions, moral disagreement 
can and does still exist. As I argued there, the fact that we observe less moral disagreement 
within narrowly defined cultural groups can partly be attributed to individuals joining those 
cultural groups whose moral values they identify with, and thus their relative moral consensus 
does not necessarily stem from shared environmental influences. Moreover, even if it is often 
latent and stifled, particularly within social groups that demand strong conformity with the 
moral status quo, individuals of the same narrowly defined cultural group sometimes do hold 
conflicting views concerning the relative importance of their culturally shared values and 
norms.  
 
I want to suggest that, to a large extent, this moral disagreement is to be explained in terms 
of individuals within cultural groups possessing different affective dispositions from one 
another. Recall that the TEA model holds that our affective responses on their own do not 
constitute our moral outlook. Our internalisation of culturally constructed concepts such as 
norms and values are a necessary and important component in facilitating and shaping our 
individual moral judgements. Nonetheless, this is not to say that the particular affective 
dispositions of individuals themselves do not go a long way in influencing the extent to which 
we regard the culturally constructed moral concepts and norms and as morally salient. As 
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Blair’s studies on psychopath’s responses to the moral/conventional task imply, even if one 
is competent with the prevailing norms and values of one’s social environment, if one lacks 
the affective response which such cultural constructions normally get their perceived 
normative force from, one will not regard them as morally significant. Further, the evidence 
from psychological and neuroscientific studies which I cited in chapter 4 buttresses the case 
for affective responses having a direct role in moral judgement. Thus, the TEA model 
suggests that the extent to which an individual experiences an affective response towards 
particular stimuli does in fact influence their moral judgement towards it.  When individuals 
who have been exposed to the same set of culturally constructed moral concepts and norms 
morally disagree, then, the most plausible explanation is that the disagreement stems from 
differences between the disputants’ affective dispositions.  
To elaborate, given that culturally constructed moral concepts and norms gain their perceived 
normative force from affective dispositions, the extent to which we take a concept or norm 
to be morally salient is dependent on our particular set of affective dispositions. That is, the 
particular moral weight which we assign to a moral concept, such as a value (and the norms 
underpinned by that the value) will depend upon how strongly disposed we are to experience 
an affective response towards to the stimuli which the value relates to. Within any particular 
culture, there will be a plurality of values which draw their normative force from distinct 
affective bases. When conflicts occur between these values, one resolves them by weighting 
their relative importance against each other. This process, I hold, is heavily influenced by 
one’s particular set of affective dispositions. Thus, in a conflict between compassion and 
equality, one who has a stronger disposition towards harm aversion is more likely to weight 
compassion over equality, whereas one who has a stronger inequity aversion is more likely to 
weight equality over compassion. Moreover, even in cases where we lack socially shared 
moral concepts and norms which are elaborated atop particular affective bases, affective 
responses on their own can nonetheless influence our moral judgements. For instance, within 
a cultural context which does not cultivate moral concepts explicitly drawn from the purity 
domain, individuals with a strong disgust response are still liable to make moral judgements 
which are influenced by this affective disposition. This is borne out in Inbar’s study described 
in the previous chapter, which demonstrates that disgust-sensitive individuals are more likely 
to implicitly condemn gay kissing in public despite not explicitly condemning homosexuality.  
So, why would individuals of the same cultural group differ in their affective dispositions? 
The most obvious answer is that they have been exposed to slightly different environmental 
influences. Even amongst individuals who share an extremely similar cultural environment, 
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this is not to say that they will share uniform experiences of the kind which have the capacity 
to mould their emotional repertoire. For every individual’s life experience is unique regardless 
of the social environment in which they were raised, and our unique experiences will 
inevitably go some way in shaping our particular affective dispositions and, in turn, moral 
values. Thus although individuals of cultural groups might all be exposed to the same moral 
concepts and norms, there will be variation in the extent to which individuals will come to 
endorse each concept and norm, depending on the idiosyncratic environmental influences 
which shape their affective dispositions. Through their particular experience of the world, 
the affective dispositions of an individual will be shaped in a manner which will influence the 
normative weight they implicitly assign to the multiple socially constructed moral concepts 
and norms that they are exposed to. 
 
However, I also contend that there is another important factor at play: the innate 
psychological variability of individuals. Although the TEA model which I propose stresses 
the extent to which our affective dispositions are shaped by socialisation, it also acknowledges 
that the psychological mechanisms responsible for affective tendencies – and the constraints 
and biases which influence the way in which environmental factors shape them - are 
ultimately a product of our genetic heritage. Therefore, our particular genetic makeup will to 
a large extent direct the course of the development of our affective dispositions.  
 
Now, although it is true that many of the genes which encode for our affective dispositions 
will be species typical, this is not to say that they are uniform across all individuals within the 
human species. It may very well be the case that some are, for instance, genetically 
predisposed to develop stronger dispositions to experience disgust or anger than others. As 
many philosophers of biology maintain, an important feature of evolutionary theory is the 
idea that evolutionary change via natural selection is driven by what is known as ‘genomic 
plasticity’. Genomic plasticity entails that individual organisms of the same species will 
inevitably exhibit variation across all traits, partly due to variation in their genetic makeup. 
This explains how the evolutionary process gets off the ground – Darwinian evolution 
depends upon there being inheritable trait variation within species for natural selection to 
select for. As Samir Okasha puts it: 
 
 “...Darwinism leads us to expect variation with respect to all 
organismic traits, morphological, physiological, behavioural and 
genetic. For genetically based phenotypic variation is essential to the 
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operation of natural selection. If selection is to cause a species to 
evolve adaptations, and eventually to evolve into different species, 
as Darwinian theory asserts, then there must be variation within the 
species for selection to operate on. Intra-specific variation with 
respect to all organismic traits, and thus the lack of species specific 
essences, is fundamental to the Darwinian explanation of organic 
diversity.”193  
 
Given this, we have reason to believe that some of the intercultural variation between the 
affective dispositions of individuals is partly down to genetic variation between individuals.  
 
This notion gains further plausibility when we consider evidence from the interdisciplinary 
field of behavioural genetics, which studies the role of genetics in behaviour. In trying to 
understand the heritability of human behavioural and psychological traits in humans, 
behavioural geneticists generally make use of studies which compare the relative similarities 
between adoptive siblings, fraternal siblings, twins and identical twins, both raised in the same 
family environment and apart. These studies are useful insofar as they help disentangle the 
relative importance of environmental and genetic influences on traits such as personality 
variables. At one extreme, adoptive siblings share a home environment but are no more likely 
to share the same genes than at random. On the other end of the scale, identical twins 
separated at birth and raised in different adoptive homes have very similar genetic makeups, 
but are subject to a very different range of environmental influences. Meanwhile, other pairs 
such as fraternal siblings and non-identical twins raised both apart and together are subject 
to differing ranges of genetic and family environmental influences. By studying the extent to 
which such pairs possess similar behavioural dispositions, behavioural geneticists can help 
understand the extent to which the psychological mechanisms responsible for shaping an 
individual’s behaviour are inheritable. 
 
The conclusions drawn from the application of such a methodology are striking. Eric 
Turkheimer’s article ‘The Three Laws of Behavioural Genetics and What They Mean’ begins 
by starkly stating that “The nature-nurture debate is over. The bottom line is that everything 
is heritable…”194 The three laws that he cites as having been unanimously proven by the 
aforementioned studies are as follows:  
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First Law. All human behavioural traits are heritable. 
 
Second Law. The effect of being raised in the same family is smaller than the effect of genes. 
 
Third Law. A substantial portion of the variation in complex human behavioural traits is not 
accounted for by the effects of genes or families. 
 
Turkheimer goes on to argue that it would be overly simplistic to interpret these laws as 
entailing that environmental influences are unimportant in shaping human psychology and 
behaviour. On the contrary, although the evidence indicates that behavioural traits are 
genetically heritable, it does not indicate that they are perfectly so – roughly speaking, it is 
suggested that our genetic makeup accounts for about 50% of the overall influence upon our 
personality. Although our family environment does not have as much impact on our 
psychology as we might expect, the interaction between our genes and other environmental 
factors such as our wider cultural group, particular peer group and the non-shared influences 
which I mentioned earlier clearly play a substantial role. Regardless, the take home message 
is that the psychological mechanisms behind behavioural traits are inheritable. From this we 
can infer that the set of affective dispositions which an individual will ultimately develop in 
part depends upon their particular genetic endowment, which varies within human 
populations. In turn, this can help explain why individuals within the same cultural group are 
disposed to assign differing moral weight to conflicting moral concerns: the affective 
dispositions which shape their basic evaluative tendencies differ as a consequence of genetic 
variability. 
 
One might object that this claim is mere conjecture, but in fact recent studies have provided 
more concrete evidence that our particular set of moral values are influenced by our genetic 
makeup. Specifically, certain twin studies have found that political orientation is remarkably 
inheritable. For instance, in a 2013 study involving 600 pairs of twins found that political 
ideology, as measured by two different indexes, was strongly inheritable.195 This is not, of 
course, because genes can encode for the development of specific political ideologies. Rather, 
it is far more plausibly the case that more general psychological tendencies which influence 
an individual’s political views, such as our affective dispositions, are partly determined by our 
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genetic endowment. Given the obvious link between one’s particular weighting of moral 
values and one’s political orientation, this represents strong evidence that intracultural moral 
disagreement is partly a consequence of genetic variation.  
 
Thus, the TEA mode can explain intracultural moral disagreement as ultimately stemming 
from individuals of the same cultural group possessing different affective dispositions. This 
in turn is conceived of as a consequence of individual differences in both genetic endowment 
and non-shared environmental influences.  
 
Emotional Constructivism, on the other hand, can only partially endorse this explanation. 
Although Prinz can still happily point to the impact of non-shared environmental influences 
in explaining intracultural moral disagreement, he would be less comfortable with an 
explanation relying on innate psychological variation. For whilst he conceives of the 
emotional building blocks of moral judgement as deriving from innate features of our 
psychology, ultimately he holds that the development of our affective dispositions is 
determined by our experience rather than our genes. The issue with this is that there just 
seems to be too much intracultural moral disagreement to explain merely through non-shared 
environmental influences. If, as Prinz suggests, our affective dispositions are so subject to 
cultural conditioning, then any chance events which happened to influence us away from the 
dominant values of our particular cultural group would surely be outweighed by persistent 
counter-veiling influences.  
 
Another problem with going this route is that it struggles to account for the evidence from 
behavioural genetics. If our particular set of emotional dispositions are determined by our 
environment rather than innate factors, then the aforementioned twin studies would surely 
not provide evidence of their heritability. Prinz himself is sceptical of such evidence, claiming 
that insofar as twin studies typically recruit a relatively small sample of participants from a 
very limited range of cultural groups, no strong conclusions concerning the relative impact 
of environment over genetics can be drawn from them.196 However this critique does not 
quite hit the mark – the participants of such studies might not have been representative of all 
the culturally diversity which exists, but major differences over certain characteristics were 
represented, political orientation being a good example. The studies consistency provide 
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evidence such characteristics are to a large extent shared between those of a similar genetic 
endowment. The precise details of how genes and environment interact for this to be the 
case may not be clear, but it seems intransigent to simply deny the influence of genes in the 
face of such evidence.   
 
Universal Moral Grammar, meanwhile, might attempt to explain intracultural moral 
disagreement in a similar manner to the TEA model, relying on a combination of 
environmental and innate differences. However, neither factor would be as applicable here. 
Firstly, assuming that a proponent of the theory would be willing to adopt Harman’s 
aforementioned principles and parameters version of the model, they too might appeal to 
our experiences as differentially determining what norms we internalise. However this 
explanation fares less well for intracultural than intercultural moral disagreement – typically, 
children of the same cultural group are exposed to the same cultural norms. And whilst they 
may be exposed to idiosyncratic environmental influences which might endow them with 
different affective dispositions, this is less obviously the case when it comes to variations on 
norms.  
 
One might also invoke innate psychological variability between individuals as an alternative 
or complementary explanation of intracultural moral disagreement. But again, this suggestion 
is far less plausible when applied to the dedicated moral faculty which moral grammar 
theorists propose. For although emotional dispositions are the sort of thing which can differ 
on a quantitative level, thus explaining quantitative differences in the moral weight that 
individuals attribute to values, the set of innate principles proposed by Universal Moral 
Grammar are seemingly more binary. Even if we assume that genetic variation can induce 
different sets of inherent principles in individuals, or different relative lexical priorities, the 
intracultural moral variation that we observe seems to go beyond differences in such 
principles. 
 
In sum, whilst the TEA model is positioned to offer a rich and compelling explanation of 
intracultural moral disagreement which is coherent with the evidence from behavioural 
genetics, Emotional Constructivism and Universal Moral Grammar again face difficulty in 
this regard. This is the third phenomena for which a more plausible explanation has been 
borne out of the TEA model than these alternative accounts, and I have also shown it to be 
more coherent with independent evidence.  Therefore, we are in a good position to accept 
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both the TEA model in general and the account of moral conflict and disagreement which it 
offers. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have contended that, as well as being supported by an impressive range of 
independent empirical evidence, the TEA model of moral psychology best explains the 
phenomenology of intrapersonal moral conflict and the pattern of intercultural and 
intracultural moral similarity and diversity which I have highlighted in my previous chapters. 
Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar, meanwhile, does not provide a plausible explanation of 
descriptive value pluralism nor the extent of the moral disagreement between and within 
cultural groups. Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism, on the other hand, may be able to explain 
descriptive value pluralism equally as well as the TEA model. However, it faces difficulty 
explaining both the thematic similarity in what sort of considerations are treated as morally 
salient across cultural groups, the extent of intracultural moral disagreement and its apparent 
relation to genetic factors.  
 
Thus far in my thesis, although I have been considering questions related to the 
phenomenology, anthropology and psychology of moral judgement, my aims have been 
purely descriptive. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show that the conclusions which I 
have come may nonetheless have indirect normative implications. Specifically, I will be 
exploring what my account of intrapersonal moral conflict, moral disagreement between and 
within cultures and the empirical explanation of these phenomena may imply for the Rawlsian 
project of political liberalism.  
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Chapter 6: Implications for Political Liberalism 
 
Thus far in my thesis I have offered an account of moral conflict and disagreement which 
entails that it is both fundamental and inevitable, even within relatively small scale societies, 
partly as a consequence of individuals possessing different affective dispositions. But if we 
have good grounds for taking moral disagreement to be a permanent feature of human life 
then how are we ever to reach a consensus on substantive political principles? Political realists 
have suggested that we cannot, and that we should instead give up any ambition of a society 
united in its commitment to a particular conception of justice. Instead we should appeal to 
everyone’s common interests of maintaining a peaceful and stable society in order to develop 
and maintain a balance of power, a modus vivendi, between fundamentally divided citizens.  
However in Political Liberalism John Rawls is more optimistic about the prospect of a society 
regulated by a conception of justice which everyone can agree upon. He rejects modus vivendi 
political settlements whilst accepting fundamental moral disagreement as an aspect of 
‘reasonable pluralism’. This is the notion that reasonable people, i.e. those who are willing to 
cooperate with others on terms that are mutually agreeable, will forever be committed to a 
plurality of conflicting worldviews. Reasonable pluralism is a consequence of the ‘burdens of 
judgement’: aspects of human reasoning which preclude substantive agreement on what 
makes for a good life between all reasonable people. For Rawls, recognition of these burdens 
plays an important role in convincing citizens that any political arrangement justified purely 
in light of one’s own comprehensive doctrine would be illegitimate, and so we must restrict 
ourselves to drawing on shared political values when proposing terms of cooperation. In this 
way we can reach an overlapping consensus on a liberal political conception of justice, despite 
fundamentally disagreeing about matters of value.  
In this chapter I will argue that Rawls is right that recognition of the burdens of judgement 
promotes toleration, and is a vital criterion of reasonableness. However, the burdens of 
judgement are a controversial supposition regarding the nature of reasoning which Rawls fails 
to properly substantiate. Given this, it is important to make a stronger case than Rawls 
provides for the proposition that those whom one morally disagrees with are not necessarily 
exhibiting irrationality, wilful ignorance or selfishness in their disagreement. To this end I 
suggest that Rawls’s account of the burdens of judgement can be reinforced and rendered 
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more persuasive through reference to the TEA model and its account of moral disagreement, 
which I have argued for in previous chapters.  
I furthermore discuss the claim that the TEA moral psychology also entails that a minority 
of citizens will always be unreasonable, in that they will prioritise values incompatible with 
political liberalism. Conceding this, I yet suggest that recognition of the burdens of judgement 
also provides such people with pragmatic grounds for refraining from attempting to impose 
these values on the political level. As a result Rawlsians might need to accept that some 
citizens will only ever be committed to a liberal political conception for pragmatic rather than 
internal moral reasons. Given the importance of the pragmatic considerations for political 
theory, this is a concession which they should be willing to make.  
My argument will take the following structure. Section 1 will review my previous conclusions 
concerning moral disagreement and how this poses a problem for liberalism, before critically 
discussing the political realist’s proposed solution. Section 2 outlines Rawls’s basic project, 
whilst section 3 explicates the role of reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgement in 
Political Liberalism in more detail. In section 4 I defend the claim that, contra Leif Wenar, 
recognition of reasonable pluralism is indeed a necessary criterion for reasonableness. Section 
5 will demonstrate how the TEA model of moral psychology buttresses Rawls’s case for the 
burdens of judgement and consequent reasonable pluralism. Section 6 highlights the problem 
that this same account could also imply that some individuals will always be unreasonable on 
Rawls terms. Yet, in section 7, I respond by arguing that if we can convince such individuals 
of my reinforced account of the burdens of judgement, this furnishes them with the sort of 
pragmatic grounds for accepting the liberal political conception of justice which political 
realists highlight. I thus conclude that the TEA model of moral psychology has significant 
implications for Rawls’s project of political liberalism. 
 
1. Political Realism and the Problem of Disagreement 
Let me begin by very briefly reviewing the conclusions that I have established in my previous 
chapters.  
- Humans are disposed to invest weight in a multitude of values which are taken to 
have distinct normative force. Individuals can typically come to a decision about how 
best to reconcile conflicts between distinct values, but suffer tragic remorse upon 
doing so. (Chapter  1) 
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- Members of different cultural groups often fundamentally morally disagree; this 
disagreement is best explained in terms of them weighting distinct values differently. 
(Chapter 2) 
- There is good reason to believe that such fundamental moral disagreement also 
occurs within even relatively homogeneous cultural groups, albeit to a lesser extent. 
(Chapter 3) 
- Moral values are culturally constructed, but gain their perceived normative force from 
a range of distinct affective bases. (Chapter 4) 
- Our affective dispositions are variable across individuals as a consequence of non-
shared environmental influences, as well as genetic factors. This explains the 
phenomenology of moral conflict and the incidence of intercultural and intracultural 
disagreement. (Chapter 5) 
For now, the most important lesson to draw is that fundamental moral disagreement is 
inevitable. Even if agents are ideally situated with access to all the relevant non-moral facts, 
and even if they exemplify impartiality and perfect instrumental rationality, disagreement 
about what ends are worth pursuing can, and often will, persist given the way moral 
psychology operates. This is a startling conclusion, and has significant implications for 
political philosophy.  In particular, recall from my introduction that the inevitability of 
fundamental moral disagreement could be conceived of as a challenge to the very foundations 
of liberalism. This is because the dominant strand of liberalism holds that we can at least 
hypothetically all agree and consent to a set of laws which the state may legitimately exercise 
coercion in enforcing.  
What, then, can the liberal theorist say in response to this? One strategy might be to weaken 
the consent-based account of legitimacy and move in the direction endorsed by political 
realists. In recent years political realism has developed as an alternative to mainstream liberal 
thought in political philosophy, drawing influence from the works of historical figures such 
as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche and Schmitt. These theorists typically highlight the central 
role of conflict in politics, and take disagreement amongst citizens very seriously. 
Contemporary political realists follow in this tradition. This school of thought does not 
necessarily rely on the notion that such disagreement is moral and fundamental in the sense 
that I do. Some, for example Max Weber, do believe in fundamental moral disagreement, 
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although he claims that it stems ultimately from the ontological truth of value pluralism.197 
However others, such as Schmitt, take the Hobbesian line of attributing it to the influence of 
an irredeemably selfish, prejudicial and dominating human nature.198 Nonetheless, realists do 
take such disagreement to be unavoidable, and stress that a deep flaw of liberal theory is that 
it fails to meaningfully address this inherent aspect of the political situation. As Matt Sleat 
puts it in his recent book on political realism: 
“The persistence of disagreement is one of the fundamental and 
‘stubborn facts’ of political life which ensures that there is rarely any 
natural harmony or order in human affairs. The most basic political 
question, what I shall call ‘the political question’, is how we are to live 
together in the face of such deep and persistent disagreement.’199  
For the realist, then, liberalism’s hope of reaching a universal consensus on political principles 
that we can all consent to is hopelessly utopian. We can never attain what Bernard Williams 
described as the “insatiable ideal of many a political theoretician: universal consent.”200 And 
even if consent were possible from an abstract hypothetical standpoint, this does not help us 
identify a solution as to what to do in the here and now, where disagreement is rife and shows 
no signs of abating.  
This train of thought leads realists to emphasise the importance of negotiation and 
compromise in reaching a modus vivendi; a political settlement the content of which is 
determined by the particular balance of power within a society, and which all citizens can 
accept in the name of attaining the universal goods of peace and stability. This acceptance on 
the part of citizens is not as demanding a requirement as the consent which liberalism typically 
strives for. For although realists insist that a political authority must have some form of 
justification ready to offer each citizen in order to satisfy what Williams calls the ‘basic 
legitimation demand’201, this justification needn’t be accepted by all citizens on the grounds 
of their principled agreement with the moral content of the settlement. Moreover, what 
determines the content of the political settlement is not based on a conception of what 
citizens would hypothetically consent to under imagined conditions, but the particular 
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preferences and interests of those who currently inhabit the society which the political 
settlement governs. Whilst many individuals who live under a modus vivendi will not be fully 
satisfied with the arrangement, the hope is that a large enough proportion of citizens will be 
placated by the compromise and understand that it is necessary in order to avoid chaos. In 
this way, at least some degree of stability and legitimacy can be maintained despite the 
persistence of disagreement.  
Nonetheless many liberals would not take this response to be satisfactory. For one thing, 
many would not be comfortable with abandoning the liberal ideal of garnering universal 
consent amongst citizens. Realists are quick to point out that it would be misguided to 
caricature their position as boiling down to ‘might makes right’. Although they might stress 
the salience of power dynamics in the shaping of a political settlement, they equally hold that 
the interests of all those governed must be taken into account and a justificatory story must 
be offered in order for legitimacy to be retained. Yet this account of what makes a political 
authority legitimate is much less demanding than that which the liberal endorses.  
Another bone of contention for liberals might be that the content of a particular modus vivendi 
is not guaranteed to be of a liberal nature. Some realists do indeed stress that liberalism and 
realism go hand in hand, such as Michael Williams, who states that “Realism is not opposed 
to liberalism: it is a form of liberalism.”202 Many others suggest that given our current socio-
historical situation, modus vivendi political settlements must have liberal content in the here 
and now. For instance, Bernard Williams holds that under conditions of modernity, liberalism 
may represent the only viable answer to the basic legitimation demand, formulating the 
equation ‘Legitimacy + Modernity = Liberalism’.203 Nonetheless, these proposed foundations 
for liberalism might be seen as worryingly contingent on the majority of citizens within a 
given society sharing liberal values. If the balance of power within a formerly liberal society 
were to change as a result of immigration or the influence of a charismatic orator who 
promoted illiberal values, then it would seem that the logic of modus vivendi would demand 
that the settlement compromised by shifting in an illiberal direction.  
Nonetheless, if disagreement is indeed as inevitable and fundamental as my TEA model 
suggests, then it might be utopian to hope for anything more than a localised, contingent 
justification of a moderate liberal hegemony. Actual consent amongst citizens is certainly not 
forthcoming, and accounts of hypothetical consent fail to recognise that disagreement is 
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genuinely fundamental: it is not attributable to factors we can simply abstract away whilst 
retaining any of the voluntariness which is supposed to ground consent as normatively 
significant. As realists suggest, and the TEA account vindicates, it is apparently impossible to 
ever attain a society built on the ideal of universal consensus. With this in mind, should 
liberals drop their previous ambitions as over-optimistic and adopt more realistic normative 
aims for political theory, or would this be premature?  
 
2. Rawlsian Political Liberalism 
In this section I will provide an exegesis of the core ideas found in John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism. I focus on Rawls’s account of political liberalism as he too takes moral 
disagreement to be fundamental and intractable. However, he specifically rejects modus vivendi 
political settlements as an appropriate solution to this problem. Rather Rawls attempts to 
retain the liberal ideal of consensus as necessary for legitimacy. Rawlsian political liberalism, 
then, offers liberals the best hope of addressing the political problem of moral disagreement 
whilst aspiring to something more substantive than the realists’ proposed solution. 
Rawls’s transition of thought from his seminal work of A Theory of Justice to his second book 
Political Liberalism was largely shaped by his recognition of the fact of ‘reasonable pluralism’ 
and how this presents a problem for his earlier position. Reasonable pluralism is manifest 
when reasonable people, who regard themselves as free and equal citizens and are willing to 
cooperate under fair terms of cooperation when assured that others will do so, are committed 
to a diversity of incompatible comprehensive doctrines. A comprehensive doctrine is an 
exercise in both theoretical and practical reason and roughly translates to a worldview. 
Examples of such include moral doctrines such as Utilitarianism and Kantianism, as well as 
religious doctrines such as Catholicism and Judaism. Each doctrine typically entails an 
associated conception of the good: a view on what is of final value in human life and how 
values are to be weighed against each other when they conflict. 
One important aspect of reasonable pluralism is moral disagreement, insofar as it involves 
diversity in people’s conceptions of the good. For instance, some individuals will reason to 
the conclusion that consequentialist considerations are paramount and may typically resolve 
moral conflicts by appealing to something like the principle of utility. Others will be led to 
endorse a more deontological moral worldview, leading them to conceive a different account 
of what is of most value in life. Still others will refer to a traditional religious doctrine with 
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its own set of prescriptions and values to determine their conception of the good. Yet Rawls 
admits that as it is presented in A Theory of Justice, ‘justice as fairness’ represents a partially 
comprehensive doctrine of its own, and thus will not be endorsed by all reasonable citizens.204  
This is insofar as Theory of Justice invokes moral values and concepts beyond political justice, 
such as full autonomy, objectivity and moral justification. This, Rawls suggests, entails that 
his earlier project is not fully publicly justifiable, and presents difficulties in terms of both 
liberal legitimacy and, relatedly, stability. 
According to Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy: 
“Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which 
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse 
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason.”205     
This principle is one of Rawls’s chief normative assumptions and is derived from the idea 
inherent in the political culture of liberal democratic constitutional regimes that only the 
collective body of the public, conceived of as free and equal citizens, can justify the 
enforcement of state statutes.  Yet reasonable pluralism necessarily implies that no single 
comprehensive doctrine can be the object of consensus amongst reasonable people 
exercising freedom of thought. Thus, if we accept the liberal principle of legitimacy, then a 
society which is governed according to any particular comprehensive doctrine cannot 
legitimate the coercive power of the state. 
Rawls thereby agrees with the realist that a universal consensus on moral principles, even 
amongst those he classes as ‘reasonable’, is utopian. However, he is not willing to give up on 
the liberal principle of legitimacy and denigrates modus vivendi political settlements as “political 
in the wrong way”206.  Not only does such a solution infringe on the liberal principle of 
legitimacy, but Rawls deems it fundamentally unstable for the reason previously cited: it is 
ultimately hostage to the particular balance of power within a society.207  
Moreover, reasonable pluralism entails that any society which is governed according to any 
particular comprehensive doctrine will fail to win the support of each and every reasonable 
citizen by addressing their freely exercised reason. And if some reasonable individuals within 
such a society do not have internal reasons as to why they should obey the laws as they are 
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specified by the state, it remains fundamentally unstable. Internal reasons are those reasons 
which one identifies with as normatively significant in light of one’s own set of values. 
Without such internal reasons, an individuals’ compliance with the state will always be 
contingent on externally imposed sanctions. Now of course a state may attain a high level of 
a kind of stability without meeting the demand that all reasonable citizens freely support its 
governance. Nonetheless, for Rawls the problem of stability is not merely the practical matter 
of how to ensure that citizens comply with the statutes of the state, willingly or not. Instead, 
he wants to attain stability for the right reasons, whereby reasonable citizens are motivated to 
comply for internal reasons. So a society governed according to any particular comprehensive 
doctrine cannot be stable in the sense which Rawls regards as essential. Thus, Rawls sums up 
his project in Political Liberalism as addressing the following problem: “How is it possible that 
there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly 
divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”208 
Rawls’s solution to this problem is to propose a ‘freestanding’ liberal political conception of 
justice which is not derived from any particular comprehensive doctrine. Rather it aims to be 
as neutral as possible between controversial philosophical, religious and moral positions, and 
so can act as the focus of an ‘overlapping consensus’ on the most appropriate conception by 
which to regulate society. This does not represent a mere modus vivendi, as those who live 
under the political conception endorse it for internal reasons rather than grudgingly accepting 
it out of pragmatic considerations. For although it is a moral conception, it is one which is 
compatible with any reasonable comprehensive doctrine, and thus reasonable pluralism does 
not preclude reasonable citizens from endorsing it. This is because, rather than its 
fundamental ideas being derived from any particular comprehensive doctrine or conception 
of the good, they generated from the widely accepted values implicit within the public 
political culture of liberal democratic states. Moreover, a political conception of justice need 
only be endorsed by citizens as appropriately regulating the political sphere. It does not strive 
to provide answers to questions which go beyond this distinct subject matter, such as whether 
moral facts exist or what a flourishing life consists in; citizens are left to freely answer such 
questions on their own. Adherents of such diverse comprehensive doctrines as Catholicism, 
Utilitarianism and Kantian Liberalism can find moral reasons to affirm the liberal political 
conception from their own internal perspectives. It thus acts as a ‘module’ which can slot 
into any reasonable system of values and widely be regarded as the proper basis of societal 
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governance. Citizens widely recognise it as legitimately defining the scope of public reason in 
terms of limiting what can be publicly justified to others in the public political forum. We will 
return to the viability of this solution later.  
 
3. The Burdens of Judgement 
To take a step back:  why does Rawls conceive of reasonable pluralism as an inevitable 
consequence of maintaining freedom of thought? Because, he suggests, the theoretical and 
more significantly the practical reasoning of all reasonable individuals is subject to the 
‘burdens of judgement’.  These burdens represent constraints on our reasoning and lead us 
to reach different conclusions on matters relating to our comprehensive doctrines.  
Rawls proposes six burdens which I briefly name and summarise below, although he admits 
that this list is not exhaustive: 
Assessment of Evidence: The relevant evidence is often hard to assess. 
Difference in Weighting: Different people give different weight to different considerations.  
Conceptual Vagueness: Concepts are vague and in need of interpretation. 
Different Experiences: We are subject to different life experiences. 
Normative Conflict: Normative considerations sometimes conflict. 
Range of Values: There are multiple values, and societies must choose which to prioritise.209  
These factors are presented in a somewhat disjointed, piecemeal manner, which might leave 
the reader confused as to how they relate to each other or apply to individual cases of 
reasoning. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw out a coherent account of the burdens of 
judgement which hopefully clarifies how Rawls most plausibly conceives of them as leading 
to a reasonable diversity of both general comprehensive doctrines and more particular 
conceptions of the good. To illustrate this proposed reading I will demonstrate how the 
burdens can lead to reasonable disagreement over a particular moral issue – namely, whether 
or not it is morally permissible to consume meat and other animal products.   
When we are assessing the moral permissibility of consuming animal products the first thing 
which we might notice is that there are many distinct normative considerations which we 
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might take into account. On the one hand, there is the appreciation of the distinct 
gastronomic experiences which can only be achieved from eating meat and dairy products, 
and the supposed nutritional advantages of an omnivorous diet. On the other hand, we might 
conceive of animal rearing agricultural practices as involving the suffering of sentient beings, 
causing environmental damage and cultivating vicious character traits, such as brutality or 
merely a general insensitivity to the welfare of fellow creatures. Assuming that we accept that 
these are all legitimate candidates for normative considerations relevant to the issue, we can 
see that the two sets of competing concerns come into conflict. Whilst there may indeed be 
means of minimising such conflicts, in some cases trade-offs must be made.  For instance, 
we could potentially still gain the gastronomic pleasure we accrue from eating animal 
products to some extent whilst minimising the animal suffering and environmental impact 
associated with raising animals. Nonetheless, given the current state of agricultural 
technology, we could not do so without massively restricting our consumption of animal 
products and increasing their price. Hence, Normative Conflict applies in this and many other 
cases.210  
However this burden isn’t in itself a direct cause of disagreement. For although we might all 
recognise that normative considerations sometimes conflict, we might nonetheless agree on 
what trade-offs should be made between them when they do.  Rather, Normative Conflict 
represents a background factor concerning the ways in which normative considerations can 
interact with one another which sets the scene for reasonable moral disagreement. This is 
also the case with regard to Range of Values. As some have noted, the fact that societies are 
limited in the range of values which they can simultaneously realise presents reasonable 
people with the occasion for disagreement rather than causing it directly.211 
Yet when we take burdens of Assessment of Evidence, Difference in Weighting and Conceptual 
Vagueness into account, reasonable disagreement is to be expected over the issue under 
consideration. Assessment of Evidence entails that given the difficulty in assessing evidence 
reasonable individuals will often come to different conclusions regarding, for instance, how 
much negative environmental impact animal husbandry has, how much animals suffer from 
contemporary farming practices and the extent to which an omnivorous vs. a vegan diet is 
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pointing to this burden. To do so would be to incorporate a philosophically contentious position into part 
of his overall project, in a way that would undermine his aim of maintaining neutrality between 
reasonable worldviews. Recall from chapter 1 that I too commit myself only to descriptive value 
pluralism rather than normative/metaethical value pluralism. 
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beneficial to one’s health. So even if individuals were to agree on how much weight should 
be attributed to each normative consideration, they might nonetheless disagree on the facts 
which pertain to the considerations at stake and determine the stakes of the trade-off 
involved.   
As Difference in Weighting makes clear, however, reasonable individuals will come to different 
conclusions regarding the relative importance of the relevant considerations, even when there 
is agreement on which are in fact relevant to the issue at hand. For instance, some might take 
animal suffering to be an extremely important normative consideration. They might take it 
to easily outweigh what is in their eyes the relatively negligible concern that minimising it 
diminishes our capacity to enjoy the full range of eating experiences available to us. Yet others 
might take the opposite view. There is also the further difficulty that some will not even 
recognise the same sorts of considerations as being pertinent. For instance, one might come 
to the conclusion that animal suffering is not a legitimate normative consideration. Perhaps 
they might base this on the view that only the suffering of beings with certain psychological 
characteristics which non-human animals lack is morally salient.  
Conceptual Vagueness meanwhile highlights the further complicating factor that the concepts 
which we refer to when taking the considerations into account might themselves be subject 
to differing interpretations. For example, two individuals who are independently attempting 
to determine the extent to which raising animals necessitates animal suffering might come to 
very different conclusions because they are relying on different notions of what ‘suffering’ 
entails. One might take a thin conception of suffering which is constituted by directly painful 
experience, whilst another could employ a thicker conception which also includes being 
deprived of autonomy, companionship and access to a certain environment which promotes 
flourishing.  
Finally, Different Experiences suggests that people’s individual life experiences also contribute 
to reasonable disagreement. Rawls might be seen here to cite this as an additional independent 
factor which leads people to disagree, external to the burdens Assessment of Evidence, Difference 
in Weighting and Conceptual Vagueness. Yet it is not clear how one’s unique life experience could 
contribute to disagreement other than via influencing one’s weighting of values, 
interpretation of concepts and assessment of evidence. So to take a more charitable 
interpretation, it makes more sense to instead suppose that he is appealing to Different 
Experiences in order to help provide a partial explanation for Assessment of Evidence, Difference in 
Weighting and Conceptual Vagueness. The implicit claim seems to be that the reason that people 
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assess evidence differently, attribute different weights to different considerations and 
interpret concepts differently is partly due to their unique life experiences. To illustrate, one 
who has been brought up on a farm is likely to have different views concerning the 
permissibility of eating animal products than another who grew up in a strictly vegetarian 
commune. This is in virtue of the fact that they are subject to different life experiences which 
mould their values, concepts and the ways in which they interpret evidence relevant to the 
case.  
These are all intuitively plausible suggestions as to why it may be impossible to reach a 
consensus on issues such as whether or not we are morally obliged to be vegan, even amongst 
reasonable persons. In section 5 I will attempt to reinforce Rawls’s account by appealing to 
my proposed account of moral psychology. First, though, I will scrutinise Rawls’s contention 
that one criterion of reasonable people must be that they accept the burdens of judgement 
and the reasonable pluralism that it implies in order for the project of political liberalism to 
succeed. 
 
4. Rawls vs. Wenar on Reasonableness 
Thus far in my exposition of Rawls I have continually referred to ‘reasonableness’ without 
clearly explaining what is meant by such a term, and given that the notion plays a key role in 
Rawls’s schema, this must be addressed. In doing so, I will turn to Leif Wenar’s interpretation 
in his paper ‘Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique’, and go on to evaluate his claim that 
the burdens of judgement play an unnecessary and counterproductive role in Rawls’s overall 
argument. Responding to this charge will help me elucidate my contention that recognition 
of the burdens of judgement is a necessary prerequisite for being willing to forego proposing 
political terms based on reasons drawn purely from one’s own comprehensive doctrine. A 
willingness to make this concession undergirds the possibility of a stable society united under 
the banner of a liberal political conception of justice. Hence, my buttressing of the case for 
the burdens by appealing to moral psychology is important in verifying Rawls’s claim that we 
can realistically hope to eventually reach the overlapping consensus which he envisages.  
Wenar notes that “Justice as fairness proceeds through Political Liberalism to the soft rhythm 
of the reasonable”212 and goes on to cite over thirty different ways in which the term is 
deployed throughout the book. Indeed, in the previous section I have already referred to 
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reasonable pluralism, reasonable persons, reasonable comprehensive doctrines and 
reasonable disagreement.  To make sense of this diverse application of the word, Wenar 
suggests that it is most charitable to interpret Rawls as intending his proposed definition of 
‘reasonable persons’ as revealing the grounding concept of reasonableness, by reference to 
which we can derive an understanding of what is meant by the term in all its various guises.  
Wenar explains that Rawls takes reasonable persons to have each one of the following five 
attributes: 
“Reasonable persons: 
1. a) possess the two moral powers - the capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception 
of the good; b) Posses the intellectual powers of judgement, thought and inference; c) have 
a determinate conception of the good interpreted in the light of some comprehensive view; 
d) are able to be a normal, fully cooperating member of society over a complete life; 
2. are ready to propose and willingly abide by principles and standards that constitute fair 
terms of cooperation, on the condition that others will reciprocate; 
3. recognise the burdens of judgement; 
4. have a reasonable moral psychology; and 
5. recognise the five essential elements of a conception of objectivity.”213   
 
 The full details of these listed attributes need not concern us as yet – for now it is enough to 
note that they are characteristic of the reasonable in Political Liberalism, and as suggested, we 
should understand all its uses in relation to these characteristics. For instance a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine is a doctrine which someone who possesses these attributes could 
affirm and which does not deny that reasonable persons have these attributes. Meanwhile, 
reasonable disagreement is disagreement which occurs, or could occur, between reasonable 
people.214   
Whilst Wenar is sympathetic to Rawls’s overall project of developing an inclusive liberal 
political conception of justice that can garner widespread acceptance, he holds that it is 
problematic to insist upon such an expansive notion of the reasonable. Wenar argues that in 
incorporating the latter three items on the list in his conception of reasonableness, Rawls 
                                                          
213 Ibid, p.37 Note that criterion 4 might suggest circularity in Rawls’s definition of reasonableness. 
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is philosophically controversial, as it involves a non-Humean conception of desire. This aspect of Wenar’s 
critique of Rawls’s definition of reasonableness is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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goes beyond what justice as fairness requires as a political conception and risks saddling his 
project with some philosophically contentious and needlessly alienating commitments. In 
fact, Wenar claims, only the first two aspects of reasonableness are necessary in terms of 
achieving Rawls’s aims, and offers an alternative ‘limited presentation’ of justice of fairness 
which takes only these two as the defining features of reasonableness.  
I will not engage with the whole of Wenar’s case here, but concentrate on the more specific 
claim that building in recognition of the burdens of judgement as an aspect of reasonableness 
is unnecessary and counterproductive. As Wenar notes, Rawls affirms that recognition of the 
burdens of judgement serves the purpose of ensuring that reasonable persons will see the 
inappropriateness of proposing terms of co-operation which are grounded entirely in their 
own particular conception of the good, and be willing to limit themselves to appealing to 
public reason when engaging in public political discourse. Yet Wenar suggests that this cannot 
be the case, since he claims that the first and second criteria of reasonableness are enough to 
cement this condition. In particular, on his interpretation the capacity for a sense of justice 
along with the second criterion ensures that reasonable persons will only be willing to impose 
rules on others which could be endorsed by all, and believe it illegitimate to use political 
power to repress different comprehensive doctrines.  Thus, “There is nothing else here for 
the burdens of judgement to do, beyond what the limited conception of the reasonable 
person has already done.”215 
Rawls further suggests that recognition of the burdens of judgement helps convince people 
to accept liberal constitutional principles such as freedom of conscience. Nonetheless, Wenar 
contends that the existence of comprehensive doctrines which apparently reject the burdens 
of judgement, and yet endorse such principles, proves that such recognition is not necessary 
for doing so. He points to modern Roman Catholicism as an example of such a doctrine. 
Contemporary Vatican doctrine is emphatic in its commitment to the right of religious 
freedom. Yet, according to Wenar, along with many other common religious doctrines it 
roundly rejects an appeal to the burdens of judgement as an explanation of moral and 
religious disagreement. For whilst the burdens suggest that such disagreements often result 
merely from the shared difficulties we all face when engaging in reasoning, a religious faith 
such as Catholicism “characteristically presents itself as universally accessible to clear minds 
and open hearts.”216  For the religious believer, disagreement is instead to be explained in 
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terms of factors such as “...worldly temptation, demonic intervention, divine predestination 
and so on – forces within the horizons of the religious doctrine’s sure scheme of value and 
fact.’217   They thus deny the influence of the burdens of judgement and so fail to qualify as 
reasonable on Rawls’s terms.  
Of course, Wenar concedes, Rawls could simply respond that the fact that Catholicism and 
other religious beliefs might fail the test of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not 
compel him to moderate the requirements of reasonableness. He could simply admit that 
such religious doctrines and their adherents will remain unreasonable just so long as they 
remain committed to denying the burdens of judgement. After all, Rawls is for the most part 
working in the realm of ideal theory, not trying to avoid offending against every currently 
existing comprehensive doctrine’s sensibilities to get them on board with his political 
conception of justice.218  However this is problematic insofar as it excludes a large swathe of 
individuals who are nonetheless willing to tolerate those of other comprehensive doctrines 
and accept the liberal political conception of justice. A religious believer might well consider 
the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines that we encounter in contemporary society as 
unfortunate and avoidable. They might attribute it to such factors as selfishness, wilful 
ignorance or irrationality. Yet this is not to say that they would eagerly impose their own 
conception of the good on others, given half the chance. In fact such religious believers are 
often morally committed to standing against such an imposition, rather than merely 
recognising the practical impossibility of realising it. Merely their commitment does not 
depend upon the recognition of the burdens of judgement, or so Wenar claims. As such there 
is no relevant justification internal to Rawls’s project to deny them the status of reasonable 
persons. Further, even if political liberalism is primarily an exercise in ideal theory, there is a 
need to address the concern of the political realist that the project should ultimately be 
practically realisable. Insisting that those who reject the burdens of judgement are necessarily 
unreasonable can potentially present a problem for stability if it entails that a large proportion 
of people are alienated from the political conception as it is presented. This is a point which 
I will expand upon later. In any case, to summarise for now, Wenar not only claims that 
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218 Larry Krasnoff argues that despite highlighting it himself, Wenar doesn’t sufficiently address this 
point, and as a consequence his argument is deeply flawed. (See Krasnoff, L.‘Consensus, Stability and 
Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism’ The Journal of Philosophy, (1998) pp.279-280) This is a 
consequence of Krasnoff’s insistence that the practicality of developing an overlapping consensus is 
irrelevant to Rawls’s position, concerned as it is with political justification. In contrast, as will become 
clear throughout this chapter, I take such practicalities to be salient considerations, and thus do not 
think Wenar’s point can be dismissed on the grounds that it is of mere practical significance. 
CHAPTER 6 – IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
155 
 
recognition of the burdens of judgement is a redundant criterion for reasonableness, but that 
it is a requirement which is inimical to the general aim of keeping the political conception 
acceptable to as wide a range of worldviews as possible.  
In reply one could, in the first instance, contest this general characterisation of how religious 
believers who endorse freedom of conscience typically conceive of moral and religious 
disagreement. Whilst Wenar cites the tenet of papal infallibility and the work of various 
Catholic theologians in making his case that Catholicism is hostile to the burdens of 
judgement, this does not necessarily preclude the possibility that most adherents of the faith 
take a far less strident view. It doesn’t seem likely that the majority of vaguely liberal minded 
Catholics today would maintain, for instance, that a person born into a predominantly Hindu 
community refrains from accepting Catholicism only by virtue of their own irrationality, 
selfishness and/or weakness of will. Rather, they are apt to admit that such an individual’s 
failure to accept the truth of Catholicism is more likely to relate to her own individual life 
experience, being as it is more conducive to the acceptance of a Hindu comprehensive 
doctrine. Moreover, whilst Wenar suggests that he is appealing to Catholicism only as a 
representative example of all religious doctrines, it might be argued that most other religious 
worldviews found within liberal democratic societies are more receptive to the burdens of 
judgement than he gives credit for. For instance, adherents of moderate Protestantism, Islam 
and Judaism seem to accept that whilst those who have a conception of the good other than 
that proscribed by their comprehensive doctrines are wrong, they are not necessarily guilty 
of selfishness or irrationality. 
However this would not serve as an adequate defence against Wenar’s main point, which is 
that it is perfectly consistent in theory to reject the burdens of judgement whilst maintaining 
a commitment to liberal values for independent reasons. So, what I mean to show is that 
recognition of the burdens of judgement along with the first and second aspects of 
reasonableness is necessary to guarantee an attitude supportive of a liberal political 
conception of justice.219 This is on the grounds that the first two aspects of reasonableness 
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do not, in fact, rule out riding roughshod over those whose comprehensive doctrines we take 
to be necessarily irrational or immoral. The first and second aspects of reasonableness only 
commit individuals to refrain from proposing terms of cooperation which they take others 
to be reasonable in rejecting. If one takes someone to be necessarily unreasonable by virtue 
of them rejecting the terms that one favours, then it is entirely consistent for a reasonable 
person to refuse to see the need to publicly justify such terms to those who disagree with 
them. I thus contend that Rawls is correct to maintain that the burdens of judgement “are of 
first significance for a democratic idea of toleration.”220 
To elaborate, recall that the first criterion of reasonableness specifies that reasonable 
individuals have the capacity for a sense of justice. The second criterion meanwhile entails 
that reasonable citizens are ready to propose and willingly abide by principles and standards 
that constitute fair terms of cooperation on the condition that others will reciprocate. Wenar 
interprets these criteria alone as committing individuals to something like the liberal principle 
of legitimacy; he assumes that they ensure that those who are reasonable in his limited sense 
will not be willing to repress different comprehensive doctrines, and will propose only those 
terms of cooperation which others can be expected to endorse.  They are thus committed to 
ensuring the public justifiability of political arrangements.221 However, I take this to be 
interpreting the implications of the first and second criteria of reasonableness to be broader 
than is actually the case. For an individual having a capacity for a sense of justice and a desire 
to cooperate with others under fair terms does not necessarily entail that they will be reluctant 
to propose terms of cooperation that others might in fact reject. On the contrary, if one is 
convinced that those who might reject one’s favoured terms of cooperation are doing so 
because they are necessarily irrational, wilfully ignorant or motivated by the distorting 
influence of self or group interest, then one generally does not see the need for public 
endorsement. The implicit practices and values of liberal democratic political cultures do 
imply that it is a breach of justice and fairness to impose terms on citizens without due reason 
for discounting their dissent. However, insofar as people perceive their opponents as morally 
and/or epistemically unjustified in their disagreement, they generally do take themselves to 
be justified in ignoring them. For individuals take such a failure to endorse the terms drawn 
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from their own comprehensive doctrine to be an indication that their opponents are 
unreasonable and therefore beyond the need for public justification.  
To elaborate, when we morally disagree with one another it is often tempting to ascribe to 
our opponents the sort of debunking explanations discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 (such as 
wilful ignorance, irrationality and/or selfishness). For instance those who endorse left wing 
policies, such as market regulation and the redistribution of wealth, will often accuse those 
who oppose them of doing so because they are either greedy or in the grip of false 
consciousness. They may insist that their opponent’s typical appeal to economic theories 
which highlight the efficiency of free market practices is spurious, and borne out of a desire 
to maintain a status quo which is favourable to their class interests. Meanwhile, those on the 
political right will sometimes claim that left wingers are motivated by envy rather than social 
justice, and that the economic arguments against laissez faire capitalism are so obviously 
misguided that they can only be made by those who are either irrational or have been blinded 
by socialist ideology.  
The burdens of judgement suggest a more charitable potential interpretation of one’s 
opponent’s reasoning. Insofar as individuals are receptive to the possibility of this alternative 
explanation of their disagreements, they are more likely to accept that to ride roughshod over 
their opponent’s conception of the good is to fail to respect the need for public justifiability 
when it comes to political decision making. Note that this is not on the grounds that they 
come to see that they are unjustified in remaining firmly committed to their own conception 
of the good. As Rawls makes clear, reasonable persons can be convinced that they are 
unquestionably correct with regards to their comprehensive doctrine and conception of the 
good, even in the face of their recognition of the burdens of judgement.222 Although it is 
inevitable that individuals will typically take their opponents to be mistaken in coming to 
different conclusions, what is important is that they do not regard them as necessarily 
unreasonable. Individuals within democratic societies implicitly adopt the first and second 
criteria of reasonableness due to the widely shared background values and practices in the 
public political culture, and this leads to a perceived need for public justification. But people 
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are typically only apt to feel the need to provide a public justification to those whom they 
take to be reasonable, even if misguided.  
What the burdens of judgement do is convince people that those who they may otherwise 
take to be unreasonable in virtue of their disagreement are in fact not necessarily so. On the 
other hand, those who reject the burdens of judgement are likely to take themselves to be 
justified in proposing terms of cooperation deriving solely from their particular 
comprehensive doctrine that their opponents can’t accept. Since they take opponents to be 
exemplifying an uncooperative attitude in their rejection of such terms, they do not take the 
requirement of public justifiability to prohibit themselves from doing so. So, the path from 
the burdens of judgement to a commitment to the political conception runs through 
recognition that those who hold contrary comprehensive doctrines and associated 
conceptions of the good potentially do so for reasons which, from their own internal 
perspective, are genuinely moral and rationally justifiable. 
In sum, Wenar is wrong to assume that the first two criteria of reasonableness are enough to 
secure a commitment to the political conception of justice in all cases. Only the recognition 
of the burdens of judgement can ensure that those who share those values which Rawls takes 
to be implicit in liberal democratic public political cultures will be willing to exercise the 
necessary restraint to facilitate an overlapping consensus on the political conception.  
Nonetheless, there is a related point which threatens to undermine Rawls’s case for the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus. That is, despite recognition of the burdens of 
judgement being crucial for Rawls’s project to be feasible, in the real world many people 
simply do not always recognise the extent of their influence. Many who share liberal values 
and would otherwise meet the criteria of reasonableness simply reject the proposition that 
those whom they disagree with on certain issues are not necessarily doing so out of 
irrationality or self-interest. They might not actually reject the burdens wholesale – they could 
concede that in some instances they apply, but nevertheless hold that they do not allow for 
as much reasonable disagreement in certain areas as Rawls takes them to. For instance, whilst 
many individuals today would accept that general religious disagreement might stem from 
the burdens of judgement, people are typically less inclined to give a similar explanation for 
disagreement over particular moral issues, such as abortion or euthanasia. Given that people 
are so strongly invested in the moral judgements which they favour, it should not come as a 
shock that they are reluctant to attribute reasonableness to those who come to different 
conclusions. They will thus be motivated to reject the influence of the burdens in such cases.  
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In Rawls’s presentation the burdens of judgement are not especially well established, leaving 
us with little to say to such people. For the most part he simply asserts them as facts 
concerning the nature of reason that plausibly account for the pluralism which he takes to be 
inevitable under liberal institutions, as evidenced by its growth since the European 
reformation of the church. But as Wenar points out, Catholics could reasonably favour a very 
different interpretation of this historical story which does without the burdens as a factor in 
shaping pluralism, and instead emphasise human immorality or wilful ignorance in explaining 
it.223 Indeed, it is not only religious believers who have a conception of reasoning which is 
incompatible with Rawls’s account of reasonable pluralism. Many, if not most, agnostic and 
atheistic believers similarly account for the extent of the moral disagreement by citing the 
moral blindness or viciousness of those with whom they disagree rather than appealing to 
something like the burdens of judgement. If people continue to explain pluralism in this sort 
of way, then they will take public justifiability to have a relatively narrow scope, and thus 
remain unreasonable.  
An implication of this is that if we want Rawls’s project to be practically realisable, we need 
to present the burdens of judgement in a more convincing manner. Now one might argue 
that since, as has been previously suggested, Rawls is working within the remit of ideal theory, 
it still remains the case that nothing hinges on people actually recognising the burdens of 
judgement in his presentation of political liberalism. One might contend that what is or is not 
practically conducive to the establishment of an overlapping consensus on the political 
conception of justice is beside the point: all that matters is that it is realisable under certain 
idealised assumptions. Nonetheless Rawls himself is perfectly clear that the relative feasibility 
of his project actually being realised is of no small importance to him. He suggests that 
although he need not guarantee that we will, in fact, eventually achieve the sort of society 
legitimately and stably governed by the political conception of justice he imagines, it is not 
enough that he describes a mere conceptual possibility. Rather, it is incumbent on him to 
provide the grounds for a “reasonable faith in the possibility of a just constitutional 
regime.”224 Insofar as this is the case, and widespread recognition of the burdens of judgement 
gives us further grounds for such a hope, it is vital for the Rawlsian project to provide as 
compelling a case for them as possible.  
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5. The Import of the TEA model 
I now want to suggest that the case for the burdens of judgement as some of the major 
sources of moral disagreement can be improved by appealing to the TEA account of moral 
psychology which I argued for in Chapters 4 and 5. If such a psychologised account of the 
burdens of judgement can be made then this buttresses Rawls’s claims regarding the 
reasonableness of pluralism, and empirically vindicates what I have argued is a crucial element 
of his central thesis. Moreover, if this presentation of the burdens of judgement is more 
amenable to the wider population than Rawls’s rather abstract and contestable account, it has 
the potential to help persuade a wider range of individuals of reasonable pluralism. This, in 
turn, improves the chances of realising the conditions under which an overlapping consensus 
could develop and vindicates Rawls’s reasonable faith in his project being practicable.   
To summarise my argument of the later chapters: the available empirical evidence heavily 
implicates our affective tendencies in shaping our interpretation of moral concepts, what we 
morally value and to what extent. They are thus liable to be strong determinants of the details 
of our particular conceptions of the good.  
For instance, those with a strong disgust response are likely to interpret the concept of moral 
purity as involving refraining from certain sexual practices, and place greater normative 
weight on values relating to sexual purity than those with a weaker disgust response. 
Meanwhile, those with a stronger inequity aversion response are more likely to interpret 
justice as necessarily involving the redistribution of wealth, and weight equality higher than 
those without such an affective disposition. To the extent that this is the case, moral 
disagreement can be partially explained in terms of differences between the emotional 
dispositions of individuals. Furthermore such differences stem from both variations in the 
non-shared environmental influences that individuals are exposed to and genetic differences 
between individuals. 
What is the upshot of all this for Rawls’s account of the burdens of judgement? For one it 
vindicates his claim that people’s conception of the good will inevitably differ as a 
consequence of the uniqueness of their life experiences. Recall that I earlier suggested that, 
on my interpretation of Rawls, this burden is to be conceived as fundamental insofar as he 
intends it to explain the other burdens. One of the major reasons we will always differ over 
the proper weightings of values, our interpretations of concepts and assessments of the 
evidence is because the different influences that we’ve been exposed to lead us to do so. I 
have argued that non-shared environmental influences not only shape our concept 
CHAPTER 6 – IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
161 
 
acquisition and the way in which we assess evidence directly, but also the affective 
dispositions which indirectly make some concepts and assessments of evidence more 
psychologically appealing to us than others. Rawls’s contention that our unique life 
experiences contribute to moral disagreement thereby gains some credence. Environmental 
influences upon us do indeed play a strong role in determining our conception of the good, 
especially our interpretation of value concepts and the degree of normative weight that we 
assign to them.  
However the evidence which indicates the importance of genetic influences on our affective 
dispositions also suggests an additional way in which the burdens of judgement can be 
reinforced. It implicates another major factor which contributes to moral disagreement and 
which is both inevitable and does not stem from either irrationality or the distorting influence 
of self-interest on the part of agents. This is that it is simply the case that individuals who 
possess different genetic dispositions will tend to come to endorse different conceptions of 
the good. This is because the affective mechanisms which are partly shaped by such 
dispositions influence which values most strongly resonate with us.  
Insofar as this is the case, the TEA model of moral psychology which I propose lends extra 
weight to Rawls’s account. Those who are even minimally committed to certain liberal 
political values have good internal reasons to exercise restraint in terms of drawing on their 
own conception of the good when proposing political terms of cooperation. My account 
provides another reason to suppose that the conceptions of the good of those one morally 
disagrees with can sometimes be interpreted as both reasonable and internally rational, rather 
than necessarily stemming from either wilful ignorance or selfishness. It further vindicates 
the notion that enforcing a society-wide adherence to a particular conception of the good 
necessarily involves reneging on the liberal principle of legitimacy. Given the evidence, it is 
fair to suppose that the only kind of society wherein one could conceivably reach full 
consensus on a conception of the good whilst maintaining freedom of conscience would 
involve ensuring that the life experiences and genetic makeup of individuals would be utterly 
identical. Even if such a society were ever to be realisable in practice, it would necessitate 
such overwhelming control of the lives of individuals that only those with a complete 
disregard for liberal values would be willing to implement it. 
This reinforced, psychological account of the burdens of judgement thereby helps show that 
Rawls is right to highlight the possibility of reasonable disagreement with regard to 
conceptions of the good. Given my argument that the burdens of judgement are a crucial 
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element of Rawls’s scheme, this represents a bolstering of the overall argument for political 
liberalism. Moreover, my account has the advantage that it is not reliant on any abstract claims 
regarding the nature of reasoning itself, but is rather based upon empirical evidence regarding 
how our moral psychology operates. Rawls claims that one epistemic requirement of 
reasonable citizens is that they recognise the five essential elements of a conception of 
objectivity, and one of these involves drawing inferences and making judgements “on the 
basis of mutually recognised criteria and evidence”225. This being the case, an account of the 
source of reasonable disagreement backed up by empirical findings is less likely to prove 
controversial amongst those who might otherwise reject the current presentation of the 
burdens of judgement.  
Hence the TEA model could play an important role in fostering the conditions under which 
an overlapping consensus is possible. It has the potential to persuade the wider population 
that moral disagreement can be, and often is, the result of affective variation rather than those 
that they disagree with being necessarily unreasonable. Once people are convinced of this, 
they will realise that their own comprehensive doctrine is not necessarily publicly justifiable, 
and therefore cannot legitimately ground a political conception of justice.  
 
6. Plural Conceptions of Justice  
Despite my claim that appealing to my TEA model can help improve the prospects of 
developing an overlapping consensus, I now want to turn to a line of argument which might 
suggest the opposite conclusion. I have suggested that emphasising the role of affective 
variance as one of the major sources of moral disagreement can help reinforce the wider 
population’s commitment to a political conception of justice. However, one might claim that 
the very same evidence which justifies this emphasis might also imply that such a 
commitment will never be universally shared.  
Recall that Rawls believes that an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice 
is achievable in spite of the intractable diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines which 
the burdens of judgement imply, as a consequence of there being certain latent political values 
shared within liberal democratic societies. However, many commentators have noted that it 
is not clear that he is justified in claiming that supposedly widely shared values will be enough 
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to motivate people to put their non-political values to one side when engaging with fellow 
citizens in the public political forum.226    
For one thing, many otherwise reasonable people have strong moral commitments which 
conflict with what Rawls’s proposed conception of justice recommends. To take an oft 
discussed example, many Catholics subscribe to a conception of the good which maintains 
that abortion is morally equivalent to murder. Such a Catholic may accept that someone 
might, via the burdens of judgement, come to reasonably disagree with such a conclusion. 
Nonetheless, they might hold that the importance of preventing what they conceive of as 
murder is such that they would not be willing to forgo proposing terms which outlaw 
abortion. They could recognise that such a restriction might very well stand against the liberal 
principle of legitimacy and require riding roughshod over other liberal political values. 
Nonetheless, despite their acknowledgement that such concerns are important moral 
considerations, they could still hold them to be ultimately negotiable in the face of the non-
political values drawn from their particular conception of the good.   
Rawls insists that most people will take the political values of the conception of justice to be 
“very great values and hence not easily overridden.”227  He furthermore contends that many 
people in fact subscribe to only partially comprehensive doctrines, which encompass fewer 
non-political values and are more loosely articulated than fully comprehensive doctrines.228 
As a consequence, they will be more open to integrating those political values embedded 
within the shared, freestanding political conception into their deliberations over matters of 
basic justice. Thus potential conflicts of values will be minimised and people will be willing 
to accept that only political values should govern the political realm, despite some maintaining 
conceptions of the good which may seem to recommend different political arrangements. 
However, as Fabian Freyenhagen suggests, these are just not convincing enough reasons for 
us to refrain from worrying that some people simply will not be willing to forgo the social 
enforcement of their deepest held moral commitments.229  Insofar as the account of the 
influence of the burdens of judgement is reinforced by the TEA model, this seems even more 
                                                          
226 For a selection of commentators who present some variations on this claim, see Caney, S. ‘Anti-
perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism’ Political Studies Vol. 43, 2, (1995) pp. 248–264 Clarke, S 
‘Contractarianism, Liberal Neutrality and Epistemology’ Political Studies (1999) pp.627-642 Gaus, G 
‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political: How the Weaknesses of John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism can be Overcome by a Justificatory Liberalism’ Inquiry (2010) pp.259-284 
227 Rawls, J.  Political Liberalism, p.139 
228 Ibid, p.175 
229 See Freyenhagen, F. ‘Taking Reasonable Pluralism Seriously’ in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 
(2011) pp.327-334. 
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pressing a worry. For my account suggests that the manner in which one weighs distinct 
values against each other is partly dependent on one’s affective dispositions. And since such 
dispositions vary even amongst those who have been exposed to similar environmental 
influences, some of those who are brought up in a background liberal political culture might 
still attach great moral weight to considerations which conflict with liberal political values. 
Moreover, even if one concedes that our shared political values dramatically reduce the scope 
for reasonable disagreement concerning conceptions of justice, one might suggest that there 
is still room for the burdens of judgement to entail at least some such political disagreement. 
Most people within our own political communities do typically lend some weight to the values 
of freedom and equality, and regard them as the most salient within the political sphere. 
Nonetheless, they certainly do not agree on how these are to be interpreted and/or balanced 
against each other in instances where they conflict.  In fact, it seems that some of the most 
pressing disagreements which make setting the terms of cooperation difficult are precisely 
those concerning how we interpret and balance various political values.  
Rawls does hold that, initially, consensus can only be reached on the constitutional essentials 
of the liberal state and that a full blown overlapping consensus on a conception of justice is 
something which develops over time.230  Whilst we might not currently agree on the liberal 
political conception of justice, we at least all conceive all citizens as free and equal, which 
entails an implicit commitment to democracy and the liberal principle of legitimacy. This 
constitutional consensus represents a step towards the eventual consensus on the liberal 
political conception of justice. He also has faith that the way in which he models and unpacks 
the various moral conceptions and considered judgements to which the vast majority of 
people living in liberal democratic societies are implicitly tied leads us to much more 
convergence in our conceptions of justice than is presently the case. For instance, the thought 
experiment of the original position still plays a role in political liberalism by way of prompting 
us to model our widely shared yet vague political values of fairness, freedom and equality so 
that we may move to more determinate principles of justice.231 Finally, the political 
conception of justice is not meant to prescribe every statute of the state; only the way in 
which the ‘basic structure’ of society is governed. The political decisions that fall outside this 
remit are to be determined according to a democratic procedure guided by the requirements 
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of public reason. So, in Rawls’s schema, some reasonable political disagreement is accounted 
for and a means by which it can be legitimately resolved is offered.  
Nonetheless in his later work ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, Rawls comes to 
recognise that, although reasonable people can come to a consensus regarding the 
constitutional essentials, they may not actually come to a complete convergence on the 
particular conception of justice which he proposes. Rather, there exists a family of liberal 
political conceptions of justice which different people will hold to be more or less 
reasonable.232  The suggestion of a plurality of reasonable conceptions of justice does not 
trouble Rawls, however, on the basis that individuals need not recognise the conception of 
justice which governs the political realm as necessarily being the most reasonable. As long as 
they endorse it as reasonable to some extent, he holds that society can be stable for the right 
reasons (i.e. because citizens accept it on the basis of a moral rather than practical 
justification). This subtle move represents a weakening of the requirement of the liberal 
principle of legitimacy but is necessary given the clear potential for reasonable disagreement 
concerning political conceptions of justice.  
Yet even given this more modest ambition, my reinforcement of the burdens of judgement 
might imply that it is too much to hope for. For if the extent to which we take values to be 
normatively salient is largely dependent on our particular set of affective dispositions, then 
whether we can be expected to endorse the sacrifice of non-political values in the name of 
political values as reasonable depends on our emotional repertoire. Of course, insofar as we 
find his arguments convincing, Rawls’s modelling of our supposedly implicit moral 
conceptions can help push us in a generally liberal direction. And living in a liberal democratic 
society might not only typically inculcate us with certain political values but also cultivate the 
affective bases which underpin them, insofar as our affective dispositions are malleable in the 
face of cultural influences. However, since some of the major determinants of such 
dispositions are genetic and non-shared environmental influences, which are variable across 
individuals and beyond the reach of our general social environment, we can expect this 
willingness to endorse the priority of political values to similarly vary regardless of how 
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Rawls concedes that there will be some variation within the range of liberal conceptions of justice, to 
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society is structured. Therefore there is reason to be pessimistic at the prospect of a 
universally endorsed overlapping consensus on even a range of liberal conceptions of justice. 
On the one hand this might be thought not to be a great problem for Rawls, for he portrays 
individuals who are willing to let their own non-political values take precedence when 
proposing terms of cooperation with others as, by definition, unreasonable. And political 
liberalism does not hold that an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice 
must include those who are unreasonable in order to be legitimately realised – that aim would 
surely be utopian. However despite this being the case, the account of moral psychology 
which I have highlighted does suggest that a certain proportion of such ‘unreasonable’ 
persons are likely to persist, and, at the least, their coercion cannot be justified on the grounds 
that they are necessarily blameworthy of blatant epistemic failings or self-interest. Rather, 
their reluctance to refrain from imposing their particular conception of the good on others 
could result from their possessing an emotional makeup which causes certain non-political 
values to resonate with them particularly strongly, whilst the widely shared political values 
lack such affective resonance. This leads them to evaluate the former as more normatively 
significant than the latter. Again, one could yet insist that this doesn’t present a problem for 
the legitimacy of a political conception of justice. Even if their failure to be reasonable can’t 
be regarded as obviously epistemically or morally blameworthy from a non-comprehensive 
standpoint, their coercion may be justified insofar as it would otherwise be impossible to 
legitimate any form of state. Nonetheless, even if one takes this line, the prospect of a society 
in which a proportion of people will never have internal moral reasons to accept the political 
conception of justice presents a lingering problem for the kind of legitimate stability Rawls 
wants. 
 
7. Rawlsian Realism 
It is for this reason that I hold that something needs to be said to those individuals that Rawls 
takes to be unreasonable in order for a liberal state to be stable. Doing without a justificatory 
story to offer the unreasonable person arguably infringes upon even a weakened liberal 
principle of legitimacy, given that we cannot explain their unreasonableness in terms of self-
interest or epistemic failings, and more importantly, neglecting to do so might also prompt 
them to undermine the stability of a liberal state. I suggest that Rawlsians must at this point 
borrow from political realism in order to plug this justificatory hole and that my reinforced 
account of the burdens of judgement helps in doing so. Recall that realists take the stubborn 
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fact of moral and political disagreement to ultimately undercut the possibility of ever realising 
the liberal hope for a society where all citizens willingly consent to a particular political 
authority. Instead, they argue, we must appeal to the importance of maintaining peace and 
security in order for the state to gain the assent of its citizens. For the realist a political 
authority attains legitimacy as long as it achieves these goals whilst also managing to manage 
an effective compromise, a modus vivendi, between the various conflicting political ends of its 
citizens. In the background context of western democracies, this compromise will typically 
take a liberal form, and most people will accept it for internal reasons, even if they do not 
take it to be ideal. 
But a minority of individuals will yet possess a set of affective dispositions which lead them 
to denigrate the importance of liberal values; what leads them to assent to the political 
authority? Well, so long as they accept my reinforced account of the burdens of judgement, 
then they are in a good position to recognise that attempting to impose their own conception 
of the good on others would inevitably lead to conflict and instability. For even if someone 
regards it as permissible to violate the liberal principle of legitimacy, they might nonetheless 
come to see that permitting the enforcement of particular conceptions of the good would 
come at the price of a perpetual war between those who hold rival conceptions. Despite the 
individual’s judgement that, all other things being equal, they would be willing to dominate 
dissenters, their recognition of perpetual disagreement could convince them that given the 
impracticalities of doing so they should be willing to sign up to a mutual agreement not to do 
so.   
Rawls himself would not, of course, be satisfied with individuals employing this sort of 
rationale in order to concede to the political conception of justice, given his explicit statement 
that “No one accepts the political conception driven by political compromise”233  and 
aforementioned disdain for modus vivendi style arrangements as ultimately unstable. Yet whilst 
it is true that it would not fully deliver the idealised sort of stability which Rawls is aiming 
for, as previously mentioned, he has already watered down his ambitions on this score by 
admitting that not all reasonable citizens will converge on the same liberal political conception 
of justice. What matters is not that individuals all enthusiastically endorse the same political 
conception of justice for purely internal reasons, which, as even Rawls eventually admitted, 
is impossible. Instead, we should settle for achieving the more realistic goal of ensuring that 
as many as possible have a strong enough mixture of both internal and pragmatic reasons to 
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not actively oppose the political conception. For this is the most pressing manner in which 
stability could be threatened.234  
However, to the extent that people widely accept my reinforced account of the burdens of 
judgement, this latter worry will not be as serious as might once have been thought. For 
whilst the balance of power between those holding competing conceptions of the good might 
indeed fluctuate, people have good reason to believe that others will always dissent from their 
own conception. This is especially the context of the large scale societies of modern liberal 
democracies: the more individuals there are within a society, the more likely that a wide range 
of conceptions of the good will inevitably gather a sizable number of adherents. In fact, there 
is also the probability of there being some outliers who reject the prevailing conception of 
the good even within relatively homogeneous, small scale societies. As noted above, the only 
way to guarantee that people would all converge on their own preferred conception of the 
good would be through a combination of genetic manipulation and strict regulation of the 
environmental influences individuals are exposed to. Such measures are not merely taken as 
morally abhorrent by the vast majority of people in our current cultural context, but are also, 
importantly, practically impossible to implement. Thus even those who would be willing to 
sacrifice almost anything in the name of universal convergence on their conception of the 
good would have to recognise that their ambitions are simply not feasible, given what we can 
discern from the moral psychological evidence. As such, they have good pragmatic reason to 
adopt the Rawlsian attitude, and rely only on shared political values when proposing terms 
of cooperation, in order to avoid a perpetual struggle with those who will always 
fundamentally disagree with them.  
All of this is not to say that we can be secure in the knowledge that unreasonable people will, 
in fact, refrain from trying to realise their own conception of the good through political 
means. Some unreasonable individuals might outright reject my psychologised account of the 
burdens of judgement, or else deny that the pragmatic benefits of maintaining peace and 
security in the face of perpetual conflict are enough reason to give up on their political 
ambitions. And there will always be fanatics who will stop at nothing to attempt to enforce 
their own values, even in the knowledge that such attempts are ultimately futile. However 
there is little we can do here in terms of offering such individuals a cast-iron case for not 
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doing so. At this point, all we can do is “contain them so that they do not undermine the 
unity and justice of society"235, as Rawls suggests we can legitimately do with all those whom 
he identifies as unreasonable. Given that my stance provides us with at least something to 
say to such individuals, we can at least be more confident that we have retained an added 
layer of legitimacy, and be more hopeful that the number who reject the justification we offer 
will be small enough so as not to threaten the stability of a liberal state.   
In sum, my reinforced account of the burdens of judgement suggests that a liberal society 
will always produce a minority who will weight certain non-political values highly, to the point 
that they will prioritise them over the liberal values of the political conception of justice when 
such values conflict. Such individuals may be deemed unreasonable by the likes of Rawls, but 
their very existence could threaten the stability of political liberalism. However, to deal with 
this problem, we can incorporate the realist strategy of acquiring stability through appealing 
to such citizens for their assent via the pragmatic necessity of compromise. Moreover, my 
reinforced account of the burdens of judgement strengthens the case for such compromise 
in fact being necessary, which means that more can be persuaded away from undermining 
liberalism for pragmatic reasons.  
So even if it turns out that Rawls was too optimistic to hope for a society where almost all 
individuals were reasonable on his terms, we might nonetheless have a basis to hope to 
develop a relatively stable society governed by a liberal political conception of justice. Most 
members of this society would endorse the political authority for internal reasons, whereas 
others will assent to it based on an appreciation of the fact that we simply can’t attain 
widespread agreement on anything more substantive. Whilst many might mourn the fact that 
we cannot find a better solution to the political problem of irrevocable moral disagreement, 
if they accept my proposed explanation of it as inevitable and potentially reasonable, they will 
simultaneously be forced to concede that a political liberalism with a realist slant is the most 
we can realistically hope for. In Rawls’s own words, “We strive for the best we can attain 
within the scope the world allows.”236 
  
                                                          
235 Rawls, J. Political Liberalism, xvi-xvii 
236 Ibid, p.88 
CHAPTER 6 – IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
170 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to apply the implications of my proposed TEA model of 
moral psychology to liberal political theory. In doing so, I have moved from a purely 
descriptive endeavour towards normative enquiry. At first blush, this might appear 
controversial. The recent development of empirically informed moral psychology has ignited 
fierce debate within ethical theory. Whilst some have contended that this new understanding 
of moral psychology should help shape our values, others have remained stalwart in their 
resistance to the influence of the research program on our normative principles. The latter 
camp often cite Hume’s law and the naturalistic fallacy in defence of their position: we cannot 
directly derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, and this equally holds with regard to those facts 
concerning the psychological mechanisms which facilitate moral judgement itself.  
However descriptive truths always influence our normative practices – our knowledge of 
them is crucial when we are concerned with how to instrumentally realise those moral values 
which we already hold dear.  This in no way offends against Hume’s law, which specifically 
states that only direct moves from an ‘is’ premise to an ‘ought’ premise are fallacious. Moving 
from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ indirectly via an intermediate ethical principle which the ‘is’ pertains 
to is not debarred.  
When it comes to deciding how we should live together, moreover, facts regarding the 
motivations and behaviour of humans, and the extent to which they can be directed, become 
particularly salient. Determining whether a society run according to any proposed set of terms 
of cooperation will in actuality instantiate the values we desire to bring about or not depends 
upon what we think about how humans are, or have the potential to be. It is for this reason 
that some psychologists and biologists who have studied human nature from an ostensibly 
descriptive standpoint have unwittingly provoked intense ideological controversy.237 Given 
that our moral values are such an important component in shaping our motivation and 
behaviour, then, facts concerning how people come to have these values, and the extent to 
which we can come to share them or not, become extremely relevant.  
Here, I have demonstrated one way in which my TEA model can have important implications 
for a particular type of political theory. I have argued against Wenar that recognition of the 
burdens of judgement is in fact a necessary criterion for signing up to an overlapping 
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consensus on a liberal political conception of justice. Furthermore, the TEA model of moral 
psychology for which I have previously argued can help buttress Rawls’s case for the burdens 
of judgement as an explanation of moral disagreement as reasonable. Since Rawls’s current 
case for the burdens is inadequate, persuading individuals of the TEA model is a fruitful path 
towards creating the sort of conditions under which political liberalism could be realisable. 
Whilst this same model might also suggest that a certain proportion of people will always be 
unreasonable from a Rawlsian perspective, such people can nonetheless be convinced to 
refrain from attempting to politically enforce their own conception of the good on pragmatic 
grounds. The TEA model of moral psychology may therefore spell out the need to take a leaf 
from the political realist’s book and subscribe to a principle of legitimacy which is not quite 
as demanding as liberalism traditionally requires. Yet doing so allows us to have reasonable 
faith in the possibility of attaining a stable society, regulated by a liberal conception of justice, 
which we can conceive of as legitimate.   
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The overall argument of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, some moral disagreement both within 
and between cultural groups is fundamental, and that this stems from individuals sharing 
similar values that have distinct moral force, and yet differing in the relative normative weight 
that they assign to each. This, along with independent empirical evidence, indicates that my 
proposed Two-stage Enculturated Affect (TEA) model is the most plausible model of moral 
psychology. In turn, this model predicts that fundamental moral disagreement is ineliminable, 
due to individuals being subject to different environmental and innate psychological 
influences which determine how much weight they assign to values. Finally, these conclusions 
regarding moral disagreement can inform liberal political theory – in particular, it underscores 
the necessity for political liberalism to shift in a more realist direction.  
In Chapter 1, I argued that the phenomenology of moral conflict lends credence to 
descriptive value pluralism. I held that when people are faced with situations of moral conflict 
where two or more competing values are at stake, they are often able to judge one resolution 
to be all-things-considered best. Nonetheless, I further suggested that their judgements will 
leave them with an unnerving sense of moral loss, which Steve De Wijze captures in his 
articulation of the experience of tragic remorse, and which they take to be an appropriate 
response. This, I argued, implies that individuals implicitly take a range of values to have 
distinct normative force, which can only be partly commensurated.  
In light of this, a potential interpretation of moral disagreement is of it stemming from 
individuals weighting values differently, and thus coming to different all-things-considered 
resolutions when they conflict. Chapter 2 made the case for such fundamental moral 
disagreement existing between members of distinct cultural groups. In doing so, I discussed 
a range of anthropological examples of moral disagreement and highlighted the extent to 
which distinct groups often share similar values, but nonetheless differ in how much 
consideration they pay to each. I described various ‘defusing explanations’ which have been 
proposed that conceive such disagreements as apparent rather than fundamental. These 
defusing explanations, I argued, may be plausible in some cases, but cannot account for the 
whole range of intercultural moral disagreements which we encounter. In particular, I 
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considered Doris and Plakias’s recent presentation of cases which seem resistant to defusing 
explanations, and build upon their argument.  
Chapter 3 continued with the theme of substantiating fundamental moral disagreement, but 
focused on the claim that it also occurs between members of the same cultural group, 
including relatively narrowly delineated groups. I discussed preliminary reasons why we 
should conceive of the sort of moral disagreements encountered within our broad societal 
cultural group as fundamental, citing studies which suggest that such disagreements typically 
stem from differences in value weighting rather than non-moral disagreement. Further citing 
instances of moral disagreement within more narrowly defined groups, in particular, between 
peer groups and between professional ethical theorists, I argued that we also have good 
reason to sometimes take moral disagreement emerging in these groups as fundamental.  
Chapter 4 started by offering an overview of Shaun Nichols’ and Jonathan Haidt’s accounts 
of moral judgement and the cultural construction of moral norms. I argued that both were 
incomplete and each needed to be modified. I articulated Nichols’ ‘sentimental rules’ account 
of the precise link between affect and moral judgement, along with his ‘affective resonance’ 
hypothesis, which concerns the role of affective dispositions in shaping the cultural evolution 
of moral norms. Finding Nichols’ work promising but incomplete, I moved on to discuss 
Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory, which I found to offer explanatory advantages over 
Nichols’, yet again suffer from certain deficiencies. In light of this, I proposed my own TEA 
model, which combines the best insights from each theory and adds additional elements to 
offer a more complete explanation of moral psychology.  It was claimed that, in the first 
stage, although our emotional dispositions are malleable in the face of cultural influences, our 
evolved, innate emotional learning biases help shape (but not determine) the moral values 
which are culturally constructed in communities. In the second stage, the moral values 
constructed within a particular community go on to influence the cultural evolution of moral 
norms. 
Chapter 5, meanwhile, demonstrated how this model has more explanatory power with 
regards to the phenomenology of moral conflict and the incidence of fundamental moral 
disagreement when contrasted with competing accounts. I introduced two competing 
accounts of moral psychology: Jesse Prinz’s Emotional Constructivism, which is less nativist 
than my own TEA model, and John Mikhail’s Universal Moral Grammar, which is more 
nativist. After critiquing each as less well supported by empirical evidence than the TEA 
model, I compared them each in terms of their capacity to explain moral conflict, and the 
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pattern of intercultural and intracultural moral disagreement. I argued that while Emotional 
Constructivism could potentially explain the phenomenology of moral conflict, it fared less 
well than the TEA model in terms of explaining why distinct cultural groups often share 
values, and why individuals within the same group often morally disagree. Meanwhile, 
Universal Moral Grammar can explain the similarity in moral values across cultural groups, 
yet struggles to explain the phenomenology of moral conflict as well as inter and intracultural 
moral disagreement. 
Finally, Chapter 6 unpacked the implications that the TEA model’s explanation of 
fundamental moral disagreement has for liberal political theory. In light of the problem that 
ineliminable moral disagreement might raise for liberalism, I first discussed the possibility of 
turning to political realism as an alternative form of political theory which takes account of 
disagreement. I next articulated one prominent version of liberalism that takes moral 
disagreement amongst reasonable individuals as an important part of its justification; John 
Rawls’ political liberalism. I argued against Leif Wenar that recognition on the part of the 
populace that moral disagreement can be reasonable, via the burdens of judgement, is indeed 
an important precondition if political liberalism is to work. I claimed that, nonetheless, Rawls 
does not do enough to convince us that moral disagreement is indeed reasonable. On the 
other hand, my TEA model can reinforce the burdens of judgement, and thus strengthen 
Rawls’s overall argument. Finally, I claimed that this improved account of the burdens of 
judgement might imply that a minority of individuals would always have values which would 
lead them to be unreasonable, and that political liberalism thereby needs to move in the 
direction of political realism if it is to be both practicable and legitimate. 
Throughout the course of this thesis, I have made several distinct contributions to our 
understanding of moral disagreement, its origins and implications. In chapter 1, I have 
described the often overlooked phenomenology of moral conflict, and utilised this to claim 
that individuals engage in moral deliberation in an implicitly value-pluralistic manner. As I 
noted, moral philosophers such as Berlin and Williams have argued from moral conflict to 
normative value pluralism before. However, my argument here is original insofar as it draws 
on the way moral conflict is experienced by agents in order to sketch a purely descriptive 
account of pluralism. Whilst the case for fundamental moral disagreement between cultural 
groups has been made before, chapter 2 brought new considerations to bear and defended 
Doris and Plakias’s argument from various objections.  Moreover, it applied the account of 
moral deliberation from the first chapter in order to offer some original insight as to what 
exactly is going on when moral disagreement turns out to be fundamental. Chapter 3, 
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meanwhile, continued to draw upon my account of moral deliberation to discuss a topic 
which has been seldom touched upon before – intracultural moral disagreement – and 
offered novel reasons for taking it to also be fundamental. In Chapter 4 I offered innovative 
critiques of Nichols’ and Haidt’s accounts of moral psychology and fused the best elements 
of both together, along with some additions, in order to produce my own TEA model of 
moral psychology. Chapter 5 offered further critiques of other competing models of moral 
psychology and furthermore demonstrated the superiority of the TEA model to such models 
in an innovative way: by testing their capacity to explain the phenomenology of moral conflict 
and fundamental moral disagreement as I conceive of it. Finally, in Chapter 6 I applied my 
TEA model to liberal political theory, and unpacked the implications that it has for the 
plausibility of Rawlsian political liberalism.  
There are certain areas of philosophical interest where the research of this thesis could be 
applied further. In particular, my work may have important implications for ethical and 
metaethical theory. I will now note just some examples of areas in ethics and metaethics 
where my research could be fruitfully applied. 
In chapter 1, I hinted that my argument for descriptive value pluralism might render value 
monist ethical theories such as utilitarianism and Kantian deontology implausible. However, 
I did not follow this line of thought, and instead concentrated merely on the descriptive 
psychological implications. Yet if my account of a value pluralistic moral phenomenology, 
underpinned by the TEA model of moral psychology, is indeed descriptively accurate, then 
one might indeed develop a critique of monistic normative theories on the basis of their 
incongruence with our moral psychology. As I mentioned, most would agree that our 
pretheoretical intuitions have at least some weight when we are attempting to formulate moral 
theory. An acceptance of this, when combined with descriptive value pluralism, might help 
make a case in favour of normative value pluralism.  
On the other hand, one might argue that if my proposed TEA model of moral psychology 
holds, then we should instead reject moral intuitions as legitimate sources of moral 
knowledge. The neuroscientist Joshua Greene has argued that insofar as our moral intuitions 
are to a large extent a product of affect rather than more cognitive processes, they are not to 
be trusted.238 Others have claimed that those moral intuitions which we take to be shaped by 
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evolutionary forces can be ‘debunked’, since evolution is likely to select for beliefs which 
prove adaptive rather than those which are true and the two do not necessarily go hand in 
hand.239 Stronger versions of this argument hold that since all moral thinking has been 
contaminated by evolutionary influence, no moral judgement can be verified and we should 
ultimately be moral sceptics.240 Since the TEA model holds that our moral intuitions are 
indeed the result of affect, which in turn is a product of evolution, my work here could help 
reinforce the empirical assumptions behind such arguments.  
Moreover, as I noted briefly in the introduction and chapter 2, moral disagreement is often 
stressed by moral anti-realists and relativists whilst being dismissed as merely apparent by 
moral realists. Thus, my own analysis could also have important implications for metaethics. 
As Doris and Plakias note in their article, although some realists claim to be able to make 
room for fundamental moral disagreement, it is not clear that they can do so whilst remaining 
consistent.241  Insofar as my model strengthens the case for moral disagreement and ultimately 
attributes it to differences in affective dispositions, this might increase the pressure on moral 
realists. At the very least, simultaneously affirming both moral realism and the correctness of 
my TEA model would seem to suggest that our ability to intuit moral truth is down to factors 
beyond our control. Only those who were blessed with a certain set of genetic predispositions 
and exposed to a certain range of environmental influences would weight values in such a 
manner which is congruent with the supposed external moral truth. Of course some realists 
are happy to admit that only a minority of moral experts are directly privy to the moral truth. 
However, given that there would be no principled and independent manner of determining 
who these experts are, this wouldn’t bode well for our chances of attaining what realists think 
of as genuine moral knowledge. 
In addition to these further applications of my research, there are also ways in which my 
argument could be developed further. Firstly, in chapter 1 my claims regarding the 
phenomenology of moral conflict may be restricted to individuals from within western 
cultural groups. For the presumption that individuals do in fact experience tragic remorse in 
the manner that De Wijze argues, and regard the response as appropriate, is based on a 
combination of anecdotal evidence and examples from western cultural narratives which 
feature moral conflicts. This may be enough to establish the response as typical within 
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western cultural groups, but things may be different in other societies. Given the extent of 
intercultural moral variation, which I have explored elsewhere in my thesis, we should be 
wary about generalising too much from the way that individuals from cultural groups defined 
broadly respond to moral conflicts.242 Nonetheless, my case would be more complete if I 
could point to some stronger evidence. In light of this, it would be useful to conduct a cross-
cultural survey which tested for whether individuals experienced tragic remorse and regarded 
it as appropriate within all cultural groups.  
Secondly, the evidence for intracultural disagreement that I cited in chapter 3 could be 
bolstered. There, I pointed to moral judgement surveys as a source of evidence for 
fundamental moral disagreement existing within cultures, and cited a few examples which 
demonstrated fundamental disagreement amongst individuals from similar cultural 
backgrounds. However, I also raised the possibility of conducting a meta-analysis of such 
surveys in order to find stronger evidence for this.  Another means of gathering more 
evidence would be to conduct a new moral judgement survey which specifically aimed to 
sample respondents who had been exposed to extremely similar cultural influences and test 
the extent of disagreement amongst them.  
Thirdly, my proposed TEA model would benefit from being spelt out in more detail. I 
contend that my account is an advancement over that of both Haidt’s and Nichols’, insofar 
as it provides a more detailed picture of in what sense and to what extent innate affective 
dispositions are culturally malleable, and how these interact with norms and values. 
Nonetheless there are still areas of the account which remain underdeveloped. For instance, 
more could be said regarding how exactly the cultivation and moralisation of innate affective 
tendencies works, and how the innate dispositions of individuals interact with cultural 
influences in a manner which leads to intracultural moral disagreement. Moreover, my 
articulation of the TEA model does not address why, exactly, different cultural groups 
selectively cultivate and moralise affective tendencies to different patterns in the first place. 
One possibility is that this is due to interactions with other innate dispositions which shape 
cultural evolution, such as prestige-bias. This could lead cultural groups to enculturate its 
individuals to develop and moralise affective tendencies more in line with those its high status 
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members are innately disposed towards. There is not yet enough evidence available to 
determine if this is in fact the case, but this and many other questions could be addressed in 
a more developed articulation of the TEA model. 
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